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Abstract 
No existing finance literature focuses on the predictability of average 
stock return in the tourism industry, although it is increasingly recognized 
as an important economy. This study examines the performance of 
tourism stocks in the U.S. from 1990 to 2000. 
This study adopts an integrated viewpoint that includes the most critical 
explanatory variables to try to find the determinants of the contrarian or 
momentum profits of the tourism industry and the overall market. The 
study finds that the magnitude and persistence of future returns of tourism 
stocks can be predicted based on past returns, past earning surprises, 
trading volume, firm size, and holding period. However, when 
considering transactions costs and risk premium, it may not be profitable 
to establish intermediate-term momentum strategies or long-term 
contrarian strategies. 
The evidence of the study tends to support price overreaction and the 
correction hypothesis, and is clearly inconsistent with the risk-based 
hypothesis and the underreaction hypothesis. The study also confirms the 
earning underreaction hypothesis. In addition, the evidence of this thesis 
strongly confirms that short-horizon contrarian profits are partially due to 
lead-lag effects. 
The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that tourism price 
momentum profits in the intermediate-term are partially due to the big 
firms' overreaction to past price. Also found the high volume stocks tend 
to earn high momentum profits in the intermediate-term. The oversupply 
of tourism firms, particularly big firms, in prosperity increase the 
volatility of stock returns and give rise to serious financial problems in 
subsequent error correction periods. The study suggests that a 
conservative growth strategy accompanied by an internal-oriented 
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Chapter 1： Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis is a study of the stock performance and predictability focused 
on the tourism industry. A general view related to the study is presented in 
this section. 
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is one of the most important concepts 
in modern finance research. Shleifer and Summers (1990) say: "If the 
efficient markets hypothesis was a publicly traded security, its price 
would be enormously volatile." There is abundant theoretical and 
empirical evidence supporting the EMH, and at the same time there is 
other literature, particularly recent literature, rejecting this hypothesis. 
Many early studies support the EMH, for instance, Samuelson (1965) 
documents that stock prices should follow a random walk if rational 
competitive investors require a fixed rate of return. Fama (1965) finds that 
stock prices were indeed close to a random walk statistically, and so do 
other researchers (e.g. Fama and French, 1993, 1995) since Fama. 
Michael Jensen (1978) writes that: "The efficient markets hypothesis is 
the best established fact in all of social sciences." 
However, since the 1980's there have been more evidence contradicting 
the random walk hypothesis and EMH. Shiller (1981) and Leroy and 
Porter (1981) both use the volatility test to show that the price volatility in 
the stock market is not well explained by the changes in dividends. The 
phenomena suggest that something other than the fundamentals affect the 
stock price. The empirical studies on earnings announcements also do not 
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support the semi-strong form of EMH，which predicts that prices will 
reflect any public information in very brief durations (e.g. several 
minutes). The publication of Ball and Brown (1968) illustrates that the 
abnormal rate of return upwards (downwards) drifts begin at least 12 
months before a good (bad) earning announcement is released and 
continues for approximately one month after the day of announcement. 
The study of Beaver, Clarke, and Wright (1979) strengthens the finding of 
Ball and Brown (1968). 
Among the evidence contradicting EMH, numerous recent studies 
document patterns of the predictability of average stock returns; many 
finance papers have reported the relationship between stock returns and 
past firm performance data in a different horizon. 
In short-horizon, for example, the tests of Lo and Mackinlay (1988) find 
that weekly portfolio returns have large positive autocorrelations and 
strongly reject the random walk hypothesis; Lehmann (1990) and Conrad, 
Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) report significant negative autocorrelations 
in the returns of individual securities. Jegadeesh (1990) find short-term 
return reversals at monthly and weekly intervals and put forward the stock 
market overreaction hypothesis. Lehmann (1990) put forward the 
"contrarian trading strategy" of individual securities; selling the securities 
that have performed well and buying the securities that have performed 
poorly will earn positive profits. This evidences suggest that past price 
data contain important information for forecasting future stock returns. 
Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), Blume, Easley, and O'Hara 
(1994), and Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) report that there is strong 
evidence of a relation between trading activity information and 
subsequent weekly returns of individual securities. One important 
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conclusion of these studies is that high-transaction securities experience 
price reversals, while the returns of low-transaction securities are 
positively autocovarying. 
From the long-horizon economic data, DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) 
found a reversal in long-term returns, that is stocks with low long-term 
past returns tend to outperform long-term winners over the subsequent 
three to five years. Poterba and Summers (1988) find that there is a mean 
reversion in the stock returns in long horizon, though their methodology, 
such as overlapping samples, was subject to criticism. Fama and French 
(1988) also report evidence of the long predictability of stock returns; they 
found that a slowly mean-reverting component of stock prices tend to 
induce negative autocorrelation in returns; based on the tests for the 1926 
to 1985 period, the autocorrelation is weak for the daily and weekly 
holding periods common in market efficiency tests but stronger for three 
to five year long-horizon returns of portfolios of small firms. 
In the intermediate time horizon, the empirical puzzle is not return 
reversal but return continuation. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) add new 
evidence to the literature in researching the predictability of stock returns 
based on past returns. They document an intermediate-horizon with three 
to twelve months of "momentum" in stock prices, that is, past winners on 
average continues to outperform past losers. The result is supported by 
the tests of Rouwenhorst (1998), who obtains very similar results in a 
sample of 12 European countries over the period from 1980 to 1995. 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) put forward the concept of an 
"earning momentum" strategy to refer to the investment strategy based on 
past earnings-related information. They show that intermediate-horizon 
return continuation can be partially explained by the investors' 
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underreaction to earning news. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) indicate that 
momentum excess profits have continued in the 1990s. 
It is noteworthy that recent literature suggests that the that average stock 
returns are predictable not only based on previous return, but also on 
previous earnings and of transactions number. Examples include the 
earning momentum strategy (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996), the 
short-horizon contrarian trading strategy using the past trading volume 
and past returns (Campbell, Grossman, and Wang, 1993; Blume, Easley, 
and O'Hara, 1994; and Conrad, Hameed, and Niden, 1994)，and the 
intermediate-horizon "volume-based price momentum" strategy (Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2000). 
Pervious studies have attempted to discover evidence and explanations 
about the relationship between stock returns and the past firm 
performance from the explanatory variables (e.g. different formation and 
holding periods, past trading volume, past price or earning information, 
and firm size). These pervious studies have investigated this issue in the 
overall market within limited dimensional frameworks -- two to three 
explanatory variables. None of the studies use all the explanatory 
variables. In addition, few previous studies examine the price behaviors of 
stocks focusing on some special industry. 
In recent years, the U.S. tourism industry, including hotel, restaurant, 
airline, recreation, and other sectors, has witnessed rapid expansion and 
fierce competition. The tourism industry had become one of the largest 
industries by the end of the last century. The World Travel & Tourism 
Council 2002 TSA Research Report says that the industry's economic 
contribution (direct and indirect) in 2000 was US$ 1,151 billion or 
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11.66% of the US GDP and had 16.83 million job positions counting for 
12.45% of total employment. 
It is interesting to explore the tourism industry's economic impact on the 
US. Tourism stocks which are derivatives based on the tourism assets 
reflect these impacts. Despite the fact that the tourism industry is 
increasingly recognized as an important economy, there is a woeful 
shortage of research on tourism stocks, and no existing literature focuses 
on the predictability of average stock return in the tourism industry, in 
contrast to the numerous finance studies concerning the stock market as a 
whole. 
This study attempts to fill some of these gaps. Notably, this study adopts a 
viewpoint that includes the most critical explanatory variables - formation 
and holding periods, past trading volume, past price or earning 
information, and firm size - in a multi-dimensional framework. The main 
purpose of this study is to provide insights into the relationship between 
stock returns and past firm performance in the tourism industry in the U.S. 
The thesis tries to find the determinants of predictability of stock price for 
the tourism industry and the overall market. 
The tourism industry has its special properties, and tourism stocks may 
perform differently compared with the whole stock market. Thus, the 
thesis studies the difference between the tourism stock portfolio and the 
market stock portfolio. For example, big tourism firms who could raise 
capital easily in public sources tend to take aggressive overreaction in 
expansive macro economic climates and to other positive news such as tax 
deregulation and hotel construction cost decline. For another example, the 
products and services of the tourism industry are highly perishable, and 
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consumption takes place simultaneously with their availability or they are 
not consumed. If they are not sold on the day, the potential of selling them 
again for that day is lost forever. Thus, their near-term earnings or other 
performance related information could be more easily observed and 
precisely acquired by analysts and investors. 
The thesis also examines and evaluates competing explanatory hypotheses 
for the profitability of contrarian and momentum strategies in different 
horizons based on past firm performance (return, earning data and trading 
volume) and firm size. What's more, using the "earning momentum" 
strategy in tourism industry this study could provide additional evidence 
to evaluate EMH and to explain stock return predictability in a new way. 
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1.2 Thesis Outline 
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2，section 2.1 
gives the definition of the tourism industry and tourism stocks in the U.S. 
Section 2.2 reports some statistics on the U.S. tourism industry in recent 
years and reviews the financial problems of the early 1990s. Mean-
variance analysis and Fama-French three-factor risk-adjusted performance 
of tourism stocks from 1990 to 2000 are reported in section 2.3. 
Explanations of high systematic risk in the tourism industry are also 
discussed in this section. 
Chapter 3 is the related literature review in the predictability of future 
returns. 
Chapter 4 presents the motivations and research questions of this study in 
subsection 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Section 4.3 presents the research 
hypotheses. 
In Chapter 5, section 5.1 presents the research methodology. Subsection 
5.1.1 indicates the samples and data selection criteria. Portfolio formation 
procedure is documented in subsection 5.1.2. Subsection 5.1.3 reports the 
summary statistics for price and earning strategies. Section 5.2 examines 
the empirical results for different price contrarian strategies based on past 
returns, past trading volume, firm size, formation periods and holding 
periods over short-term and evaluate competing explanatory hypotheses 
for short-term contrarian profits. In section 5.3, empirical results for price 
or earning momentum strategies over intermediate-term and long-term are 
discussed. Price overreaction hypothesis and earning underreaction 
hypothesis are tested and confirmed. 
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Chapter 6 gIves the results, contributions, and questions for future 
research. 
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Chapter2： Tourism Industry and Tourism 
Stocks 
2.1 Definitions 
As defined by the U.S. Census bureau, the tourist or traveler is: anyone 
who goes to a place at least 100 miles away from home and returns. The 
term "tourism" can be viewed from different perspectives. According to 
Lundberg, Krishnamoorthy and Stavenga (1995), it is an activity in which 
people are engaged in travel away from home primarily for business or 
pleasure. It is businesses that provide goods and services to travelers, and 
involves any activity that causes a traveler to incur an expenditure on his 
or her trip. Tourism is an industry comprising thousands of component 
businesses, including lodgings, restaurants, airlines, cruise lines, railroads, 
rental car agencies, travel marketers and expediters, and convention 
centers. There are also travel reception services, commercial 
campgrounds, and parts of retail shops, food stores, and gas stations. 
Using the U.S. Census Bureau's 1987 Standard Industrial Classifications 
(SIC) code system, major industry groups 58 (Eating And Drinking 
Places, 451 (Transportation By Air, scheduled), 70 (Hotels, Rooming 
Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places), 79 (Amusement And 
Recreation Services), and industry 4724 (Travel Agencies) and 4725 
(Tour Operators) can be listed in the tourism sector. The tourism industry 
sample is selected by SIC code from the stocks traded in the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks exchanges for the time period from 1990 to 
2000. 
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2.2 Tourism Industry and Stocks in the U.S. 
2.2.1 Introduction 
According to the 2002 Research Report of World Travel and Tourism 
Council (WTTC), the tourism industry is one of the world's largest 
industries. In 2001，it contributed 3.71% or US$ 1.81 trillion to the US 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Contribution is expected to rise in 
nominal terms to US$ 2.27 trillion (3.8%) by 2012. In the past ten years, 
the world tourism industry grew almost twice as fast as the world's 
overall GNP. Worldwide, 73 million people worked in the industry in 
2001，and another 127 million people worked in related sectors (WTTC 
TSA Research Report, 2002). 
The tourism industry in the U.S. is one of the largest industries of that 
economy. It contributed 4.38% (US$ 446 billion) of the national GDP in 
2001; its employment as 6.48 million jobs or 4.81% of total employment 
(WTTC TSA Research Report, 2002). The major three tourism sectors in 
U.S. are lodging (hotel and motel), restaurant, and airline industries. The 
lodging industry and airline industry are dominated by a few major 
players. The restaurant industry consists predominantly of small 
businesses; however, restaurant chains continue to play a growing role 
and are controlling a larger share of restaurant sales. 
A. Lodging Industry 
According to the 1999 Travel and Tourism Market Research Handbook 
(Richard K. Miller & Associates, Inc., 1999), the U.S. lodging industry 
recorded revenues of almost US$ 88 billion in 1997，with profits of more 
than US$ 14.3 billion. The commercial lodging business in the U.S. 
10 
generates more than US$ 63 billion in sales each year, representing about 
1% of the country's GNP. 
From the end of twentieth century to the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, mergers, acquisition, and joint ventures changed the competitive 
environment of the lodging sector in the U.S. Almost all the milestone 
events were significant transactions: such as, Bass Pic. bought Holiday 
Inn for US$ 2.2 billion in 1990; Starwood bought Westin for US$ 1.6 
billion in 1997; Starwood bought ITT for US$ 13.7 billion in 1998; Bass 
acquired Inter-Continental for US$ 2.9 billion in 1998; Hilton acquired 
Promus group (its 1443 hotels with 199,000 rooms) for US$ 41 billion in 
1999 (Vogel, 2001). 
Hotel chains account for a large percentage of the U.S.'s hotel room 
inventory. In 1999，the number of the rooms of largest 25 hotel chains, 
such as Cendant Corporation, Bass, Marriott International, Choice Hotels 
International, Hilton Hotel Corporation, and Starwood Hotels & Resorts, 
was 2.4 million, or about 70% of the U.S. market (Angelo and Vladimir, 
2001) 
B. Restaurant industry 
In the restaurant industry, about 25 percent of the US$ 254.9 billion in 
restaurant sales in 1992 could be considered tourism-related. Total sales 
in 1999 and 2000 was US$ 359.3 billion and 376.1 billion respectively 
(National Restaurant Association, 2001). In 1996, international tourists 
spent a total of US$ 90.5 billion in the U.S. They spent 18 percent of this 
travel money on food and beverage (Mattson, 1997). 
Restaurant chains have dramatically increased their share of sales over the 
last three decades. In 1999，the top 100 chains generated 50.7% of the 
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restaurant sales in the U.S.，up from 46.5% in 1989; it was less than 33% 
in 1972 (Technomic Consultants, 2000). 
C. Airline industry 
On a global basis 1.5 billion passengers a year take 20 million flights over 
more than 1.3 billion miles (Vogel, 2001). 
In the U.S., according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
revenues for U.S. commercial carriers were US$ 107.4 billion in 1997, 
and profits were US$ 7.9 billion (Richard K. Miller & Associates，Inc., 
1999). Ten U.S. airlines were listed in the world's top 50 airline 
companies in 1993 according to the 1992 revenues (Fortune Magazine, 
December 1993). Their total revenue was more than 70 billion US$. The 
number of airlines has shrunk in the 1990s as the industry consolidated 
into an oligopoly dominated by a few mega-carriers. At of the end of 
1990s, there were twelve major U.S. airlines: Alaska, America West, 
American, Continental, Delta, Federal Express, Northwest, Southwest, 
TWA, United, UPS, and US Airways. (Vogel, 2001) 
Since the 1970s, publicly raised capital, such as is raised in traditional 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) stocks, and new financing instruments such 
as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs), have been abundant and have provided financing to the tourism 
industry, particularly to big tourism firms. Most of the larger hotel, airline, 
and restaurant chain companies raised capital through stock sales. The 
total fundings from public sources amounted to a little over US$ 1 billion 
in 1990 and escalated to over US$ 10 billion in 1996. (Powers and 
Barrows, 2002) 
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Since the first introduction of a hotel REIT in 1993，REITs have grown 
remarkably. Burch and Taylor (1997) report that US$ 1.4 billion was 
raised in the initial public offerings between August 1993 and August 
1996. According to Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. (1999), five percent 
of hotel properties are now owned by REITs. By the end of 1999, the 
number of publicly traded hotel REITs was 19 with a total market 
capitalization of US$ 8.8 billion. 
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2.2.3 Financial Problems 
During the economic recession period of the 1980s, the tourism industry 
encountered serious financial problems and losses. By 1993 the hotel 
industry in the U.S. had experienced nine consecutive years of losses 
totaling more than US$ 33 billion, a record from the 1930s Great 
Depression when 80 percent of all hotels were in financial trouble 
(Lundberg et al.，1995; and Vogel, 2001). In 1992，U.S. airlines lost $4.4 
billion, bring total losses for the previous three years to over US$ 10 
billion which is more than the accumulated industry earnings between 
1945 and 1992 (Lundberg et al., 1995). The number of business failures in 
the restaurant industry was increased to 4578 in 1992 (Zheng, 2002). 
The reasons for the losses were several. Besides macro economic reasons, 
the most serious one for the tourism industry resulted in the overbuilding 
of supply due to investor and developer optimism rather than in response 
to market demand. 
The financial problem for the lodging industry was due to overbuilding in 
1980s. The data for the lodging industry indicates a cyclical pattern (e.g. 
Choi, Olsen, Kwansa, and Tse, 1999). When hotel occupancies rise and 
investments look promising, vast amounts of capital investment results in 
overbuilding. Another factor which caused excessive hotel building in the 
1980s was the amount of foreign investment pouring into the U.S. due to 
the U.S. government's policy of favoring a cheap American dollar. Excess 
capital availability in the 1980s resulted in the overbuilding which caused 
financial problems from 1984 to 1992. It took nearly a decade before 
demand began to catch up with supply. In the late 1980s, the servicing of 
debts consumed more than 10% of the tourism industry revenue (Vogel, 
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2001). High-leveraged hotel companies had difficulty meeting the interest 
payments. Even small drops in occupancy were enough to place hotels in 
financial jeopardy. 
For the restaurant industry, Schwartz (1999) points out that many 
restaurant chains had expanded too quickly and consequently had gone 
bankrupt in the recession. Under-capitalization was common. Many new 
restaurants failed because they lacked a financial cushion to carry them 
through the several months needed to gain consistent profitability. 
The financial turbulence in the airline industry was partially due to macro 
economic reasons, fuel price increases since 1989，and an oversupply of 
planes and related equipment (Morrison and Winston, 1995). 
Economic expansion had begun again in 1992. In 1993，the tourism 
industry became a major beneficiary of rising demand. Room occupancy 
rates and lodging industry profits increased steadily. The overbuilding 
cycle in the lodging industry appeared to have passed. Airline companies 
also became profitable in 1993 with a net profit of more than US$ 2 
billion. 
As said earlier, the lodging industry and airline industry have been 
dominated by a few big firms, and the largest restaurant chains have 
controlled a larger share of restaurant sales over the last decades (Powers 
and Barrows, 2002). Larger tourism firms have played a growing role in 
the tourism economy. In particular, the top lodging chains and airlines 
lead the oversupply in 1980s which resulted in serious financial problems. 
Top lodging companies, such as Sheraton, Hilton International, Inter-
continental, Westin, Holiday Inn, and Marriott expanded dramatically in 
the 1980s, and their financial problems were serious from the middle of 
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the 1980s to the beginning of 1990s (Vogel, 2001). Similarly, the major 
airlines had bet on a strategy of more planes, more flights, and more hub 
airports. By 1993，it was clear that strategy had failed. The new strategy 
pushed for wage and salary cuts, and greater efficient work rules 
(Lundberg et al” 1995). 
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2.3 Mean-Variance Analysis and Fama-French 
Three-Factor Risk-adjusted Performance of 
Tourism Stocks in the U.S. (From 1990 to 2000) 
The economics of the tourism industry, like most other businesses, closely 
reflects the general economy. Hotel occupancy rates and airline capacity 
rates rise during prosperity. In recession, we can see the spate of job 
losses, airline capacity reductions, restaurant failure rate increases, and 
room occupancy rate slashes. Many studies (such as Lundberg, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Stavenga (1995), Vogel (2001)，and Powers and 
Barrows (2002)) also report that tourism industry profits have been quite 
volatile and sensitive to overall economic conditions. 
In the stock market, the excess rates of return of equally weighted tourism 
stock portfolios are highly correlated with that of market portfolios, an 
equal-weighted portfolio consisting of all stocks traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ for the time period from 1990 to 2000. Please note 
that all return data used in this study are excess returns, the return above 
the risk-free rate of return (30 days U.S. Treasury Bill rate of return). 
In this subsection, the thesis uses mean-variance analysis and Fama-
French Three-Factor model to compare the performance of tourism stocks 
and the overall market in the U.S. from 1990 to 2000. 
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2.3.1 The Comparison between Tourism Stocks and Market 
Portfolio in the U.S. 
Figure 2.1 
Monthly Returns of Market and Tourism Stocks (1990/01-
2000/12) 
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Monthly Returns of Market and Tourism Stocks: 12-Month 
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present the monthly return of tourism stocks and 
market equal-weighted portfolios from January 1990 to December 2000. 
These figures illustrate that stock market performance and tourism 
industry stock performance are closely related to the macro economic 
climate and the tourism economy. 
In 1992, the year after the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. economy recovered 
from its long-term recession; however, due to oversupply which began in 
the middle 1980s, the aggregate tourism industry became profitable again 
in 1993. The data shows that stock performance of the U.S. tourism 
industry rebounded strongly following that of the whole market and 
reached its peak in the end of 1993. 
The general economy and the tourism industry alike showed a slowdown 
in 1994. Fortunately, the recession was not deep. Thereafter, a long 
economic expansion took over, with the tourism industry growing twice 
as fast as the total GNP and becoming one of the largest industries in the 
United States (WTTC TSA Research Report, 2002). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
also reveal that the performance of the whole stock market and tourism 
stocks show a downward shift in 1994 and rebound very quickly in 1995. 
The stock market and tourism stock performance remained strong from 
1995 to the early 1998. 
The Asian financial crisis began to affect the growth of the economy and 
the tourism industry in 1998. Although seriously affected, since early 
1999 the tourism industry recovered faster in the macro economy. Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 indicate that the slowdown in the whole economy and the 
tourism industry in particular had direct impacts on stock performance. 
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The data also reveal that the tourism stocks were more sensitive during 
this crisis. 
From 2000，there are many negative signs for America's general 
economy. It is likely that the U.S. will experience another long-term 
economic recession, especially after the September 11 terrorism attack in 
2001. It seems the tourism industry in the U.S. is once again being 
subjected to the combined impact of economic slowdown and 
overbuilding. 
Many studies (Lundberg et al. (1995), Vogel (2001), and Powers and 
Barrows (2002), etc.) report that the tourism industry as a whole is 
sensitive to the changes in general economic conditions. On the other 
hand, the tourism industry grew almost twice as fast as the total GNP in 
the past decade (WTTC TSA Research Report, 2002). 
Panel B of Table 2.1 illustrates that the tourism stock portfolio has a 
higher standard derivation (STD) based on monthly return data, which 
means the tourism stocks portfolio is more volatile. However, in Panel A, 
we find that the STD based on weekly return data of the tourism portfolio 
is lower than that of the market portfolio. This implies that tourism stocks 
are more stable in short-term than the whole stock market. Both Panel A 




Statistics of Monthly and Weekly Return for Tourism Stock and 
Market Portfolio in the U.S. (1990/01-2000/12) 
This table reports the statistics of tourism stock portfolio and market portfolio and one-way 
equal mean ANOVA between these two portfolios in the U.S. The monthly and weekly return 
data are the monthly and weekly return in excess of the Treasure bill rate. The equal-weighted 
market portfolio includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The sample of 
equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ. "STD" is the standard derivation. "F Stat." is the F statistics. "P-Value" is the 
probability that a value is statistically greater than or equal to the observed value. The sample 
period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Weekly Data 
Groups Mean STD 
Tourism 0.001316 0.000378 
Market 0.001800 0.000406 
Monthly Data 
Groups Mean STD 
Tourism 0.006227 0.064040 
Market 0.008113 0.041048 
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2.3.2 Fama-French Three-factor Regression and Risk-
adjusted Performance 
To lay the groundwork, Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 report Fama-French 
Three-Factor regression statistics and Ljung-Box-Q statistics based on 
monthly return and weekly return for an equal-weighted tourism stock 
portfolio. Risk-adjusted abnormal return (Alpha) is estimated by the 
intercept in the Fama-French three-factor regression model: 
(ii = - A ) - R f ] - 元 E ( S M B ) — ^ . E ( H M L ) 
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports that weekly risk-adjusted abnormal return 
(Alpha) is not significant at a 10% level. Thus we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the risk-adjusted return of a tourism stock portfolio equals 
zero. The loadings of the three factors are highly significantly different 
from zero. The estimated market factor loading (systematic risk) is 
significantly smaller than one at either the 5% or 10% level. This finding 
indicates that tourism stocks portfolio based on weekly return data has a 
slightly smaller market risk than the whole market portfolio. 
In Table 2.2 Panel B, the study uses the Ljung-Box-Q tests for up to the 
fourth, eighth, twelfth, sixteenth, and sixtieth week order autocorrelation 
in the residual term. Ljung-Box-Q statistics are used to test whether a 
group of autocorrelations or cross-autocorrelations is significantly 
different from zero. The Q � statistics has Chi-square distribution with s 
degrees of freedom, s is the order of autocorrelations. 
The Q-statistics are significant at a 5% level for the residual term. Thus, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residual is autocorrelated. 
The empirical results in Panel B are not consistent with the 1996 study of 
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Fama-French. It implies that something other than the market factor, 
SMB, and HML may also cause the autocorrelation in a tourism stock 
portfolio in the short-term. Thus, I expect that the profits of different 
investment strategies based on past price, past trading volume, and firm 
size cannot be eliminated in risk-adjusted returns of tourism stocks in a 
short investment horizon. 
A probable explanation for smaller market loading (systematic risk) is that 
the return microstructure-bias within a one-industry portfolio is smaller in 
the short-horizon, say, one or two weeks, than those within the market 
portfolio which comprises of hundreds of industries. Thus, firms within 
an industry tend to be similarly sensitive to macroeconomic information 
shocks and are exposed to similar supply and demand fluctuations. In the 




Fama-French Three Factor Regression and Ljung-Box-Q Statistics 
Based on Weekly Return for equal-weighted Tourism Stock 
Portfolio 
This table reports the regression estimated over weekly data of the tourism stock portfolio 
in the U.S. The dependent variable is the weekly return in excess of the risk-free rate 
(treasure bill rate). The explanatory variables are the weekly returns from the Fama and 
French (1993) Research Factor portfolio for size and book-to-market factors and weekly 
return in excess of the Treasury bill rate on the value-weighted market portfolio of all the 
component stocks from the Research Factor portfolio. The sample includes all tourism 
stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. In Panel A, FF factor loadings are the 
slope coefficient in Fama-French three-factor model time-series regressions. "T Stat." is the 
T statistic. "Market" is the market factor (the value-weighted index minus the risk-free 
rate), "SMB" is the size factor (small stocks minus big stocks), and "HML" is the book-to-
market factor (high minus low book-to-market stocks). "Alpha" is the intercept term or 
three factor risk-adjusted abnormal return. The T statistics for market factor test the null 
that the loading is equal to 1. Panel B reports the Statistics summary of the Ljung-Box-Q 
test for the dependent variable - weekly rate of return of tourism stock portfolio, Fama-
French three factors — Market, SMB, and HML, and residuals (or risk-adjusted rate of 
return of tourism stock portfolio). “ Q � ” ’ “Q(12)，’，"Q(16)", and “Q(60)” are the Ljung-
Box-Q tests for up to fourth, eighth, twelfth, sixteenth, and sixtieth week order 
autocorrelation in the residuals. P-Values are shown in parentheses below the Ljung-Box Q 
Statistics. The sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A: Regression Statistics Summary 
FF factors FF factor loadings T Stat. P-Value 
Alpha -0.00 -0.55 0.58 
Market (Beta) 0.83 5.26 0.00 
SMB 0.65 17.13 0.00 
HML 2JA 
Panel B: Ljung-Box Q statistics 
• Q statistics 
Variables q � qq】） q(16) Q(60) 
Tourism Stock returns 121.94 144.21 151.73 228.41 
(Not risk-adjusted) (0.00) (Q.QQ) (0.00) (0.00) 
Residuals or Tourism Stock returns 112.02 120.57 123.93 185.54 
(Risk-adjusted) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
~ “ l l 0 3 2 0 ^ 漸 ket Factor (0.23) (0.29) (0.14) (0.01) 
… ^ 12.74 28.37 37.54 94.68 
讓 Factor (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3 0 S 134.38 
(0.00) (0.00) (Q.Ql) (0.00) 
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Panel A of Table 2.3 reports that monthly risk-adjusted abnormal return 
(Alpha) is significantly negative at the 10% level, which means the 
tourism stock portfolio is regarded as underperforming the overall market 
based on monthly return. The loadings of the SMB and HML are highly 
significantly different from zero. Market factor loading (systematic risk, 
Beta) is significantly higher than 1. If we overlook autocovariances of 
market factor and cross-autocovariances between market factor with SMB 
and HML, the tourism stocks portfolio is more sensitive than the whole 
market portfolio on a monthly return basis. The reasons why the tourism 
stock portfolio has a higher systematic risk and undervalued performance 
based on monthly return data are discussed in next section. 
In Table 2.3 Panel B, the study uses the Ljung-Box-Q tests for up to 
fourth, eighth, twelfth, sixteenth, and twentieth month order 
autocorrelation in the three factors and the residual term. Since the test Q 
statistics for the residuals falls above the upper boundary at P-Value<0.05 
significant level, it can be concluded that residuals were not positively or 
negatively auto-correlated in the intermediate and long horizon. The 
empirical results in Panel B are consistent with the 1996 study of Fama-




Fama-French Three Factor Regression and Ljung-Box-Q Statistics 
Based on Monthly Return for equal-weighted Tourism Stock 
Portfolio 
This table reports the regression estimated over monthly data of the tourism stock portfolio 
in the U.S. The dependent variable is the monthly return in excess of the risk-free rate 
(treasure bill rate). The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from the Fama and 
French (1993) Research Factor portfolio for size and book-to-market factors and monthly 
return in excess of the Treasury bill rate on the equal-weighted market portfolio of all the 
component stocks from the Research Factor portfolio. The sample includes all tourism 
stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. In Panel A, EF factor loadings are the 
slope coefficient in Fama-French three-factor model time-series regressions. "T Stat." is the 
T statistic. "Market" is the market factor (the value-weighted index minus the risk-free 
rate), "SMB" is the size factor (small stocks minus big stocks), and "HML" is the book-to-
market factor (high minus low book-to-market stocks). "Alpha" is the intercept term or 
three factor risk-adjusted abnormal return. The T statistics for market factor test the null 
that the loading is equal to 1. Panel B reports the Ljung-Box-Q statistics for dependent 
variable - monthly rate of return of tourism stock portfolio, Fama-French three factors -
Market, SMB, and HML, and residuals (or risk-adjusted rate of return of tourism stock 
portfolio). “Q(4)，，，“Q(8)，，’ "Q(12)", “Q(16)”’ and "Q(20)" are the Ljung-Box-Q tests for up 
to fourth, eighth, twelfth, sixteenth, and twentieth month order autocorrelation in the 
residuals. P-Values are shown in parentheses below the Ljung-Box Q Statistics. The sample 
period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A: Regression Statistics Summary 
FF factors FF factor loadings T Stat. P-Value 
Alpha -0.01 -1.89 0.06 
Market (Beta) 1.37 3.82 0.00 
SMB 0.74 7.26 0.00 
HML IJ2. ^ 
Panel B: Ljung-Box Q statistics 
. Q statistics 
Variables Q � Q ^ Q^】） Q^^) Q(20) 
Tourism Stock returns i T ^ 1 5 ^ I S M 23.34 25.43 
(Not risk-adjusted) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) 
~Residuals or Tourism Stock O ^ 5 M ^ l ^ l 
returns (Risk-adjusted) (0.80) (0.56) (0.53) (0.49) (0.61) 
r 7 T ~ T ~ ^ iT30 13M 2K12 ~ MarketFactor ( _ ) � � � ⑴.!？） (Q.pg) 
5.86 11.28 20.39 24.11 28.09 
or (0.12) (0.13) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) 
^ 41.40 5 2 ? ^ ~ 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
26 
2.3.3 Explanations of High Systematic Risk and 
undervalued performance in Tourism Industry and Tourism 
Stocks 
The specific reasons why the systematic risk (Beta) in tourism the industry 
and tourism stocks is higher than market are probably due to: (1) income 
elasticity of demand is high; (2) products and services of the tourism 
industry are highly perishable and intangible; (3) there is a cyclical pattern 
in the tourism industry; (4) tourism industry firms, particularly, big 
lodging chains and airlines, have an inclination to overreact to the market. 
Point (4) is probably helpful in explaining why the tourism stocks are on 
average undervalued during 1990 to 2000. 
> Demand Elasticity and Consumption Characteristics of Tourism 
Products 
Tourism products and services are not necessary products or services. 
Consumer desire to travel is subject to the economic climate. Under tough 
circumstances, demand may dry up in the short-term. Houthakker and 
Taylor (1970) calculate the consumer income elasticity of demand in the 
U.S. and report that the elasticity for airline travel, foreign travel, 
restaurant meals, and local buses and trains are as high as, 5.82, 3.08， 
1.61，and 1.38. They report that overseas travel and airline travel are 
regarded as luxuries and they are highly income elastic. Vogel (2001) 
suggests that the income elasticity of demand for travel by air is usually in 
the range of 1.5 to 2.5. 
Harris and Brown (1998) point out that products and services of the 
tourism industry are highly perishable and intangible, they are affected by 
fluctuating demand, and their production, delivery, and consumption takes 
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place simultaneously. For instance, the demand for a hotel's guestrooms 
and its restaurant tables fluctuates on daily and seasonal basis, and if a 
guestroom, a restaurant table, or an airline seat is not sold on a given day, 
the potential of selling the room or the table again for that day is lost 
forever. Whereas, in the manufacturing industry, finished goods can be 
stored and sold at a later date to recover a proportion of cost in a worst-
case scenario. The simultaneous production, delivery, and consumption of 
accommodation and food and beverages does make it difficult for 
managers to take remedial action, if things do not turn out as planned. 
> Business Cycles and Overreaction in Prosperity 
The historical data of the lodging industry indicates a cyclical pattern. 
Choi, Olsen，Kwansa, and Tse (1999) report that, from 1966 to 1993, the 
hotel industry demonstrated three cycles. The hotel industry peaked in 
1967，1973’ 1980，and 1989 and troughed in 1969，1974，1982, and 1991. 
Similar to other heavily capitalized industries such as real estate and 
finance, tourism industry is apt to overreact in prosperity. Big tourism 
companies which are easy to raise capital in public sources, lead the 
overreaction behavior. Choi et al. (1999) also found that the mean 
duration of the hotel industry cycle is 7.3 years. The mean duration for 
contraction is 1.7 years and 5.7 years for expansion, which implies that 
investors and developers tend to be over-optimistic. Thus, in the lodging 
industry, overlapping the economic occupancy curves are cycles of 
overbuilding that occur with prosperity when easy credit is available. 
Lundberg et al (1995) point out that the cost of money and the exuberance 
of developers and investors have exaggerated the cyclical nature of the 
business, making it largely responsible for much of the overbuilding that 
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leads to periods of heavy losses because of “too many rooms in the inn" in 
an economic recession. 
When hotel occupancies rise and investments look promising, easy money 
made it possible for hotel developers to borrow vast sums for 
construction, and as a result, many hotel companies were over-leveraged 
- too much debt for the earning capacity of the property. Hotel companies 
have such large debts that interest payments are difficult to meet even 
with relatively high occupancies and good management. Thus, a small 
economic recession is enough to result in a serious financial problem. 
The restaurant and airline industries perform the same way as the hotel 
industry, expanding too quickly in prosperity and getting trapped into the 
financial problem of having to make payments for debt interest and 
matured principal raised in an aggressive expansion period. Zheng (2002) 
points out that bankrupt restaurant firms may have heavily relied on debt 
to finance sales growth without proper control of their operating and 
financing cost. The financial problem of airline industry ranging from 
1988 to 1994 was partially due to the oversupply of planes and related 
equipment (Morrison and Winston, 1995; Vogel, 2002). 
In sum, an explanation for the high systematic risk and the undervalued 
performance of tourism stock is the fact that tourism industry firms, 
particularly big firms, tend to exhibit aggressive growth (overreaction to 
the market) in the revival and expansion phase of the business cycle in 
comparison with other industrial sectors (Powers and Barrows, 2002; 
Vogel, 2001; and Lundberg et al.，1995). The fast-growing tourism 
industry needs large amounts of additional capital to support their growth 
and expansion. Raising additional debt through issuing new stock carries 
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the risk of diluting future earnings and increasing the level of uncertainty 
(Brueggeman and Fisher, 1997). It will certainly augment financial risk, 
and consequently, enlarge the systematic risk in the stock market, 
although the overreaction is an important source of momentum profits in 
the intermediate-term. 
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Chapters ： Literature Review 
This thesis is a finance study in the tourism industry. Chapter 3 reviews 
the related finance literature. Section 3.1 introduces the anomalies in 
average stock returns and the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. In 
section 3.2，explanations of predictability of stock returns in the short-
term, intermediate-term, and long-term are reviewed. Subsection 3.3 
summaries the finance literature related to past trading volume, past 
earnings data, firm size, and industry effect. 
3.1 Anomalies in average stock returns and 
Fama-French three-factor model 
Finance studies indicate there are many average stock return patterns 
which can not be explained by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of 
Sharp (1964) and Lintner (1965). These patterns are normally called 
anomalies. Examples include, the January effect, Monday effect, 
predictability of stock returns by past returns, past earnings, and past 
transaction number. Other firm characteristic effects that are related to a 
firm's average stock return, such as, firm size (often using market 
capitalization ME as proxy), book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME, the 
ratio of the book value of common equity to its market value), earnings-
price ratio (E/P), cash flow-price ratio (C/P), and past sales growth, are 
also anomalies examined in the recent finance literature (Banz, 1981; 
Basu, 1983; Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; and Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
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Fama and French (1996) argue that many of the CAPM average-return 
anomalies are related, and can be captured by the Fama-French-three-
factor model (Fama and French, 1993). They found that, except for the 
continuation of intermediate-term returns, the anomalies largely disappear 
in the model. The three-factor model put forward by Fama and French 
(1993) is cited as the theoretical basis for a multifactor explanation of 
asset pricing. The three-factor model says that the expected return on a 
portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate ) - / ? , ] is explained by the 
sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad 
market portfolio (Rj^ - R f ) \ (ii) the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks 
(SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of 
low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). Thus, the expected 
excess return on portfolio i is, 
E(R. )-Rf = A [EiR^ ) - R f ] + 郷MB) + /^.ECHML), 
where ) - /？^  ], E(SMB), and E(HML) are expected premiums, and 
the factor sensitivities or loadings, /3,，s^  ’ and h. are the slopes in the 
time series regression of, 
R.-R^ = Pi (R^ —尺/)十 SiSMB + / i .HML + e. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) document that lower (higher) trading 
volume is associated with higher (lower) book-to-market ratios, higher 
(lower) factor loadings on the Fama-French HML factor, and lower 
(higher) stock returns over the previous five years. 
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Although Fama and French (1996) try to rationalize a number of related 
empirical predictability anomalies of stock returns, they fail to account for 
the profitability of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum strategies. As 
Fama and French (1996) report, if the risk premium of the three stock-
market factors is considered, the price reversal in the short and long-
horizon largely "disappears" in the regression residuals of the three-factor 
model (Fama and French, 1993). 
However, their conclusion that the results are consistent with rational 
three-factor CAPM and APT is questionable. One of the basic 
assumptions of the multifactor CAPM model is that autocovariances of 
SMB and HML is zero, but this assumption is not sufficiently true in the 
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993，1996), because if the price 
reversal or momentum in different horizons is "disappear" in the residual 
term of the regression model, the autocovariance in the residual term must 
be zero in statistics. It can be concluded that the autocovariance in stock 
mean return is a function of autocovariances and/or cross-autocovariances 
of SMB, HML, and excess market return. Though it means that the 
regressed loadings of the three factors in Fama-French model are not 
sensitive in the strict econometrics meaning, the thesis still can use the 
model to calculate the risk-adjusted abnormal return as follows: 
a j = E ( R i ) - R f - A哪M ) -尺 / ] -讽S M B ) -细H M L ) 
ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) and GARCH 
(generalized ARCH) are two econometric models that are frequently used 
to predict implied volatilities. This issue is beyond the scope of this thesis 
and I would like to leave the issue for future study. 
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3.2 Explanations for predictability of stock 
returns in different horizons 
Recent finance literature has focused much attention on the relationship 
between stock returns and the past firm performance, including past 
average return, past earning, and past transaction number. The 
explanations on return predictability are among the most controversial 
aspects of the debate on market efficiency since the finding of long-term 
reversal (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985，1987)，short-term reversal 
(Jegadeesh, 1990; Lehmann, 1990)，and intermediate-term momentum in 
average stock returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). In the next chapter, 
the thesis tests different hypotheses concerned with the explanation of 
mean stock returns predictability in the tourism industry and the whole 
market. 
A. Explanations of Short-horizon Return Reversals 
As for short-horizon predictability in stock prices, many explanations 
have been put forward to account for reversal effects and contrarian 
strategies in stock prices. For example, Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) examine whether bid-ask spreads can 
explain short-term reversals. Lo and Mackinlay (1990) document that 
short-horizon excess profits may also be due to lead-lag effects or cross-
autocovariance between the unconditional mean returns of stocks; returns 
of large stocks lead those of smaller stocks. To contradict the behavior 
model of stocks' own-autocovariance as the only source of contrarian 
profits, Lo and Mackinlay construct a particular contrarian strategy to 
show that, in despite of negative autocorrelation in individual stock 
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returns, weekly portfolio returns are strongly positively autocorrelated and 
are the result of important cross-autocorrelations. The "lead-lag effect" 
hypothesis by Lo and Mackinlay (1990) is tested and supported by some 
recent studies, such as those of Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999). 
B. Explanations of Intermediate-horizon Return Momentums 
From the reporting of momentum strategy by Jegadeesh and Titman in 
1993，many portfolio managers and stock analysts accepted the view that 
momentum strategy yields significant profits. Using a U.S. sample of 
NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period from 1965 to 1989，Jegadeesh and 
Titman find that a strategy that buys past six-month winners and shorts 
past six-month losers earns approximately one percent per month over the 
subsequent six months. Although the results have been well accepted, 
the source of the excess profits and the interpretation of the evidence are 
widely debated. Various theories have been presented to give rise to 
positive intermediate-term return autocorrelations. These theories can be 
classified into two categories: behavior models and risk-based models. 
(1) Behavior models 
A number of recent research (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996; 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1998; and Hong and Stein, 1997,1999) propose behavior models 
based on the premise that investors interpret past information, such as 
prices, trading number, and earning data. These behavior models imply 
that the holding period momentum profits arise because of an overreaction 
or underreaction to information that pushes the prices of winners (losers) 
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winners (losers) above (below) their fundamental values in the subsequent 
intermediate-term, say three to 12 month. 
The behavior models can be further subdivided into two subsets according 
the exact mechanism that is at work. They are the overreaction hypotheses 
and the underreaction hypotheses. 
The market overreaction hypotheses states that prices initially overreact to 
news about fundamentals and then continue to overreact further for a 
period of time. The “overconfidence bias" hypothesis of Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and the "positive feedback 
trader" model of DeLong et al. (1990) can be listed in this subset. These 
models also predict that in long-term subsequent time periods, when the 
stock prices of the winners and losers revert to their fundamental values, 
the returns of losers should exceed the returns of winners. So long-term 
contrarian excess profits may be due to the market overreaction of 
investors (DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Lehmann (1990) and Lo and 
Mackinlay (1988, 1990)). Both intermediate-term momentum and long-
term reversals in average stock returns can be explained by the 
overreaction behavior model. 
In the subset of the underreaction hypotheses, some studies, such as 
Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988)，Bernard and Thomas (1990), and Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), suggest that investors may underreact 
to information such as earnings or past price information and that a 
momentum strategy may produce excess profits. More recently, the 
"conservatism bias" hypothesis of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
indicates the momentum effect of stock prices is due to conservative 
investors who do not update their beliefs sufficiently when they observe 
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new public information. In the "gradual-information-diffusion" model of 
Hong and Stein (1997, 1999) and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), firm-
specific information gradually diffuses at heterogeneous speeds across the 
investors, who thus observe different pieces of private information at 
different points of time, generate underreaction and positive return 
autocorrelations. One important implication of the underreaction 
hypotheses, which is different with the overreaction hypotheses is that 
prices will tend to slowly adjust to information. But once the information 
is fully reflected on prices there is no further predictability in stock 
average returns. Hence, the post-holding period returns will be zero. 
Although behavior models are supported by a large number of finance 
studies, some analyses suggest that this support should be interpreted with 
caution because some evidence cannot be interpreted by either the 
overreaction hypotheses or the underreaction hypotheses individually. For 
example, Hong and Stein (1999) find that the profitability of momentum 
strategies in the smallest stocks declines sharply with market 
capitalization, and profitability of momentum strategies work well among 
stocks with low analyst coverage. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) 
find strong evidence of return reversals in long-term (36 months to 60 
months) for small firms, but the evidence is somewhat weak for large 
firms, particularly when evaluating portfolio performance relative to the 
Fama and French (1993) benchmark. In addition, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) document that, although strong evidence of return reversals in the 
1965 to 1982 period is found, the evidence of return reversals is 
substantially weaker in the 1982 to 1998 period. Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
also report that contrarian strategies net statistically significant excess 
profits in long horizons only during the 1926-1947 subperiod. These 
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contradicting evidences are noteworthy because if the behavior model is 
correct, there is no distinguishable performance difference between 
different firm sizes, especially between either the magnitude or the 
significance of the momentum excess profits in the two subperiods. 
(2) Risk-based models 
Others (e.g., Conrad and Kaul (1998)，Fama and French (1993, 1996))， 
however, have suggested a risk-based interpretation of momentum. Risk-
based models suggest that the profitability of momentum strategies may 
simply be compensation for risk. Fama and French (1993) construct a 
rational pricing model with market, size (SMB), and BE/ME (HML) 
factors. One of their later studies (Fama and French, 1996) documents that 
the results are consistent with rational multifactor ICAPM or APT asset 
pricing. The conclusion is questionable as mentioned earlier because of 
the possible existence of significant autocovariance of the Market, SMB 
and HML factor, and Cross-autocovariance between them. In addition, 
many studies report that the F-F three-factor model does not subsume 
momentum effects. 
The risk-based model put forth by Conrad and Kaul (1998) argues that the 
profitability of momentum strategies could be entirely due to cross-
sectional variation in expected returns rather than to any predictable time-
series variations in stock returns. Under the Conrad and Kaul (1998) risk-
based hypothesis, the higher returns of winners in the holding period 
represent their unconditional expected rates of return and thus predict that 
the returns of the momentum portfolio will be positive on average in any 
post holding period, including the long-horizon from 13 to 60 months. 
Although risk-based models are certainly a logical possibility, there is 
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little evidence that favors such a risk theory. For example, to test the 
conflicting implications of the underreaction and overreaction behavior 
models, and the Conrad and Kaul (1998) risk-based hypothesis, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) examine the returns of the winning and losing stocks 
in the 60 months following the formation date, and report that the 
cumulative return in months 13 to 60 for the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
momentum portfolio is negative, which is consistent with the overreaction 
theories but inconsistent with the Conrad and Kaul hypothesis. 
C. Explanations of Long-horizon Reversals 
As for the explanations of long-horizon reversals, many studies, including 
those of DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Chopar, Lakonishok, and 
Ritter (1992), and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) support the concept of 
market overreaction. They document that the long-term price reversals 
represent a price error correction to a previous intermediate-term price 
overreaction. 
Other competing explanations, include "microstructure biases" hypothesis 
of Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995) arguing that 5-year contrarian profit 
is due largely to low-priced 30% stocks' sensitivity to 
microstructure/liquidity effects, "upward bias in cumulating single-period 
returns" hypothesis of Conrad and Kaul (1993), and "changing expected 
returns" hypothesis due to time-variation in relative risks (Ball and 
Kothari, 1989). Since past price and earning performance is closely 
related to the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME), the phenomenon of 
long-term reversals is related to the kinds of "book-to-market equity 
effects" discussed by Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) Lakoniskhok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), and Fama and French (1992, 1995). 
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3.3 Literature related to past trading volume, 
past earnings data, firm size, and industry 
effect 
Many recent studies focus on the relationship between the predictability 
of average stock returns and past trading volume or past earnings. 
Examples include, the short-horizon "price-volume contrarian" strategy of 
Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), Blume, Easley, and O'Hara 
(1994), and Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994), intermediate-horizon 
"volume-based price momentum" strategy of Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000), the "earning momentum" strategy of Brown, Harlow and Tinic 
(1988)，Bernard and Thomas (1990), and Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok (1996). Others, such as Hong, Lim, and Stein (1999) research 
the impact of firm size on the profitability of average stock return in the 
intermediate and long-horizon. Notably different from previous empirical 
studies and explanations concerning the return predictability, Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999) put forth the "industry momentum" hypothesis to 
explain momentum effect. 
A. Past trading volume 
In the research of return predictability in the short-horizon, Campbell, 
Grossman, and Wang (1993) indicate, "Price changes accompanied by 
high volume will tend to be reversed; this will be less true of price 
changes on days with low volume". The evidence from some empirical 
studies (e.g. Blume et al. (1994) and Conrad et al. (1994)) supports this 
significant relationship between past trading information and current 
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returns in individual securities. Using an intermediate-horizon "volume-
based price momentum" strategy, the study of Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) shows that the magnitude and persistence of price momentum can 
be predicted based on trading volume. Specifically, price momentum 
effects reverse over the next five years, and high (low) volume winners 
(losers) experience faster reversals. It is also found that firms with high 
past turnover ratios (another proxy of trading volume) earn lower future 
returns, and have consistently more negative earnings surprises over the 
next eight quarters. Conditional on past volume, Lee et al. (2000) create a 
momentum portfolio that either exhibits long-horizon return reversals or 
long-horizon return continuation. This finding shows that past volume 
may be helpful to reconcile intermediate-horizon underreaction and long-
horizon overreaction effects. 
B. Past earnings data 
Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988), Bernard and Thomas (1990) find that 
price momentum in the intermediate-horizon is a function of past 
earnings. 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) document that the predictability 
of future returns from past returns is due to the market's underreaction to 
information, in particular to past earnings news, because security analysts' 
earnings forecasts also respond sluggishly to past news, especially in the 
case of stocks with the worst past performance. They find past return and 
past earnings surprise each predict large drifts in future returns after 
controlling for the other. 
C. Firm size 
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Hong, Lim, and Stein (1999) use firm size as an additional explanation 
variable to test intermediate-term momentum in stock returns identified by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). They find that the profitability of 
momentum strategies in small stocks declines sharply with firm size 
decrease because small firms have low analyst coverage. The finding is 
consistent with the “gradual-information-diffusion’’ hypothesis (Hong and 
Stein, 1997，1999) that firm-specific information only gradually diffuses 
across the investing public. 
D, Industry momentum 
A recent article by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) tries to use the 
"industry momentum" hypothesis to explain momentum effect. They 
document a significant momentum effect in industry components of stock 
returns which accounts for much of the individual stock momentum 
anomaly. They find that momentum investment strategies are significantly 
less profitable once the stocks are controlled within an industry. By 
contrast, industry momentum investment strategies, which buy stocks 
from past winning industries and sell stocks from past losing industries, 
appear highly profitable, even after controlling for size, book-to-market 
equity, cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns, and potential 
microstructure influences. Thus, they identify industry momentum as the 
source of much of the momentum excess profits at the intermediate 
horizon. 
E, Section summary 
In sum, prior studies have documented a striking pattern of price 
momentum in intermediate horizon, price reversal in the short-term and 
long-term, and earning momentum. Other studies have examined the 
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relationship between future returns and past trading volume, or firm size. 
This thesis integrates these two lines of research and report the joint 
distribution of future returns conditional on both past trading volume or 
firm size and past returns or past earnings data in different horizons for 
tourism stocks and the overall stock market. More importantly, the 
findings provide more information to evaluate the explanations for 
predictability of stock returns in different horizons and to understand the 
economic impact of the tourism industry on the stock market. 
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Chapter 4: Motivations and Research 
Questions 
4.1 Motivations 
This thesis is a finance study focusing on the tourism industry. Thus, its 
motivations have two dimensions: finance and tourism. 
A. For finance research 
The objective in the finance respect of this thesis is to trace the sources of 
the predictability of future stock returns based on past returns, earning 
news, past trading volumes, and firm size in different investment 
horizons. 
The relationship between stock performance and past information is one 
of the most considered areas in recent finance research. While the 
existence of the predictability of stock returns does not seem to be too 
controversial, it is much less clear what might be driving it. A number of 
potential hypotheses have been reported in the past decade. For example, 
Lo and Mackinlay (1990) present a lead-lag hypothesis for short-term 
reversals; Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)，and Hong and Stein 
(1997, 1999) propose behavior models (overreaction or underreaction) for 
intermediate-term momentum, while Conrad and Kaul (1998), and Fama 
and French, 1993，1996) suggest a risk-based interpretation; Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999) attempt to use the "industry momentum" hypothesis 
to explain momentum effect; Chopar, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992), and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) support of market overreaction hypothesis. 
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Many other studies focus on the explanation of predictability of average 
stock returns in terms of past trading volume, past earnings, and firm size. 
For all the above alternative explanations, the critics argue that observed 
empirical predictability patterns arise because of data mining. This 
criticism is typically the hardest to issue because empirical research in 
nonexperimental settings is limited by data availability. Although, it is 
difficult to assess the significance of individual studies that find that a 
particular trading strategy is profitable, this thesis hopes to contribute to 
the research on predictability of stock returns and evaluation of alternative 
explanations. 
On the other hand, while the previous studies examine the price behaviors 
for stocks in all, and then try to generalize the results, I take a different 
approach. I investigate the price behavior patterns in the tourism industry 
only. Choosing stocks within a specific industry rather than from the 
whole stock market has its advantages: firms within an industry tend to be 
highly correlated; they operate in the same regulatory environment, 
exhibit similar behavior in the corporate finance arena, are similarly 
sensitive to macroeconomic shocks, and are exposed to similar supply and 
demand fluctuations. The return microstructure-bias in stocks within one 
industry is smaller than those among different industries. Thus, the results 
of the empirical study are more convincing. 
B. The tourism industry 
The objectives for the tourism industry are the following: 
First, according to the 2002 Research Report of World Travel and 
Tourism Council (WTTC), in the past decade, the world tourism industry 
grows almost twice as fast as the whole world GNP. We will be 
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witnessing the start of a new era of tourism and travel. The tourism 
industry is one of the world's largest industries by the end of the last 
decade. However, the historical data indicates that the tourism stocks were 
more risky and undervalued on average from 1990 to 2000. Thus, it is 
important to understand how the tourism industry directly or indirectly 
influences its stock market performance, and what the relationship among 
tourism industry performance, tourism stock returns predictability, and 
stock undervalue are. 
Second, the historical data of the lodging industry indicates a cyclical 
pattern (Choi, Olsen, Kwansa, and Tse, 1999). Many studies, for example, 
Vogel (2001)，and Powers and Barrows (2002), report that the tourism 
industry is more sensitive to the fluctuating market demand than other 
sectors. Lundberg et al. (1995) point out that the tourism industry, similar 
to other heavily capitalized industries such as real estate and finance, 
tends to oversupply in prosperity and when there is other positive 
information; therefore, the industry encounters serious losses during the 
subsequent economic recession period. Hence, these patterns may have 
important impacts on stock performance. 
Third, some characteristics of the tourism industry may have special 
impacts on the stock price behavior. These relationships will provide 
more information on the study of profitability of investment strategy 
patterns. Thus, it is inspiring to explore such relationships. From this 
viewpoint, research on the impacts of tourism characteristics on stock 
performance provides additional evidences and perspectives in examining 
return predictability patterns, justifying the relative predictive power of 
explanatory variables, and evaluating the competing hypotheses for the 
predictability of stock returns. 
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While numerous studies have developed models to explain the 
relationship between the current stocks performance and past stock return, 
past earnings data, and other firm characteristics for the overall market, no 
prior studies focus on the tourism industry. In this vein, the thesis fills this 
gap and attributes to the finance study in the tourism industry. 
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4.2 Research Questions 
First, this research provides insights into the relationship between stock 
returns and past firm performance for the tourism industry and the overall 
market in the USA. The study examines the predictability (contrarian or 
momentum effect) of stock returns in different horizons, - short horizon 
(one week to one month), intermediate horizon (three months to twelve 
months), and long horizon (thirteen months to sixty months) - based on 
past return and past trading volume. The thesis also tests the relationship 
between firm size and return predictability. None of the previous studies 
have examined the price behaviors of stocks with all of the explanation 
variables. The "triangulation" methodology can control the potential 
extraneous variables and reduce the errors arising from them, and thus 
enhance the predictability power of these determinant variables. 
Second, using the "earning momentum" strategy could provide more 
evidence to evaluate market efficiency and to explain stock return 
predictability in a special way. As reported by many studies (Bernard and 
Thomas, 1990; and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996), it is natural 
to look at earnings to try to understand movements in stock prices because 
the predictability of stock average return is largely due to the component 
of returns that is related to this earnings-related information. Thus, 
earnings are normally believed to be one of the driving forces for return 
momentum behavior in these studies. 
Third, one implication of the "industry momentum" hypothesis of 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) is that momentum investment strategies 
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are significantly less profitable once the stocks are controlled within an 
industry. Thus, the thesis can test the "industry effect" hypothesis. 
Fourth, whether the tourism stocks and the whole stock market has 
overreaction (own-autocovariance or/and cross-autocovariance), 
underreaction to past information, behave as those in Conrad and Kaul 
(1998) risk-based hypothesis, or can be explained by Fama-French model, 
is still not resolved. The thesis finds that oversupply of the tourism 
industry in prosperity has a significant impact on the mean rate of return 
of tourism stocks. The study tests various theories, which have been 
proposed by previous studies to explain predictability in stock returns. 
Furthermore, the thesis studies the impacts of some characteristics of the 
tourism industry on tourism stock performance. For example, big firms 
tend to take more aggressive overreaction than small firms. It would be 
interesting to examine how big tourism firms' overreaction affects the 
momentum profits of big tourism stocks -- whether intermediate-term 
price momentum strategies for big capitalization stocks are more 
profitable than those of small stocks. Another characteristic of the tourism 
industry is that its products and services are highly perishable and 
intangible; production, delivery, and consumption take place 
simultaneously. Thus, tourism firms' near-term earnings could be more 
precisely expected by analysts and investors and thus be partially reflected 
in tourism firm stock prices before the date of earning disclosure. 
Whereas in the manufacturing industry, products could be sold at a later 
date if the market condition is not good, so manufacturing firms' next 
quarter earnings could not be expected as easily as tourism firms. This 
property of the tourism industry implies that the persistence and 
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magnitude of the tourism earning momentum strategies and market 
earning momentum strategies will be different on average. 
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4.3 Hypotheses 
The research questions of this thesis are found in the following 12 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis of Predictability of average returns based 
on past return and earning): Average tourism and market stock 
returns in different horizons can be predicted by past returns and 
past earnings. 
Numerous studies report the short-term return reversal, intermediate-term 
return momentum (or continuation), and long-term return reversal effects 
based on past return data. Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988), Bernard and 
Thomas (1990), and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) find that 
price momentum in the intermediate-horizon and long-horizon is a 
function of past earnings related data. This research uses price momentum 
(or contrarian) and earning momentum (or contrarian) proposed by Lee 
and Swaminathan (2000) and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) to 
test the predictability of average stock returns in short, intermediate, and 
long-horizon. That is, whether those strategies can earn statistically 
significant profits for tourism stocks. 
Hypothesis 2 (Hypothesis of Predictability of average returns based 
on past trading volume): Average tourism stock returns in different 
horizon can be predicted by past trading volume. 
In the short-term, Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) find that price 
changes accompanied by high volume will tend to be reversed. Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) report that the magnitude and persistence of stock 
returns' momentum in the intermediate-horizon can be predicted by 
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trading volume. It is possible that average tourism stock returns in 
different horizons can be predicted by past trading volume. 
Hypothesis 3 (Firm size influence hypothesis): Firm size has 
significant impact on the predictability of average tourism stock 
returns in different horizons. 
Using the market capitalization as the proxy of firm size, Hong, Lim, and 
Stein (1999) find that the profitability of intermediate-term price 
momentum strategies in small stocks declines sharply with firm size 
decrease. The research hypothesizes that the profitability of past return 
and earning strategies for tourism stocks can be explained by firm size in 
different investment horizons. 
Hypothesis 4: Short-term predictability of return is partially due to 
lead-lag effect: returns of larger stocks lead those of smaller stocks. 
(Lo and Mackinlay, 1990) 
Neither overreaction nor underreaction models, which are proposed to 
explain profitability of mean returns in intermediate-term and long-term, 
is suitable for short-term price reversal. Table 2.3 and Table 2.2 
demonstrate that the market loadings (Beta) between weekly and monthly 
return for tourism stock portfolio are quite different. It implies a different 
driving force for short-horizon price reversal compared with intermediate-
term price momentum and long term reversal. Lo and Mackinlay (1990) 
find the lead-lag hypothesis which proposes that short-term contrarian 
profits are due to the small stocks' price overreaction to past big stocks. 
Big (small) stocks refer to stocks whose market capitalizations are higher 
(lower) than average level. 
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Hypothesis 5: Short-term price contrarian profit for small stocks is 
higher than that for big stocks. 
If short-term contrarian profits are due to the small stocks' overreaction to 
past big stocks, price contrarian strategy for small tourism stocks should 
earn higher contrarian profit than that for big tourism stocks. 
Hypothesis 6: Contrarian price strategies in the short-term can earn 
significant profit even if the returns of these portfolios are risk-
adjusted by Fama-French three-factor model. 
As reported in Table 2.5，since the Q-statistics of the risk-adjusted weekly 
return of tourism stock portfolio is not substantially less than the return of 
the tourism stock portfolio based on weekly return, then something other 
than the market factor, SMB, and HML may be causing the 
autocorrelation in the tourism stock portfolio in short-term. 
Hypothesis 7 (Intermediate-term and long-term overreaction to past-
return hypothesis): Profitability of the momentum price strategy in 
the intermediate-term and the contrarian strategy in long-term are 
partially due to market overreaction. 
As discussed in section 2.4, the tourism industry tends to overreact in a 
time of prosperity. It implies that the profits in the intermediate-term 
momentum price strategy for tourism industry arise because of an 
overreaction to price information that pushes the prices of winners 
(losers) above (below) their fundamental values in the intermediate-term. 
The profits in long-term price contrarian strategy are due to the stock 
prices of the winners and losers reverting to their fundamental values in 
the subsequent long-term. 
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The other main theories that explain the profitability of intermediate 
momentum strategy are the underreaction hypotheses, the Fama-French 
three-factor model, and CK risk-based models (Conrad and Kaul, 1998). 
To test these competing hypotheses, the article examines the holding 
period return of the past-price momentum portfolio up to 60 months out. 
If the momentum profits are significantly negative in the long-term, which 
is consistent with the overreaction theories, the alternative hypotheses 
(underreaction, and CK risk-based model) could be rejected. 
Hypothesis 8: The magnitude of profit of the intermediate-term 
momentum price strategies for big tourism firms is higher than small 
tourism firms. 
The intermediate-term systematic risk (Beta) in tourism stocks is higher 
than that of the whole market partially because of "overbuilding", 
particularly by big firms' overreaction to the market. 
The tourism industry, especially the lodging sector and airline sector, has 
been dominated by a few major players, and top restaurant chains have 
accounted for a major share of restaurant sales in the last decades. 
Historical evidence indicates that those big tourism firms tended to 
expand too aggressively in prosperity and therefore resulted in an 
oversupply which exaggerated their financial problems in ensuing 
recessions. 
Thus, the price momentum strategy for big tourism firms is expected to 
earn higher momentum profit than small tourism firms. 
Hypothesis 9 (Intermediate-term and long-term underreaction to 
past-earning hypothesis): Intermediate- and long-horizon stock 
returns predictability underreact to past earning related information. 
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Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) document that the predictability 
of future returns from past returns is due to the market's underreaction to 
information regarding past earnings news, especially in the case of stocks 
with the worst past performance. The thesis uses an earning momentum 
strategy to study whether the market underreacts or overreacts to earning 
related information. 
Hypothesis 10: The earning momentum effect for tourism stocks is 
expected to be more short-lived in persistence and smaller in 
magnitude than for the whole market on average. 
Products and services of the tourism industry are highly perishable and 
intangible; the production, delivery, and consumption of them take place 
simultaneously. Whereas in the manufacturing industry, products could be 
sold at a later date if market conditions are not good. On the other hand, 
unlike the goods produced in the factories and sold in somewhere else, the 
operation information of tourism products and services can be acquired 
simply. Thus, tourism firms' near-term earnings information could be 
more precisely expected by analysts and investors and could be partially 
reflected in tourism stocks' price before the date of earning disclosure. 
Hypothesis 11 (Industry effect hypothesis): Momentum investment 
strategies are significantly less profitable once stocks are controlled 
within the tourism industry. 
This is an important implication of the "industry momentum" hypothesis 
of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). 
Hypothesis 12: Momentum (or contrarian) price strategies profit for 
the intermediate- and long-term can be significantly reduced if the 
portfolio's risk-adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor model. 
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In Table 2.3，the Q-statistics for the risk-adjusted monthly return of the 
tourism stock portfolio indicates that residuals were not positively or 
negatively autocorrelated. It probably means that the market, SMB, and 
HML factors predict most of the autocorrelation in the tourism stock 
portfolio in the intermediate and long-term. 
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
and Results 
5.1 Research Methodology 
5.1.1 Samples and Data Selection 
Tourism industry stocks in the U.S. comprise all tourism industry firms 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during the period of January 
1990 through December 2000. The sample of market portfolio is 
constructed from all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
during the period of January 1990 through December 2000. 
Tourism industry firm selection is based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 
1987 Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) code system. The tourism 
industry sample is selected from firms with SIC codes of major industry 
group 58 (Eating and Drinking Places), 451 (Transportation by Air, 
scheduled), 70 (Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging 
Places), 79 (Amusement and Recreation Services), and industries 4724 
(Travel Agencies) and 4725 (Tour Operators) from major group 47 
(Transportation Services). Because nonscheduled air transportation firms, 
such as FedEx and UPS, are not related to the tourism industry, thus 452 
(Transportation by Air, nonscheduled) is excluded. 
Return data, number of transactions, and firm sizes (market capitalization) 
for individual securities are available from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). The study uses net income as the measure of 
earnings data. Net income data come from COMPUSTAT files. 
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5.1.2 Research Design 
The study uses portfolio strategies proposed first by Lehmann (1990) and 
later addressed by Lo and Mackinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993, 2001) as basis. This study refers to the strategies of long winners 
(losers) and short losers (winners) based on past returns as "price 
momentum (contrarian)" strategies, and those based on past earnings 
surprises as "earning momentum (contrarian) strategies". 
The study employs weekly data in short-term study since much of the 
short horizon contrarian literature focuses on this interval and hence the 
profits of this thesis can be easily compared to others. Quarterly returns 
and earnings dataare used for the intermediate-term and the long-term 
because earnings are only available on a quarterly basis in Compustat file. 
At the beginning of each period (week for short-term; quarter for 
intermediate- and long-term) starting from January 1990, all stocks are 
sorted based on their previous period K returns or standard unexpected 
earnings (SUE) divided into three equally-weighted portfolios. R1 
represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns in the low 33.3% of 
the sample pool, R3 represents the winner portfolio with the highest 
returns in the upper 33.3%, and R2 represents the portfolio between the 
low 33.3% and the upper 33.3% during the previous K period. In the same 
manner, El represents the portfolio with the most unfavorable earning 
surprise (SUE) in the low 33.3% of the sample pool, E3 represents the 
portfolio that have delivered the most favorable earning surprises (SUE) 
in the upper 33.3%, and E2 represents the portfolio between the low 
33.3% and the upper 33.3% during the previous formation period. All 
stocks are equally-weighted within a given portfolio. 
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As a convention, all return data used in this study are the return above the 
risk-free rate of return (30 days U.S. Treasury Bill rate of return). 
The ranking variable used in the price momentum (contrarian) strategies 
is a stock's past compound return in the formation period K. In my 
earning momentum (contrarian) strategies, the study uses the commonly 
used standard unexpected earnings (SUE) as the measure of earning news. 
SUE； =t!lZlls± ‘ 
where e.^  is quarterly earnings (net income) most recently announced as 
of month t for stock i，is earnings one quarter ago, and g. is the 
standard deviation of unexpected earnings, - o v e r the period 
January 1990 to December 2000. The SUE model uses the assumptions 
of Random walk and Martingale process; that is, the changes in earnings 
are serially uncorrelated and this quarter's earnings are the expectation of 
next quarter's earnings. 
The research indicates K as formation period. Stocks are ranked and 
grouped into 3 portfolios on the basis of their returns over the previous 
week for short-term, previous 3，6，9’ and 12 months for intermediate and 
long-term. J represents holding periods where J = 3, 6, 9, or 12 months for 
intermediate-term and J = 36 months, 48 months, and 60 months for long-
term strategies; J = 1, 2, or 4 weeks for short-term strategies. Holding 
period returns are calculated as contrarian or momentum profits. 
Using the mean value as breakpoints, firm sizes and holding period 
trading volume are divided into two categories. The smaller firms are in 
size class CI, and the larger firms are in C2. VI represents the lowest 
trading volume portfolio, and V2 represents the highest trading volume 
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portfolio. Based on to the studies of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001), 
this study uses mean market capitalization as the measure of firm size. 
Taken together, the stocks are grouped together to form a portfolios based 
on the five explanatory variables (J, K, R/E, V，C). While the most of 
previous studies employed 2 or 3 explanatory variables in their research 
model, the study intergrate 5 variables into a single portfolio. 
For simplification, the study classifies the portfolios into two general sets 
according to whether using R (past return) or E (past earning surprise), 
price momentum (contrarian) strategies and earning momentum 
(contrarian) strategies. 
To increase the power of the tests, the study constructs special 
overlapping portfolios as suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 
2001). A momentum (contrarian) portfolio in any particular week (for 
short-term) or quarter (for intermediate-term and long-term) holds stocks 
ranked in that portfolio in any of the previous K formation period. For 
example, in the intermediate and long-term J=12 and K=3 months 
analysis, in December 1995 (the second quarter in 1995) the winner 
portfolio is comprised of 25 percent of the R3 stocks format on the first 
day of January 1995 (which will be held to the last day of December 
1995), 25 percent of the R3 stocks formatted on the first day of April 
1995 (which will be hold to the last day of March 1996)，25 percent of the 
R3 stocks formatted on the first day of July 1995 (which will be hold to 
the last day of June 1996), and 25 percent of the R3 stocks formatted on 
the first day of October 1995 (which will be hold to the last day of 
September 1996). 
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Because the Compustat database only offers quarterly earnings data, in 
short horizon, only price contrarian strategies will be used in the analysis. 
In the intermediate and long horizon, both price momentum (contrarian) 
series and earning momentum (contrarian) series strategies are used in the 
analysis. 
In the short-term, mean monthly holding period returns are employed for 
periods following the portfolio formation. In intermediate- and long-term 
study, annual holding period returns (annualized rate of return on holding 
period average basis) are computed. 
To provide additional evidence on the source of the profits of various 
portfolio investment strategies, the three-factor model (Fama and French, 
1993) are used. Risks due to market factor (Market), book-to-market 
equity ratio (HML) factors, and size (SMB) factors will be adjusted from 
the original data for the tourism stock portfolio. 
Throughout the thesis, I use the convention that statistics must have two-
tailed P-values less than 0.10 to be termed significant. Thus, a P-value 
lower than 0.10 imples an significant statistical difference. 
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5.1.3 Summary Statistics of Price and Earning Strategies 
To lay the groundwork, Table 5.1 and 5.2 reports the average daily 
returns, maximum daily returns, minimum daily returns, and stock number 
from 1990 to 2000 for the full samples of price strategies and earning 
strategies. The associated T statistics are shown in parentheses to test 
whether the returns are reliably different from zero. 
The first striking thing that emerges from the tables is that the stock 
number for earning strategies is less than that for price strategies, because 
the Compustat file from which the earnings data come from has a smaller 
stock coverage than the CRSP file. Second, the mean rate of returns and 
mean earnings for market portfolio and tourism portfolio in both earnings 
and price strategies are closely related to the macro economic climate. For 
example, economic recession in the early 1990s, the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, the 1994 slowdown, and the Asia Financial Crisis in 1998, stunted 
growth of the returns of the overall stock market and tourism stocks for a 
while. However, as the Table 5.1 illustrates, in general, the stocks 
performed solidly up to when the economic recession began in 2000. 
Third, Figure 5.2 illustrates that mean tourism earnings performed 
differently. By 1994, tourism mean earnings again soared as sharply rising 
demand finally absorbed the oversupply created in the second half of the 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2 Results for Short-term Price Contrarian 
Strategies 
In this section, the empirical results for different price contrarian 
strategies over short-term are discussed. Subsection 5.2.1 confirms that 
the price contrarian strategy is profitable for the tourism portfolio and 
market portfolio. In subsection 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, the study introduces two-
way analysis -- volume-based price contrarian strategies and size-based 
price contrarian strategies for tourism stock and the whole market, and 
examines return predictability. Subsection 5.2.4 compares Fama-French-
Three-Factor risk-adjusted returns of the basic contrarian portfolio and 
four advanced contrarian strategy portfolios based on past trading volume 
or firm size. In subsection 5.2.5, the study tests the lead-lag hypothesis 
(Lo and Mackinlay, 1990) for short-term contrarian strategy profitability. 
65 
5.2.1 Price Contrarian Strategies for Tourism Portfolio and 
Market Portfolio 
Table 5.3 
Mean Monthly Returns of Price Contrarian Strategy for Tourism 
Stock and Market Portfolio 
This table reports the mean monthly returns of tourism stock price and market contrarian 
strategy portfolio in the U.S. The equal-weighted market portfolio includes all stocks traded on 
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The sample of equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio 
includes all tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. At the beginning of 
each week starting from January 1990，all tourism stocks are sorted based on their previous one-
week return and divided into three equal-weighted portfolios. R1 represents the loser portfolio 
with the lowest returns in the low 33.3% of the sample pool, and R3 represents the winner 
portfolio with the highest returns in the upper 33.3% during the previous one-week. Combined 
portfolio R1-R3 represents long the R1 portfolio and short the R3 portfolio at the same time. All 
returns used in this study are geometric average annual returns above the risk-free rate of return 
(30 days U.S. Treasury Bill rate of return). T statistics are shown in parentheses to test whether 
the returns are reliably different from zero. The sample period is January 1990 to December 
2000. 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 
Portfolio J=1 J=2 J=4 J=1 J=2 J=4 
Week Week Week Week Week Week 
R1 0.048 0.023 O ^ 0 . 0 4 5 0.026 0.015 
(13.68)** (9.42)** (6.03)** (18.25)** (13.60)** (10.04)** 
R3 -0.031 -0.018 -0.008 -0.021 -0.010 -0.002 
(-10.94)** (-8.60)** (-5.42)** (-10.70)** (-6.48)** (-1.69)** 
R1-R3 0.081 0.041 0.020 0.067 0.036 0.017 
(19.46)** (15.86)** (11.05)** (29.90)** (23.30)** (16.00)** 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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This subsection gives the general view of the short-term contrarian 
strategies. Table 5.3 summarizes mean monthly stock returns of price 
contrarian strategy portfolios for the tourism industry and the whole 
market. The associated T statistics are shown in parentheses to test 
whether the returns are reliably different from zero. 
The table illustrates that the mean return is negative for winners and 
positive for losers in all holding periods. Both winners and losers 
experience fast price reversals. The results in the last two rows indicate 
that the profits of the contrarian portfolios are significantly positive at the 
5% level. For instance, buying previous week losers and selling previous 
week winners, and holding the contrarian portfolio for one week will earn 
8.1% monthly return for tourism stocks. 
The results are highly consistent with findings in previous studies (e.g. 
Lehmann (1990), Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) and Jegadeesh 
(1990)) that selling the securities that have performed well and buying the 
securities that have performed poorly will earn positive profits in a short-
horizon. In addition, holding the contrarian portfolios for one week will 
earn the highest contrarian returns. However, the contrarian profits drop 
fast in holding period J equals 2 weeks and 4 weeks, because the mean 
returns of the losers R1 decrease and the mean returns of the winners R3 
increase. 
It is worthy to note that tourism returns of a stock contrarian portfolio are 
higher than those of a market contrarian portfolio, particularly in the first 
week, because tourism stocks experience faster price reversion on average 
than the market portfolio. In subsection 5.2.3, the study reveals that this 
difference happens because small tourism stocks experience faster price 
reversals than small market stocks. 
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5.2.2 Volume-Based Price Contrarian Strategy for Tourism 
Portfolio and Market Portfolio 
Table 5.4 
Mean Monthly Returns of Price Contrarian Strategy Based on 
Past Return and Past Trading Volume for Tourism Stock and 
Market Portfolio 
This table reports the mean monthly returns of tourism stocks and market price contrarian 
strategy portfolio based on past return and past trading volume. The equal-weighted market 
portfolio includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The sample of 
the equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ. At the beginning of each week starting from January 1990, all 
tourism stocks are sorted based on their previous one-week return and divided into three 
equal-weighted portfolios. R1 represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns in the 
low 33.3% of the sample pool, and R3 represents the winner portfolio with the highest 
returns in the upper 33.3% during the previous one-week. Combined portfolio R1-R3 
represents that the portfolio is long the R1 portfolio and short the R3 portfolio at the same 
time. The holding period trading volume is divided into 2 equal-weighted groups. VI 
represents the lowest trading volume portfolio, and V2 represents the highest trading 
volume portfolio. V2-V1 represents that the portfolio longs the V2 and shorts the VI 
portfolio at the same time. All returns used in this study are geometric average monthly 
return above the risk-free rate of return (30 days U.S. Treasury Bill rate of return). T 
statistics are shown in parentheses below the returns values. The sample period is January 
1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A; Tourism Portfolio 
J = 1 Week J = 2 Week J = 4 Week 
— R 1 R3 R1-R3 R1 R3 Rl-R3~ R1 R3 R1-R3 
V I 0.045 -0.039 0.087 0.021 -0.020 0.042 0.010 -0.009 0.020 
(11.40)** (-11.46)** (18.60)** (7.68)** (-7.85)** (14.19)** (4.99)** (-4.79)** (9.94)** 
V2 0.050 -0.023 0.075 0.024 -0.015 0.040 0.012 -0.008 0.020 
(8.77)** (-5.11)** (11.68)** (6.12)** (-4.76)** (9.83)** (3.91)** (-3.12)** (6.74)** 
V2-V1 0.005 0.016 -0.011 0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 
(0.96) (3.33)** (-1.43) (0.78) (1.43) (-0.34) (0.57) (0.71) (0.01) 
Panel B ； Market Portfolio 
V I 0.041 -0.028 0.071 0.023 -0.013 0.036 0.013 -0.004 0.017 
(16.11)** (-14.40)** (35.00)** (11.61)** (-8.67)** (28.00)** (8.53)** (-3.18)** (18.50)** 
V2 0.049 -0.014 0.064 0.030 -0.006 0.036 0.017 0.000 0.017 
(11.61)** (-4.15)** (22.50)** (8.94)** (-2.49)** (18.00)** (6.56)** (-0.09) (12.60)** 
V2-V1 0.008 0.014 -0.006 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.004 -0.001 
(2.68)** (5.14)** (-3.01)** (2.96)** (3.33)** (0.07) | (2.06)** (2.45)** (-0.36) 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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This subsection introduces the trading volume as an explanatory variable 
and control another variable, firm size, by sample randomization to 
examine the impacts of trading volume on the predictability of contrarian 
portfolio in tourism stocks and the whole stock market in the U.S. 
Table 5.4 reports monthly returns of tourism and market portfolios formed 
on the basis of a two-way analysis between price contrarian and past 
trading volume. Table values represent the mean monthly returns over the 
next holding period J weeks (J=l, 2, 4 week). 
Several important results are found in Table 5.4 as follows. First, 
conditional on past returns of R1 or R3, high volume stocks generally do 
better than low volume stocks over the next 1, 2 and 4 weeks. 
Specifically, high (low) volume losers (winners) experience faster 
reversals. This is seen from the consistently positive returns to the (V2-
VI) portfolio conditional on past returns (R1 or R3). For instance, within 
a one-week holding period, low volume losers underperform high volume 
losers by 0.5% (0.005) per monthin the tourism portfolio. Similarly, low 
volume winners underperform high volume winners by 1.6% (0.016) per 
month for the tourism portfolio. This result can also be found in almost all 
holding periods for either tourism stocks or the market portfolio. 
Apparently, firms that experience high trading volume in the past one-
week tend to outperform firms with low trading volume. 
It also means that high (low) volume losers (winners) experience faster 
reversals than high (low) volume winners (losers) stocks. This finding is 
not consistent with the research of return predictability in a short-horizon. 
(Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) and Conrad, Hameed, and Niden 
(1994) Campbell et al. claim, “Price changes accompanied by high 
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volume will tend to be reversed; this will be less true of price changes on 
days with low volume". 
Second, Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1 show that both high and low trading 
volume portfolios can earn significant positive contrarian profits in a 
contrarian portfolio (R1-R3). For example, the high volume and low 
volume two-week holding period portfolio earn 4.0% and 4.2% per 
monthly contrarian profits respectively. I use two-factor analysis with 
replication ANOVA to test the hypothesis of equation of contrarian 
returns between high past volume and low past volume firms in 1-week 
holding periods. The statistical summary reports an F-statistics of 215.75 
(P-Value=0.00) for the tourism portfolio and a 34.92 (P-Value=0.00) for 
the market portfolio. That means that the contrarian profits of firms with 
high past trading volume are significantly higher than those with low 
trading volume in the first week after portfolio formation. However, a 
contrarian portfolio of low volume firms does not significantly 
outperform that of high volume firms in 2-week and 4-week holding 
periods. 
Finally, the contrarian returns drop fast in 2-week and 4-week holding 
periods because the mean returns of the losers decrease and the mean 
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Table 5.4 shows that: (1) high volume stocks generally do better than low 
volume stocks over the short-term; (2) high (low) volume losers (winners) 
experience faster reversals; (3) both high and low trading volume 
contrarian portfolios can earn significant profits in contrarian portfolio, 
but contrarian profits of firms with high past trading volume are 
significantly higher than those with low trading volume in the first week 
after portfolio formation; (4) profits decrease when holding period 
becomes longer. 
These evidences suggest that the magnitude and persistence of mean 
return of tourism stocks can be predicted based on trading volume 
(Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran, 1991; and Conrad, Hameed, and Niden, 
1994). Traders can leam valuable information about stocks by observing 
both past price and past volume information, thus traders who include 
volume measures in their technical analysis perform better in the market 
than those who do not. 
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5.2.3 Size-Based Price Contrarian Strategy for Tourism 
Portfolio and Market Portfolio 
Table 5.5 
Mean Monthly Returns of Price Contrarian Strategy Based on 
Past Return and Firm Size for Tourism Stock and Market 
Portfolio 
This table reports the mean monthly returns of tourism stock and market price contrarian 
strategy portfolio based on past return and firm size. The equal-weighted market portfolio 
includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The sample of equal-weighted 
tourism stock portfolio includes all tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. 
At the beginning of week starting from January 1990, all tourism stocks are sorted based on their 
previous one-week return and are divided into three equal-weighted portfolios. R1 represents the 
loser portfolio with the lowest returns in the low 33.3% of the sample pool, and R3 represents 
the winner portfolio with the highest returns in the upper 33.3%, during the previous one-week. 
R1-R3 represents that the portfolio is long the R1 portfolio and short the R3 portfolio at the 
same time. The firm size is divided into 2 equal-weighted groups. CI represents the smallest 
firm size portfolio, and C2 represents the largest firm size portfolio. C2-C1 represents that the 
portfolio is long the C2 and short the CI portfolio at the same time. All returns used in this study 
are geometric average monthly return above the risk-free rate of return (30 days U.S. Treasury 
Bill rate of return). T statistics are shown in parentheses below the returns values. The sample 
period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A: Tourism Portfolio 
J = 1 Week J = 2 Week J = 4 Week 
R1 R3 R l - R � R 1 R3 R1-R3 R1 R3 R1-R3 
O 0.079 -0.046 0.129 0.036 -0.026 0.063 0.017 -0.013 0.030 
(13.50)** (-9.79)** (18.13)** (9.09)** (-7.74)** (14.46)** (5.54)** (-5.17)** (10.09)** 
C 2 0.017 -0.016 0.034 0.009 -0.009 0.019 0.005 -0.004 0.009 
(4.72)** (-5.14)** (9.25)** (3.50)** (-3.98)** (7.66)** (2.58)** (-2.06)** (5.07)** 
C2-C1 -0.058 0.031 -0.087 -0.026 0.017 -0.043 -0.012 0.010 -0.021 
(-9.79)** (5.69)** (-12.26)** (-6.48)** (4.54)** (-8.98)** (-3.92)** (3.57)** (-6.32)** 
Panel B; Market Portfolio 
C I 0.071 -0.033 0.107 0.039 -0.016 0.056 0.022 -0.006 0.027 
(19.79)** (-10.90)** (42.30)** (13.43)** (-6.64)** (34.70)** (9.01)** (-2.62)** (25.10)** 
C 2 0.019 -0.009 0.028 0.013 -0.003 0.016 0.008 0.002 0.007 
(6.03)** (-3.63)** (11.90)** (5.30)** (-1.90)** (9.26)** (4.75)** (0.87) (5.75)** 
C2-C1 -0.050 0.024 -0.072 -0.026 0.013 -0.039 -0.014 0.007 -0.021 
(-20.60)** (9.41)** (-38.05)** (-13.00)** (6.54)** (-30.53)** (-7.86)** (4.13)** (-22.31)** 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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In this subsection, I examine the impact of firm size on the predictability 
of the contrarian portfolio in tourism industry stocks and the stocks of the 
whole market in the United States. Table 5.5 reports returns of tourism 
and market portfolios formed on the basis of a two-way analysis between 
price contrarian and firm size. Several key results emerge from Table 5.5. 
First, small firms tend to experience faster price reversals. Consequently, 
small losers ClRl earns the highest return and small winners C1R3 earns 
the lowest. For example, in a one-week holding period, small tourism 
losers have a highest monthly return of 7.9% per month in the first week; 
whereas, small tourism winners earn -4.6%. 
Second, significant positive profits in the contrarian portfolio (R1-R3) are 
found for small firms as well as large firms. The contrarian portfolio of 
small firms significantly outperforms that of large firms over all short-
term holding periods for both market and tourism portfolios. I use two-
factor analysis with replication ANOVA to test the hypothesis of equation 
of contrarian returns between small and big firms. The statistics summary 
reports the F-statistic at 200.31 (P-Value=0.00) for tourism portfolio and 
70.23 (P-Value=0.00) for market the portfolio. The null hypothesis can be 
rejected. This evidence illustrates that firm size can predict contrarian 
profits in a short horizon. 
Third, the contrarian returns decay quickly in 2 weeks and 4 weeks, 
because the mean returns of the losers decrease and the mean returns of 
the winners increase for both small and large size stocks. For example, the 
contrarian profits of 1-week, 2-week, and 4-week of small tourism firms 
are 12.9%, 6.3% and 3.0% per month respectively. 
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Finally, the table also illustrates that the contrarian profits of the tourism 
portfolio tend to outperform those of the overall market. For example, the 
average profit in one week is 12.9% per month for the tourism portfolio, 
but only 10.7% for the market portfolio. 
Figure 5.2 
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Summarily, Table 5.5 illustrates that: (1) small firms experience faster 
reversals; (2) the contrarian portfolio of small firms significantly 
outperforms that of large firms, but both of them can earn significant 
positive abnormal profits in a contrarian portfolio; (3) abnormal profits 
decrease quickly when the holding period last longer; (4) contrarian 
profits of the tourism portfolio tend to outperform those of the overall 
market. These results suggest that the magnitude and persistence of mean 
return of tourism stocks can be predicted by firm size. 
A possible explanation for the high contrarian profits of small stocks is 
that small stocks are hard to trade thus needs a higher liquidity risk 
premium. Furthermore, because it is expensive to trade smaller stocks in 
several week intervals, it may not be possible to execute active trading 
strategies with small stocks although they offer higher profits. 
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5.2.4 Risk-Adjusted Returns of Contrarian Strategy for 
Tourism Portfolio 
This subsection examines the predictability of the contrarian portfolios 
risk-adjusted by Fama-French-three-factor model for the tourism industry. 
Table 5.6 reports the returns and risk-adjusted returns for the basic 
contrarian portfolio and four advanced contrarian strategy portfolios based 
on past trading volume or firm size. There are four advanced contrarian 
portfolios: CI, C2, VI，and V2. The dotted line in Figure 5.3 represents 
the basic contrarian portfolio, which is not classified by trading volume 
and firm size. The formation period is one week. 
If the profitability of contrarian strategies can be explained by the three-
factor model (Fama and French, 1993)，the estimated intercept 
coefficients of these regressions (a, )，which are interpreted as the risk-
adjusted return of the portfolio relative to the three-factor model, will not 
differ from zero in short horizon. However, the risk-adjusted contrarian 
returns reported in Table 5.6 are not compatible with the Fama and 
French's hypothesis. Although Fama-French three factor risk-adjustment 
does substantially reduce the contrarian profits of VI, V2, CI, and C2 
contrarian portfolios, returns are significantly positive for risk-adjusted 
contrarian portfolios over the one, two, and four-week holding periods. 
Thus, something in addition to the market, size (SMB), and BE/ME 
(HML) factors explains the profits of contrarian portfolios. 
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Table 5.6 
Risk-adjusted and Non-Risk-Adjusted Mean Monthly Returns 
for Tourism Price Contrarian (R1-R3) Strategy Portfolios 
This table reports the mean monthly returns and Fama-French three-factor risk adjusted mean 
monthly abnormal returns for tourism price contrarian strategy portfolio based on past trading 
volume, and firm size. The sample of equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all 
tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. At the beginning of week starting 
from January 1990, all tourism stocks are sorted based on their previous one-week return is 
divided into three equal-weighted portfolios. R1 represents the loser portfolio with the lowest 
returns in the low 33.3% of the sample pool; R3 represents the winner portfolio with the highest 
returns in the upper 33.3% during the previous one-week. Price Contrarian Strategy (R1-R3) 
represents that the portfolio is long the R1 portfolio and short the R3 portfolio at the same time. 
Besides, using the lower and upper 33.3%s as breakpoints, the holding period trading volume 
and firm size are divided into 2 equal-weighted groups. CI (VI) represents the smallest firm size 
(lowest trading volume) portfolio, and C2 (V2) represents the largest firm size (highest trading 
volume) portfolio. "All" portfolio is the basic momentum portfolio not classified by firm size 
and trading volume. Returns used in this study are geometric average monthly return above the 
risk-free rate of return. T statistics are shown in parentheses below the returns values. The 
sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Not Risk-Adjusted Risk-Adjusted 
J = 1 Week J = 2 Week J = 4 Week 丁= 1 Week J = 2 Week J = 4 Week 
Portfo l io R1-R3 R1-R3 R1-R3 R1-R3 R1-R3 R1-R3 
V I 0.087 0.042 0.020 0.051 0.031 0.017 
(18.60)** (14.19)** (9.94)** (13.77)** (11.63)** (8.49)** 
V2 0.075 0.040 0.020 0.033 0.024 0.016 
(11.68)** (9.83)** (6.74)** (7.03)** (7.81)** (6.85)** 
C I 0.129 0.063 0.030 0.057 0.035 0.020 
(18.13)** (14.46)** (10.09)** (10.47)** (9.58)** (7.49)** 
C 2 0.034 0.019 0.009 0.027 0.020 0.012 
(9.25)** (7.66)** (5.07)** (8.49)** (8.60)** (6.37)** 
A l l 0.081 0.041 0.020 0.093 0.048 0.020 
(19.46)** (15.86)料（11.05)** (7.03)** (7.81)** (6.85)** 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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Figure 5.3 
Mean Monthly Returns for Risk-adjusted and Non-Risk-Adjusted 
Tourism Price Contrarian (R1-R3) Strategy Portfolios 
Not Risk-Adjusted (Tourism) Risk-Adjusted (Tourism) 
0.2 0.2 . 
I 0,15；^ | C M 5 -
？ 1 £ „ . ^ ^ 1 0.1 -
f � � 5 1 : ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
° . 1 ‘ 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 Holding Period J (week) 
Hold ing Per iod J (week) 
—C2 一 一 Al - ^ C l — 一 Al 
77 
5.2.5 Lead-lag Hypothesis 
The empirical results that the price contrarian strategy for small firms 
could earn higher contrarian profit than that for big firms suggest that 
short-horizon excess profits are possibly partially due to lead-lag effects; 
returns of large stocks lead those of smaller stocks (Lo and Mackinlay, 
1990). 
Fama and French (1996) find that, except for the continuation of 
intermediate-term returns, the returns of contrarian or momentum 
portfolios can be captured by the Fama-French-three-factor model (Fama 
and French, 1993) and largely disappear in the residuals. If the argument 
is correct, the time series of risk-adjusted return by Fama-French three-
factor model (sum of the intercept term and residual term) should be a 
zero-covariance stationary process ^  for both big firms and small firms in 
the short horizon. However, the evidence reported in Table 5.7 and Figure 
5.4 strongly rejects the Fama and French hypothesis. 
Table 5.7 presents the Ljung-Box-Q (or Q) statistics for autocorrelation or 
cross-autocorrelation for the tourism portfolio and the market portfolio. Q 
statistics can be used to test whether a group of autocorrelations or cross-
autocorrelations is significantly different from zero. P-Values are shown 
in parentheses below the Q Statistics. Figure 5.4 presents an auto-
correlation function (ACF) and a cross auto-correlation function between 
the risk-adjusted returns between small firms and big firms. 
‘ A stochastic process having a finite constant mean and variance is covariance stationary if for all t and 
t-s, co\{y,，) = constant. 
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Table 5.7 
Ljung-Box-Q Statistics for Autocorrelation and Cross-
Autocorrelation for Tourism Stock Portfolio and Market 
Portfolio 
This table reports the Statistics summary of the Ljung-Box-Q test for tourism stock 
portfolio (presented in Panel A) and market portfolio (presented in Panel B) in the U.S. The 
equal-weighted market portfolio includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ. The sample of equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all tourism 
stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. "Small" represents small firms. "Big" 
represents big firms. "Small-Lead-Big" represents that the Q test examines the cross 
autocorrelation between past return of small firms with lag period return of big firms; and 
so on for "Big-Lead-Small". "Risk-Adjusted" represents that the returns of small and big 
firms are risk-adjusted by Fama-French three-factor model. "Q(4)", "Q(8)", and "Q(12)", 
are the Ljung-Box-Q tests for up to fourth, eighth, twelfth, order autocorrelation. P-Values 
are shown in parentheses below the Ljung-Box Q Statistics. The sample period is January 
1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A: Tourism Portfolio 
Autocorrelation or Not Risk-Adjusted Risk-Adjusted Cross-
autocorrelation of Q � Q(8) Q(12) Q � Q(8) Q(12) 
Small 129.21 137.34 142.78 40.97 41.99 46.56 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Big 33.79 41.84 54.23 38.36 41.89 56.66 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Small-Lead-Big 19.66 23.99 34.82 5.43 7.62 13.53 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.14) (0.75) (0.26) 
Big-Lead-Small 142.54 171.57 185.31 67.79 72.27 79.84 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Panel B; Market Portfolio 
Autocorrelation or Not Risk-Adjusted Risk-Adjusted Cross-autocorrelation of Q � Q(8) Q(12) Q � Q(8) Q(12) 
1 6 5 ^ 1 7 9 . 5 0 1 8 7 . 3 7 93.15 95.16 105.29 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Big 14.51 25.99 39.71 12.94 20.33 27.00 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Small-Lead-Big 7.76 18.06 35.00 3.44 9.73 12.88 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.00) (0.33) (0.55) (0.30) 
Big-Lead-Small 145.04 162.29 174.33 28.68 29.93 36.43 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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The first point to note is that the Q statistics in risk-adjusted returns data 
are generally smaller than non-risk-adjusted return for autocorrelations in 
small and big firms "own" returns and cross-autocorrelations between 
small and big firms as well. This implies that the autocorrelations or 
cross-autocorrelation in non-risk-adjusted returns are partially explained 
by the autocorrelations of Fama-French three factors ~ market factor, size 
(SMB) factor, and BE/ME (HML) factor. However, the fact that Q 
statistics of risk-adjusted returns are still significant at a 5% level, except 
in "Small-Lead-Big", suggests that besides Fama-French three factors, 
other factors also influence the autocorrelations and cross-
autocorrelations. 
The Q statistics of “Big-Lead-Small，’ (cross autocorrelations between 
previous return of big firms with lag period return of small firms) are 
statistically below 10% and 5% significance in risk-adjusted returns. The 
evidence implies that previous big firm returns have a significant impact 
on future returns of small firms on FF three-factor risk-adjusted basis. 
But, the impacts of risk-adjusted returns of small tourism firms leading 
future big tourism firms returns can be reliably omitted statistically 
because the P-values of Q-statistics, 14% for Q(4), 75% for Q(8), and 
26% for Q(12), are above the 10% significance level. We can also draw a 
similar conclusion for the market portfolio. 
The third key finding that can be seen in Figure 5.4 is that the small 
tourism firms risk-adjusted returns have a stronger trend to positively 
correlate to previous big tourism firms risk-adjusted returns over the 
short-term (1 to 4 weeks lag). However, this evidence is relatively weaker 
for the market portfolio. The fourth order, eighth order, and twelfth order 
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Q-statistics of risk-adjusted "Big-Lead-Small" is 67.69，72.27, and 79.84 
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Table 5.8 
Ljung-Box-Q Statistics of Lead-Lag Effect for Tourism Stock 
Portfolio and Market Portfolio (Risk-Adjusted) 
This table reports the statistics summary of the Ljung-Box-Q test for the tourism stock portfolio 
(presented in Panel A) and the market portfolio (presented in Panel B) in the U.S. The returns of 
small and big firms are risk-adjusted by Fama-French three-factor model. The equal-weighted 
market portfolio includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The sample of 
equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ. “Big Lead Small，，represents that the Q test examines the cross autocorrelation 
between past return of big firms with lag period return of small firms. "Past 1 week" represents 
that the Q test examines the cross-autocorrelation between previous one week return of big firms 
and future period return of small firms; and so on for "Past 2 weeks" and "Past 4 weeks". 
“Q(4)’，，“Q(8)’，，and "Q(12)", are the Ljung-Box-Q tests for up to fourth, eighth, twelfth, order 
autocorrelation in the residuals. P-Values are shown in parentheses below the Ljung-Box Q 
Statistics. The sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A: Tourism Portfolio 
Autocorrelation or Past 1 week Past 2 weeks Past 4 weeks Cross-autocorrelation of Q � Q(8) Q(12) Q � Q(8) Q(12) Q � Q(8) Q(12) 
Big-Lead-Smal l 72.27 79.84 72.27 161.84 181.56 195.73 84.50 95.79 108.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Panel B: Market Portfolio 
Big-Lead-Small 28.68 29.93 36.43 51.57 53.46 70.22 61.35 72.18 97.07 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Table 5.8 presents additional evidence to the cross autocorrelation of 
“Big-Lead-Smair. I find the Ljung-Box-Q statistics are also highly 
significant between the previous two week and four week returns of big 
firms and future period returns of small firms. The evidence means that 
the returns of small firms positively correlate to up to four previous 
weeks' returns of big firms. 
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Taken together, the study concludes that positive cross autocorrelations 
due to big firms lead small firms' returns, such as lead-lag effect 
documented in Lo and Mackinlay (1990) can be one of the reasonable 
factors for short-term contrarian strategy portfolios. If the “big lead small" 
effect is not the reason for risk-adjusted abnormal returns, the positive 
autocorrelations in small and big stocks' returns will create the price 
momentum, not price reversals for small and big stocks in the next one to 
four weeks. Hence, the evidences in this section tend to support the Lead-
Lag Hypothesis. 
Another piece of evidence compatible with the lead-lag effect hypothesis 
is thatthe short-term contrarian profits of small stocks significantly 
outperform that of big stocks {Hypothesis 5). The prices of small stocks 
overreact to past price news of big stocks and then continue to overreact 
further for a few weeks. It suggests that contrarian portfolios of small 
stocks will on average outperform contrarian portfolios of big stocks. 
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5.2.6 Section Summary 
In this section, the evidences show that: 
(1) The magnitude and persistence of mean return of tourism stocks in the 
short-term can be predicted by past price (or return). This finding strongly 
supports Hypothesis 1 and rejects Hypothesis 11. 
(2) Contrarian profits of firms with high past trading volume are 
significantly higher than those with low trading volume in the first week 
after portfolio formation. 
(3) A contrarian portfolio of small firms significantly outperforms that of 
large firms. This finding supports Hypothesis 5. 
(4) Fama-French three factors - market factor, size (SMB) factor, and 
BE/ME (HML) factor - can partially explain the contrarian profits. 
Besides the risk compensation for the three factors, other factors also 
explain the profits of contrarian portfolios. The study supports 
Hypothesis 12 that contrarian strategy profit of the short-term cannot be 
entirely explained by the Fama-French three-factor risk-based model. 
(5) Positive cross autocorrelations due to big firms lead small firms' 
returns can be one of the reasonable factors for short-term contrarian 
strategy portfolios. This evidence supports Hypothesis 4’ the lead-lag 
hypothesis (Lo and Mackinlay, 1990). 
Both the Fama-French three-factor hypothesis and lead-lag behavioral 
models jointly explain contrarian profits. 
There are three possible explanations for the high contrarian profits of 
small stocks. First, small stocks are hard to trade in the market thus need a 
higher liquidity risk premium. Second, it's expensive to trade smaller 
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stocks in several weeks interval due to higher transaction fees. Trading on 
a small stocks contrarian portfolio needs higher profits to cover the higher 
cost. Third, short-term contrarian profits are partially due to the small 
stocks' overreaction to past big stocks. Thus small tourism stocks on 
average should earn higher contrarian profit than that of big tourism 
stocks. 
Meanwhile, we can see that the tourism industry behaves similarly as the 
market portfolio in the short-term. The reasons could be the following. 
First, the tourism industry is one sector of the whole economy. The 
economics of the tourism industry, like most other businesses, closely 
reflect the general economy. Thus, the short-term performance of tourism 
stocks tends to be highly correlated to the whole stock market. Second, as 
illustrated in subsection 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, the profitability of contrarian 
strategies of both the tourism stock portfolio and the market stock 
portfolio are similarly compensated for the risks of Fama-French three 
factors. And finally, there is no significant difference between the ways 
that investors interpret information (such as past price, past trading 
volume, firm size) of tourism stocks and the market stocks as a whole. 
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5.3 Results for Intermediate- and Long-term 
Price Momentum and Contrarian Strategies 
At the intermediate-term ranging from three to 12 months, the empirical 
puzzle is not return reversal but return continuation. Many finance studies 
also find the long-term price reversal up to five years after the events. 
Therefore, this study extends the holding period to five years. After a 
deliberated evaluation of alternative explanations, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) support the intermediate-term overreaction and long-term price 
error correction hypotheses for intermediate-term price momentum and 
long-term price reversal (or negative momentum). As discussed in 
previous chapters, the study finds strong evidence of high systematic risk 
and overreaction in prosperity for the tourism industry in the period from 
1990 to 2000. The investigation of stock performance in the tourism 
industry could potentially provide valuable insights into the explanation of 
the profitability of these momentum strategies. 
In this section, the empirical results for different price or earning 
momentum strategies over the intermediate-term and contrarian strategies 
over the long-term are discussed. Subsection 5.3.1 confirms the price and 
basic earning momentum and contrarian strategies for the tourism 
portfolio and the market portfolio. On the basis of the basic price 
momentum strategy and earning momentum strategies, the thesis 
introduces the trading volume and firm size to provide additional evidence 
on the source of momentum returns. In subsection 5.3.2, the study 
introduces volume-based price and earning momentum strategy portfolios 
for tourism stocks and the whole market and examines the return 
87 
predictability for this two-way analysis. In subsection 5.3.3, the study 
introduces size-based price and earning momentum strategy portfolios for 
tourism stocks and the whole market and examines their return 
predictability. Potential explanations for intermediate-term and long-term 
momentum strategies' profitability are evaluated in this subsection. 
Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 are tested and supported. Subsection 5.3.4 
provides Fama-French-three-factor risk-adjusted results to test Hypothesis 
13. 
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5.3.1 Basic Price and Earning Momentum Strategies for 
Tourism Portfolio and Market Portfolio 
This subsection gives the general view of the intermediate-term 
momentum strategies and long-term contrarian strategies. Table 5.9 and 
Table 5.10 summarize mean annual stock returns of price and earning 
momentum (contrarian) strategies for the tourism industry and the whole 
market. The associated T statistics are shown in parentheses to test 
whether the returns are reliably different from zero. 
This subsection discusses the basic momentum portfolios without 
explanatory variables such as past trading volume and firm size. Also, 
returns data are not risk-adjusted by Fama-French three-factor model. 
A. Price Momentum and Overreaction Hypothesis 
Table 5.9 presents mean annual returns for price momentum strategy 
portfolios based on different formation periods. R1 represents the loser 
portfolio with the lowest returns in the low 33.3% of the sample during 
the previous formation period, and R3 represents the winner portfolio 
with the highest returns in the upper 33.3% during the previous formation 
period. 
In the past decade, momentum strategies have become more popular 
among institutional investors. One might expect that the frequent trading 
activities of these institutions would eliminate the momentum effect in 
intermediate-term and the reversal effect in long-term, at least for the 
large stocks that they can trade at low transaction cost. However, Table 
5.9 reveals that in the recent period from 1990 to 2000, both winners and 
losers experience price momentum from three to 12 months and price 
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reversal in the long-term from three to five years. For example, past 3-
month tourism winners outperformed past losers 5.7%, 1.2%, 1.9%, and 
3.5% per year in future three, six, nine, and twelve months; and past three-
month tourism winners underperformed past losers 2.7%, 2.8%, and 5.3% 
per year in future three, four and five years in long-term. 
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Table 5.9 
Mean Annual Returns of Price Momentum Strategy for Tourism 
Stock and Market Portfolios (Intermediate- and Long-term) 
This table reports the mean annual returns of price momentum strategy for tourism stock and market 
portfolio in the U.S. The equal-weighted market portfolio includes all stocks traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ. The sample of an equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all tourism 
stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. At the beginning of each quarter starting from 
January 1990，all tourism stocks are sorted based on their previous formation period return is divided 
into three equal-weighted portfolios. R1 represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns in the 
low 33.3% of the sample pool, and R3 represents the winner portfolio with the highest returns in the 
upper 33.3% during the previous formation period. R1-R3 represents the portfolio is long the R1 
portfolio and short the R3 portfolio. Formation periods K are listed in the first column. All returns 
used in this study are geometric average annual return above the risk-free rate of return (30 days U.S. 
Treasury Bill rate of return). T statistics are shown in parentheses to test whether the returns are 
reliably different than zero. The sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 
Portfolio J=3 J=6 J=9 J=12 J=36 J=48 J=60 J=3 J=6 J=9 J=12 J=36 J=48 J=60 
K Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon 
3 M o n Rl 0.075 0.013 0.023 0.035 0.088 0.075 0.087 0.045 0.063 0.085 0.099 0.139 0.131 0.135 
(0.77) (0.18) (0.46) (0.85) (2.86)* (3.78)* (4.21)* (0.93) (1.89)* (3.50)* (5.13)* (12.30)* (16.41)* (13.04)* 
R3 0.135 0.025 0.043 0.071 0.065 0.053 0.050 0.137 0.144 0.160 0.177 0.124 0.118 0.136 
(1.82)* (0.51) (1.10) (2.11)* (3.35)* (4.13)* (4.01)* (3.27)* (4.93)* (6.73)* (8.40)* (15.59)* (21.54)* (13.76)* 
R3.R1 0.057 0.012 0.019 0.035 -0.027 -0.028 -0.053 0.088 0.078 0.074 0.077 -0.020 -0.020 0.003 
(1.05) (0.31) (0.65) (1.45)* (-1.02) (-1.25) (-1.90)* (2.01)* (2.61)* (3.71)* (4.53)* (-1.57) (-1.67)* (0.15) 
6 M o n Rl 0.059 0.039 0.047 0.051 0.106 0.076 0.087 0.032 0.063 0.081 0.105 0.148 0.135 0.137 
(0.57) (0.51) (0.83) (1.08) (3.13)* (3.70)* (4.40)* (0.62) (1.94)* (3.53)* (5.09)* (12.11)* (15.65)* (14.07)* 
R3 0.148 0.058 0.077 0.094 0.069 0.053 0.053 0.155 0.176 0.192 0.187 0.114 0.113 0.136 (2.02)* (1.42) (2.20)* (2.84)* (4.20)* (5.83)* (5.00)* (3.73)* (5.67)* (7.58)* (8.95)* (14.47)* (20.07)* (13.53)* 
R3-R1 0.085 0.019 0.029 0.044 -0.046 -0.028 -0.049 0.120 0.110 0.109 0.082 -0.045 -0.033 -0.002 
(1.18) (0.33) (0.71) (1.48) (-1.45) (-1.27) (-1.92)* (1.97)* (3.69)* (4.44)* (5.85)* (-2.56)* (-2.37)* (-0.11) 
9 M o n Rl 0.084 0.044 0.033 0.057 0.115 0.077 0.092 0.062 0.079 0.096 0.129 0.157 0.139 0.144 
(0.83) (0.56) (0.58) (1.22)* (3.15)* (3.29)* (3.79)* (1.21) (2.51)* (4.00)* (5.72)* (12.61)* (15.70)* (14.45)* 
R3 0.195 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.067 0.047 0.049 0.196 0.215 0.201 0.187 0.114 0.115 0.139 
(2.72)* (2.44)* (2.66)* (2.89)* (3.86)* (4.60)* (4.19)* (4.82)* (6.68)* (8.00)* (9.32)* (13.92)* (20.30)* (13.55)* 
R3-R1 0.104 0.060 0.073 0.047 -0.060 -0.038 -0.063 0.128 0.130 0.103 0.058 -0.059 -0.036 -0.008 
(1.53)* (1.07) (1.80)* (1.67)* (-1.89)* (-1.49) (-2.06)* (2.23)* (3.90)* (4.37)* (3.84)* (-3.05)* (-2.56)* (-0.35)* 
12 Mon Rl 0.105 0.035 0.041 0.061 0.094 0.067 0.084 0.073 0.086 0.115 0.144 0.157 0.137 0.145 
(1.04) (0.43) (0.69) (1.22) (2.82)* (2.82)* (3.63)* (1.42) (2.65)* (4.37)* (5.91)* (12.88)* (15.27)* (13.97)* 
R3 0.209 0.101 0.106 0.106 0.056 0.039 0.041 0.214 0.200 0.182 0.169 0.107 0.113 0.136 (2.72)* (2.33)* (2.69)* (2.97)* (3.15)* (3.97)* (3.64)* (4.90)* (6.26)* (7.67)* (8.73)* (12.83)* (19.59)* (14.00)* 
R3.R1 0.096 0.064 0.064 0.045 -0.045 -0.035 -0.062 0.133 0.109 0.065 0.025 -0.068 -0.036 -0.016 
1(1.45) (1.10) (1.63) (1.51) (-1.63) (-1.45) (-2.40)*|(2.33)* (3.53)* (2.93)* (1.46) (-3.81)* (-2.52)* (-0.72) 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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The profits of most of the momentum portfolios are significantly positive 
in the intermediate-term and significantly negative in the long-term at a 
10% significance level. The evidence confirms the results of intermediate 
price momentum and reversal in previous studies (e.g. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993, 2001)). 
I use two-factor analysis with replication ANOVA to test the null 
hypothesis that the mean momentum returns (R3-R1) of different 
formation periods is not different. The statistics summary reports an F-
statistics of 1.55 (P-Value=0.24) for the tourism portfolio and 1.64 (P-
Value=0.22) for market portfolio. Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at a 10% significance level. Therefore, there is no evidence that 
the formation period explains the momentum profits over intermediate 
and long horizons. 
Furthermore, Table 5.9 also presents the difference in persistence of 
momentum returns between tourism stocks and the overall market 
portfolio. The 60-month holding period negative momentum profits of 
tourism stocks are significantly different from zero at a 10% level (10% 
significance criteria for two-tail T-test with 140 degrees of freedom is 
1.25). However, those of market portfolio are not significant. This result 
means that price information will not likely be impounded in tourism 
stock prices within five years; however, it will be for the whole market. 
To put the above results in perspective, Figure 5.5 presents the annual 
momentum returns for different formation periods, and Figure 5.6 
presents the geometric average annual returns of different formation 
periods for the winners and losers. 
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Figure 5.5 
Mean Profits of Price Momentum Strategy for Tourism Stock and 
Market Portfolio (Intermediate- and Long-term) 
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A number of hypotheses have been proposed in the literature to explain 
the profitability of momentum strategies, such as the underreaction 
hypothesis (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok，1996; Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; and Hong and 
Stein, 1997，1999; and Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000)，the overreaction and 
price correction hypothesis (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Lehmann, 
1990; DeLong et al, 1990; and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
1998), the Conrad and Kaul (1998) risk-based hypothesis, and the Fama-
French Three-Factor risk compensation hypothesis. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) indicates that although the first three hypotheses imply momentum 
profits in the intermediate-term, the long-term holding period 
performance of the momentum portfolios differs sharply under the three 
hypotheses. Figure 5.6 simply summarizes the expected performance of 
the momentum profits under these three hypotheses. 
Stocks' annual momentum return would keep stable under the Conrad and 
Kaul (1998) risk-based model. In the underreaction hypothesis, since 
information shock is impounded into the returns at a gradually decreasing 
rate, annualized momentum return over the holding period would 
decrease, but the annual momentum profit would be significantly higher 
than zero in long-term. Under the overreaction hypothesis, the momentum 
return would be negative in the long-term error correction process when 
the stock prices of the winners and losers revert to their fundamental 
values. Thus, the long-term holding period annual momentum profit will 
approach zero or be lower than zero. The evidence of long-term negative 
momentum profits reported in Figure 5.8 is clearly inconsistent with the 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis and the underreaction hypothesis. It 
tends to support the overreaction hypothesis. 
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Figure 5.7 
Expected Mean Annual Returns of Intermediate- and Long-term 
Momentum Profits (R3-R1) under Different Hypotheses 
Annual Momentum Return 
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Summarily, the study tends to support the overreaction behavior 
hypothesis rather than the underreaction hypothesis and the CK risk-based 
hypothesis. The study will discuss the Fama-French Three Factor 
hypothesis in the end of section 5.3.4. Both the Fama-French three-factor 
risk compensation explanation (Fama and French, 1993) and the 
overreaction models (Lehmann, 1990; DeLong et al, 1990; and Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998) jointly explain contrarian profits. 
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B, Earning Momentum and underreaction hypothesis 
Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) and Bernard and Thomas (1990) find 
that firms reporting unexpectedly high earnings outperform firms 
reporting unexpectedly poor earnings and the effect persists over a period 
of about six months after earning announcement. Thus, they report that 
price momentum in the intermediate-horizon is a function of past earnings 
surprise. 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) find that past return and past 
earnings surprise each predicts large drifts in future returns after 
controlling for the other. They document that the predictability of future 
returns from past returns is partially due to the market's underreaction to 
information, in particular to past earnings news. 
In the finance literature, the most common way of measuring earnings 
surprises is in terms of the standard unexpected earnings (SUE). This 
study uses the same approach. Table 5.10 separately presents mean annual 
returns for earning momentum strategy portfolios based on different 
formation periods for tourism stocks. Table 5.10 indicates that, the news 
reflected in the past earnings announcement continues to leave its traces 
in the next several years holding period following the formation. 
Interestingly, the mean returns of the earning momentum portfolio, that is 
the spread in returns between stocks with delivered favorable surprises 
(E3) and those with unfavorable surprise (El) is significantly positive up 
to three years for tourism stocks and five years for the market portfolio. 
For instance, momentum profits for the tourism portfolio decline from 
7.9% per year in a holding period of three-months, to 4.0% in six-months, 
and to 2.5% in nine-months. The profits increase to 4.7% in a period of 12 
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months, and drop to 1.4% in 36 months, 1.3% in 48 months, and then 
declines further to 0.7% in a holding period of 60 months. 
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Table 5.10 
Mean Annual Returns of Earning Momentum Strategy for Tourism 
Stock and Market Portfolio (Intermediate- and Long-term) 
This table reports the mean annual returns of the earning momentum strategy for tourism stocks 
and the market portfolio in the U.S. The equal-weighted market portfolio includes all stocks 
traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The sample of equal-weighted tourism stock 
portfolio includes all tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. At the 
beginning of each quarter starting from January 1990, all tourism stocks are sorted based on there 
previous one-quarter, two-quarter, three-quarter, or four-quarter SUE (standard unexpected 
earnings) is divided into three equal-weighted portfolios. El represents the portfolio with the most 
unfavorable earning surprise (SUE) in the low 33.3% of the sample pool, E3 represents the 
portfolio that have delivered the most favorable earning surprises (SUE) in the upper 33.3%, and 
E2 represents the portfolio between the low 33.3% and the upper 33.3% during the previous 
formation period. E1-E3 represents that the portfolio is long the El portfolio and short the E3 
portfolio at the same time. Formation periods K are listed in the first column. All returns used in 
this study are geometric average annual return above the risk-free rate of return (30 days U.S. 
Treasury Bill rate of return). T statistics are shown in parentheses to test whether the returns are 
reliably different than zero. The sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 
Portfolio J=3 J=6 J=9 J=12 J=36 J=48 J=60 J=3 J=6 J=9 J=12 J=36 J=48 J=60 
K M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n M o n 
3 M o n E l 0.023 0.031 0.035 0.018 0.033 0.037 0.045 -0.016 0.030 0.053 0.064 0.087 0.091 0.099 
(0.38) (0.54) (0.77) (0.49) (2.71)* (3.65)* (3.99)* (-0.41) (1.04) (2.30)* (3.20)* (10.04)* (12.50)* (9.85)* 
E 3 0 104 0 071 0 060 0.067 0.046 0.049 0.051 0.212 0.194 0.174 0.164 0.112 0.112 0.120 
(1.39) (1.39) (1.62) (2.25)* (3.18)* (4.12)* (4.82)* (4.63)* (6.01)* (6.47)* (7.83)* (12.09)* (16.55)* (10.46)* 
E3-E1 0 079 0 040 0 025 0.049 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.231 0.162 0.119 0.099 0.029 0.026 0.030 
(1.51) (1.05) (0.84) (1.97)* (0.80) (0.84) (0.47) (9.13)* (9.26)* (8.14)* (8.11)* (3.64)* (3.10)* (2.19)* 
6 M o n ^ -0.007 0.015 -0.027 -0.029 0.014 0.028 0.037 -0.035 0.023 0.032 0.062 0.089 0.092 0.092 
(-0.08) (0.23) (-0.60) (-0.84) (0.84) (2.13)* (3.00)* (-0.86) (0.72) (1.35) (3.26)* (7.95)* (10.47)* (12.08)* 
E3 0.092 0.078 0.086 0.096 0.049 0.044 0.048 0.228 0.202 0.187 0.180 0.113 0.113 0.122 
(1.17) (1.45) (2.30)* (2.70)* (3.24)* (3.40)* (4.57)* (4.68)* (5.46)* (6.95)* (7.27)* (9.72)* (15.85)* (9.48)* 
E3-E1 0 100 0.062 0.114 0.126 0.035 0.017 0.012 0.271 0.177 0.154 0.118 0.028 0.028 0.041 
(1.17) (1.43) (3.77)* (5.66)* (L76)* (0.86) (0.70) (9.81)* (11.43)* (10.26)* (8.38)* (1.85)* (2.40)* (2.58)* 
9 Mon E l -0 028 -0.012 -0.019 -0.009 0.020 0.034 0.042 -0.038 -0.005 0.026 0.061 0.092 0.090 0.095 
(-0.31) (-0.17) (-0.42) (-0.29) (1.10) (2.34)* (2.64)* (-0.91) (-0.15) (1.21) (3.00)* (7.98)* (10.39)* (10.13)* 
E3 0 098 0.093 0.118 0.096 0.048 0.045 0.049 0.213 0.210 0.198 0.184 0.116 0.113 0.123 
(1.41) (2.24)* (2.63)* (2.60)* (3.82)* (4.93)* (6.82)* (4.57)* (6.54)* (7.11)* (7.14)* (9.66)* (16.26)* (10.19)* 
E3-E1 0 129 0 106 0.138 0.106 0.029 0.012 0.009 0.258 0.215 0.171 0.123 0.028 0.029 0.039 
(1.65) (1.81)- (3.31)* (3.71)* (1.49) (0.74) (0.48) (8.63)* (11.04)* (9.98)* (8.26)* (1.98)* (2.58)* (2.75)* 
12 Mon E l -0 127 -0.099 -0.059 -0.047 0.009 0.029 0.056 -0.096 -0.012 0.032 0.067 0.105 0.098 0.097 
(-1.81)* (-2.05)* (-1.50) (-1.48) (0.47) (2.26)* (3.54)* (-2.26)* (-0.37) (1.22) (2.91)* (8.27)* (10.30)* (10.53)* 
E3 0.178 0.166 0.124 0.098 0.067 0.051 0.047 0.279 0.250 0.213 0.193 0.116 0.116 0.122 
(2.40)* (3.18)* (3.07)* (2.74)* (3.94)* (4.92)* (5.24)* (5.52)* (5.86)* (6.60)* (6.67)* (10.61)* (14.31)* (11.65)* 
E3-E1 0 336 0.278 0.185 0.145 0.059 0.024 -0.010 0.403 0.263 0.180 0.126 0.013 0.024 0.036 
1(4.54)* (6.66)* (5.15)* (5.10)* (2.70)* (1.37) (-0.59) |(12.83)* (12.19)* (8.27)* (8.06)* (1.00) (2.31)* (2.56)* 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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In comparison with price momentum strategies, the mean returns of 
earning momentum portfolio do not reverse in the long-term ranging from 
three to five years. The fact that earning momentum profits have a 
downward drift but remain positive in the long horizon implies that stock 
returns respond gradually to new information in past announcement 
earning surprises. The results are consistent with the underreaction 
hypothesis (e.g. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). 
Employing two-factor analysis with replication ANOVA to test the 
equation of the mean intermediate-term momentum profits (E3-E1) for 
different formation periods, the study finds an F-statistics of 11.72 (P-
Value=0.00) for the tourism portfolio and 5.23 (P-Value=0.01) for the 
market portfolio. The null hypothesis can be rejected at a 10% 
significance level. However, in the long-term holding period, the null 
cannot be rejected at a 10% significance level. This evidence indicates 
that formation period is a useful variable in predicting the earning 
momentum profits in an intermediate-term holding period. The longer 
formation period, the higher momentum profits during the intermediate-
term are. This piece of evidence implies that the market not only responds 
gradually to new earnings information, it also responds to old earnings 
information. In this regard, this finding also supports the earning 
underreaction behavioral explanation. 
Table 5.10 illustrates the difference in persistence and magnitude of 
earning momentum profits between tourism and market portfolios. The 48 
and 60-month holding period momentum profits for tourism stocks are not 
significantly different from zero at a 10% level. However, those of the 
market portfolio are significant. This evidence support Hypothesis 10 
which indicates that in general the earning momentum effect of a market 
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portfolio tends to be stronger and longer-lived than that of a tourism 
portfolio. 
Figure 5.8 presents the trend of momentum returns of different formation 
periods in a visual way. 
Figure 5.8 
Mean Profits of Earning Momentum Strategy for Tourism Stock 
and Market Portfolio (Intermediate- and Long-term) 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 
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C. Subsection summary 
The main findings of this subsection are listed as follows. Possible 
explanations of these findings are also presented. 
(1) Sorting on past return and earning surprise (measured using SUE) give 
rise to large profits in intermediate-term momentum portfolios for tourism 
stocks as well as for the whole market. In the long-term, price contrarian 
strategies and earning momentum strategies are profitable. This evidence 
strongly supports Hypothesis 1 that average tourism and market stock 
returns in different horizons can be predicted by past returns and past 
earnings. 
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(2) This evidence also strongly rejects Hypothesis 11 — Industry effect 
hypothesis (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) - which proposes that 
momentum investment strategies are significantly less profitable once the 
stocks are controlled within the tourism industry. 
(3) This subsection finds that two pieces of publicly available 
information, stocks' prior return and prior earning surprise, help to predict 
future returns. Each of the momentum strategies is individually 
successful, and that one effect is not subsumed by the other. 
(4) Price momentum portfolio experiences price revision and have a 
significant negative momentum profits in three- to five-year holding 
periods after portfolio formation. The evidence is important because it 
refutes the common presumption that price momentum is simply a market 
underreaction (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996). Instead, the 
finding tends to support Hypothesis 7 and suggests that at least a portion 
of the momentum profits is better characterized as an overreaction. 
(5) Compared to the results of the price momentum strategy, the profits 
associated with earning momentum strategies tend to persist for a longer 
period up to five years of time. This evidence confirm Hypothesis 9，the 
underreaction hypothesis of Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), that 
a market does not incorporate the news of past earnings promptly and 
indeed the adjustment is gradual, so that there are drifts in subsequent 
returns. But my evidence is not consistent with their idea that the market 
also sluggishly responds to past price information. 
(6) Focusing on earning momentum portfolios, we get some interesting 
findings. Although earning information for market momentum portfolios 
is not likely incorporated into their prices in five years, earning 
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momentum profits for tourism portfolios will disappear within four years 
after formation. The results show that past earning information has longer 
persistence and larger effect on the performance of the whole stock 
market compared with the effect on the performance of tourism stocks. 
This evidences support Hypothesis 10 which indicates that in general the 
earning momentum effect of a market portfolio tends to be stronger and 
longer-lived than that of a tourism portfolio. 
(7) In addition, this subsection finds that the formation period can be an 
explanatory variable for earning momentum profits. A longer formation 
period earning momentum portfolio tends to earn higher profits for 
tourism stocks. However, the formation period does not explain the 
profitability for price momentum strategies. The evidence also strongly 
indicates that future tourism stock prices response to past earning 
surprises gradually lessens after 12 months. 
(8) Furthermore, I also find that price news has a larger impact in 
magnitude on future stock prices than past earnings news. It is not 
surprising when we look back at the U.S. hotel industry's "overbuilding" 
which started in the earlier 1980s and continued through the decade.. In 
spite of the serious successive losses reported during this time investors 
and developers still dreamed big, build big, and profited royally. 
(Lundberg et al, 1995) The stock price information overreaction 
dominated earning underreaction with the overbuilding of the hotel 
industry. 
This section finds that stocks' prior return and the prior earning surprise 
help to predict future returns and the market's reaction to them is 
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contradictive: overreaction versus, underreaction. The difference in the 
performances of the two kinds of strategies - price momentum strategy 
and earning momentum strategy - has some intuitive basis. The earnings 
momentum strategies are based on the performance of the most recent two 
quarters' announced net incomes (earnings), their spread divided by the 
standard deviation of unexpected earnings. Earnings or net income is a 
financial value which is an indicator of the operational performance in the 
earning period reported. In comparison, past returns reflect a broad set of 
market expectations of the firm's future outlook not limited to near-term 
profitability. On this basis these two kinds of momentum strategies are not 
subsumed by each other. They individually predict future returns. 
The hypothesis of the intermediate-term stock price overreaction and 
long-term error correction could possibly be caused by a combination 
effect of business cycles and oversupply cycles. The business cycles of the 
tourism industry are closely positively related to the general economic 
climate. For instance, Choi, Olsen, Kwansa, and Tse (1999) report the 
cyclical pattern in the lodging sector. Lundberg et al (1995) and Powers 
and Barrows (2001) find overbuilding cycles which are characterized by 
the oversupply in expansion and huge losses in recession. The restaurant 
and airline sector also tends to expand too quickly in prosperity getting 
trapped into the issue of debt payments (Zheng, 2002; and Vogel, 2002). 
These oversupply cycles overlap the economic cyclical curve and 
exaggerate the performance of tourism business. Therefore, in prosperity, 
tourism stock prices tend to overreact with the irrational expansion or 
oversupply process of the tourism industry. In recession, tourism stock 
prices drop until the demand can catch up with supply. 
103 
One possible explanation for this finding is that in general the earning 
momentum effect of a market portfolio tends to be stronger and longer-
lived than that of a tourism portfolio. Products and services of the tourism 
industry are highly perishable and intangible (Harris and Brown, 1998)， 
such as hotel rooms, restaurant seats, and airplane seats, if the 
consumption of them does not take place, the loss will be occurred 
simultaneously. On the other hand, unlike the goods produced in factories 
and sold elsewhere, the operation information of the tourism products and 
services can be acquired simply. Their current operational performance 
(such as sales) could be more easily observed, and near-term financial 
performance (such as earnings) could be more precisely estimated by 
analysts and investors than what could be done for other industries, such 
as the manufacturing industry, whose unsold products can be stored and 
sold after the next earning quarterly disclosure to recover a proportion of 
cost in a worst-case scenario and whose earnings information could not be 
easily observed by the public. Since, the market has already made very 
large revisions based on the earnings information revealed before the 
earnings disclosure for the current quarter or fiscal year for tourism 
stocks, the earning momentum effect for tourism stocks is expected to be 
more short-lived in persistence and smaller in magnitude than for the 
whole market on average. 
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C. Subsection summary 
To summarize, the tourism momentum portfolios based on past return and 
earning surprise (measured by SUE) and past trading volume shows that: 
(1) The evidences of this subsection support Hypothesis 2 that the 
magnitude and persistence of momentum profitability can be predicted 
based on trading volume. Trading volume is a valuable information 
source about future price responses. 
(2) The evidence confirms Hypothesis 7, the price overreaction 
hypothesis (Lehmann (1990)，Lo and Mackinlay (1988，1990)，and etc.), 
and Hypothesis 9, the earning underreaction hypothesis (Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). 
(3) The price momentum portfolio of high volume stocks significantly 
outperforms that of low volume for both tourism stocks and the market 
stocks as a whole. 
(4) The earning momentum portfolio of high volume stocks significantly 
outperforms that of low volume for tourism stocks; however, the study 
doesn't find this evidence in the market portfolio. 
Why price and earning momentum strategies of high volume stocks tend 
to earn higher profits than those of low volume lacks explanation in the 
finance literature. It is possibly due to high volume stocks are associated 
with higher analyst followings; therefore, they may overreact to past 
return information in large magnitude. 
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high volume losers VlRl is 10% per year, whereas low volume winners 
V2R3 earn 4% per year on average. The evidence from tourism stocks is 
also consistent with the finding of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) that high 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, looking at each column of R3-R1 in Panel A for tourism stocks, 
we see high volume V2 stocks' momentum profits are significantly 
positive in the intermediate-term, but the evidence is somewhat weak for 
low volume VI stocks. For example, the profits for high volume 
momentum portfolios based on past three months period returns are 
18.3%, 12.4%, 9.8%, and 7.0% per year in the holding periods of 3-
months, 6-months, 9-months, and 12-months, compared with insignificant 
returns of -1.8%, -3.1%, -1.5%, and 4.2% per year for low volume 
momentum portfolios. In the long-term after three years, both low and 
high volume momentum portfolios do not earn significant profits. 
Meanwhile, for the market portfolio, we see that both high and low 
volume stocks tend to earn significant momentum profits over the 
intermediate and long-term . 
Furthermore, the cells crossed by column (R3-R1) and row (V2-V1) in 
Table 5.11 illustrate that the tourism price momentum portfolio with high 
past volume trading firms significantly outperforms that of low volume 
firms in the intermediate-term. For example, the high volume tourism 
momentum portfolios based on past 6 months returns outperform low 
volume portfolios by 24.3%, 17.8%, 10.6%, and 9.6% per year in the 
holding periods of 3-months, 6-months, 9-months, and 12-months. These 
results suggest that high volume stocks contribute more to momentum 
profits than low volume stocks. I also find the same results for the market 
portfolio. The F-statistics of a two-factor analysis with replication 
ANOVA for testing the difference of mean momentum returns between 
high volume and low volume is 215.75 (P-Value=0.00) for the tourism 
portfolio and 34.92 (P-Value=0.00) for the market portfolio. The null 
2 The momentum profits in long-term is significantly negative. 
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hypothesis can be rejected at a 10% significance level for tourism and 
market portfolio. 
A probable explanation for high volume momentum portfolios 
outperforming low volume momentum portfolios for tourism stocks is that 
high volume tourism stocks, which are associated with higher analyst 
folio wings, more easily overreact to past return information then does the 
market portfolio. 
The momentum return in Figure 5.9 is the geometric average annual 
return of different formation periods. 
Figure 5.9 
Mean Profits for Tourism Stock and Market Price Momentum 
Strategy Portfolios Based on Past Return and Past Trading Volume 
Tour ism Portfolio „„ Market Portfolio 
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B. Volume-Based Earning Momentum 
Table 5.12 presents returns for tourism and market momentum portfolios 
on the basis of a two-way model between past earning surprise and past 
trading volume. The momentum return in Figure 5.10 is the geometric 
average annual return of different formation periods. Some empirical 
results are reported below. 
First, conditional on past earnings news, for tourism earning momentum 
portfolio, in low volume stocks VI tends to outperform stocks with high 
past trading volume V2 over the intermediate-term horizon; however, in 
long-term high volume stocks V2 outperforms low volume stocks VI. The 
past high volume best SUE V2E3 earns the most over holding periods of 
9-month, 12-month, and the long-term. For example, the profits for high 
volume best SUE momentum portfolios based on past three month returns 
are 6.4%，14.5%, 3.6%, 4.8%, and 6.7% per year in the holding periods of 
9-months, 12-months, 36-months, 48-months, and 60-months. 
Second, at each column of (E3-E1) in Panel A of Table 5.12, except in 3-
month formation period cases, we see both high volume VI and low 
volume V2 stocks' momentum profits are positive in the intermediate-
term and long-term and not significantly below zero. This finding of no 
price reversals in the long-term is consistent with the earning 
underreaction hypothesis. Apparently, the evidence suggests that the 
tourism stocks tend to gradually respond to prior earning news. In Panel B 
for the market portfolio, we see both firms experienced high and low past 
trading volume can earn significant positive momentum profits over the 
intermediate and long-term. 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, looking at the cells crossed by column (E3-E1) and row (V2-V1) 
in Table 5.12’ except in 3-month formation period cases, the tourism price 
momentum portfolio of high past volume trading firms tends to 
outperform that of low volume firms over all holding periods; however, 
the difference is not significant. An example can make the point. High 
volume tourism momentum portfolios based on past six months earnings 
outperform low volume portfolios by 1.6%, 1.1%, 1.1%, 1.2%, 0.0%, 
0.0%, and 0.1% per year in the holding periods of 3，6，9，12, 36, 48-
months, and 60-months. 
The F-statistics of the two-factor analysis with replication ANOVA for 
testing the difference of mean earning momentum returns between high 
volume and low volume is 3.62 (P-Value=0.06) for the tourism portfolio 
and 3.10 (P-Value=0.15) for the market portfolio. The null hypothesis can 
be rejected at a 10% significance level for the tourism portfolio but cannot 
be rejected for the market portfolio. 
Figure 5.10 
Mean Profits for Tourism Stock and Market Earning Momentum 
Strategy Portfolios Based on Past Return and Past Trading Volume 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 
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C. Subsection summary 
To summarize, the tourism momentum portfolios based on past return and 
earning surprise (measured by SUE) and past trading volume shows that: 
(1) The evidences of this subsection support Hypothesis 2 that the 
magnitude and persistence of momentum profitability can be predicted 
based on trading volume. Trading volume is a valuable information 
source about future price responses. 
(2) The evidence confirms Hypothesis 7, the price overreaction 
hypothesis (Lehmann (1990), Lo and Mackinlay (1988, 1990)，and etc.), 
and Hypothesis 9， the earning underreaction hypothesis (Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)). 
(3) The price momentum portfolio of high volume stocks significantly 
outperforms that of low volume for both tourism stocks and the market 
stocks as a whole. 
(4) The earning momentum portfolio of high volume stocks significantly 
outperforms that of low volume for tourism stocks; however, the study 
doesn't find this evidence in the market portfolio. 
Why price and earning momentum strategies of high volume stocks tend 
to earn higher profits than those of low volume lacks explanation in the 
finance literature. It is possibly due to high volume stocks are associated 
with higher analyst folio wings; therefore, they may overreact to past 
return information in large magnitude. 
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5.3.3 Size-Based Price and Earning Momentum Strategy for 
Tourism Portfolio and Market Portfolio 
A. Size-Based Price Momentum 
Table 5.13 presents returns for tourism and market momentum portfolios 
on the basis of a two-way model between past return and firm size. The 
table values represent the mean annual returns over the next holding 
periods (J=3’ 6，9, 12，36, 48 and 60 months) classified by formation 
period K (3，6, 9, 12 months). The momentum return in Figure 5.11 is 
the geometric average annual return of different formation periods. 
Several key results emerge from Table 5.13. First, conditional on past 
returns for the tourism portfolio, the big winners C2R3 tend to earn the 
highest significant positive returns in the intermediate-term. For example, 
the future returns of big tourism winners based on the prior three months 
returns are 11.8%，8.5%, 8.0%，and 10.4% per year in the holding periods 
of 3-months, 6-months, 9-months, and 12-months respectively. In the 
long-term, small firms experience faster price reversal, and therefore 
small losers ClRl tends to earn the highest significant positive returns. 
For example, the future returns of small losers based on past three months 
returns are 8.8%, 6.7%, and 7.5% per year in the holding periods of 36-
months, 48-months, and 60-months. The result is consistent with the 
findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) that return reversals in 
long-term (36 month to 60 month) for small firms are stronger. The result 
for the market portfolio is a bit different, small firms CI tend to 
outperform big firms C2 over all holding periods. Small winners C1R3 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, the columns R3-R1 in Table 5.13 indicate that in the 
intermediate-term momentum profits only for big firms are positive. For 
instance, the momentum returns for big tourism firms based on past six 
month returns are 11.1%, 14.3%，13.6%, and 13.5% per year in the 
holding periods of 3-months, 6-months, 9-months, and 12-months 
compared with 0.0%, -3.5%, -4.5%, and -1.8% for small firms. In the 
long-term, however, small firms tend to have significant negative 
momentum profits and the momentum profits for big firms are 
insignificantly negative. For example, the returns for small tourism 
momentum portfolio based on past six month returns are -7.4%, -3.5%, 
and -5.2% per year in the holding periods of 36-months, 48-months, 60-
months, and 12-months compared with -0.6%, -1.4%, and -1.0% for big 
firms. These evidences suggest that big tourism firms control the 
momentum profits in the intermediate-term, whereas small tourism firms 
contribute more than big firms in long-term. For the market portfolios, we 
see both big and small firms earning significant momentum profits over 
the intermediate and long-term. 
Third, tourism and market price momentum portfolios of big firms 
significantly outperforms that of small firms over all holding periods 
except for a portfolio based on past three-month returns. The F-statistics 
of two-factor analysis with replication ANOVA for testing a mean 
equation report 200.31 (P-Value=0.00) for the tourism portfolio and 70.24 
(P-Value=0.00) for the market portfolio. The null hypothesis can be 
rejected at a 10% significance level for the tourism and market portfolios. 
It strongly suggests that firm size is a valuable variable to predict the 
profitability of price momentum portfolios. Thus, we cannot reject 
Hypothesis 8 that the magnitude of the profit of intermediate-term 
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momentum (or contrarian) price strategies for big tourism firms is higher 
than small tourism firms. 
Figure 5.11 Mean Profits for Tourism Stock and Market Price Momentum Strategy Portfolios Based on Past Return and Firm Size 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 0.20 1 0,20 1 
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B. Size-Based Earning Momentum 
Table 5.14 presents returns for tourism and market momentum portfolios 
on the basis of a two-way model between past earning surprise and firm 
size. The momentum return in Figure 5.12 is a geometric average annual 
return of different formation periods. 
Some empirical results are reported as folio wings.First, conditional on 
past returns R1 and R3, I do not find the highest rewarding portfolio for 
tourism stocks; however, for the market portfolio, the small best SUE 
C1E3 tends to outperform other combination portfolios over both 
intermediate and long-term holding periods. 
Second, at each column of E3-E1 in Panel A, we see that both the big and 
small tourism firms' momentum profits are significantly positive in the 
intermediate-term of 6-months, 9-months, and 12-months. For example, 
the returns for the momentum portfolio based on past nine month earning 
news in nine months after formation are 32.7% per year for small firms 
and 8.2% per year for big firms. Interestingly, in the long-term the small 
momentum portfolio tends to earn positive returns; however, big firm 
momentum portfolios for formation periods of 9-month and 12-month 
tend to earn negative profits. For example, the profits for big firms 
momentum portfolio formatted on the basis of past 12 months earning 
news in 36 months, 48 months, and 60 months are -0.4%, -3.6%, -6.4% 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Panel B for the market momentum portfolio, we see both firms can 
earn significant positive momentum profits over the intermediate and 
long-term. This finding of price momentum in the long-term is highly 
consistent with the earning underreaction hypothesis. 
Finally, this price momentum portfolio of small firms tends to 
significantly outperform that of low volume firms over all holding 
periods, except in the formation period of the 3-month case for tourism 
earning momentum portfolios. 
The F-statistics of two-factor analysis with replication ANOVA for 
testing the difference of mean earning momentum returns between high 
volume and low volume report 3.87 (P-Value=0.06) for the tourism 
portfolio and 33.79 (P-Value=0.00) for the market portfolio. The null 
hypothesis can be rejected at a 10% significance level for both the tourism 
and market portfolio. 
Figure 5.12 
Mean Profits for Tourism Stock and Market Earning Momentum 
Strategy Portfolios Based on Past Return and Firm Size 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 
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C. Subsection summary 
Taken together, the momentum portfolios based on past return and 
earning surprise (measured by SUE) and firm size shows that: 
(1) After controlling for the impacts of trading volume, the evidence in 
this subsection suggest that part of the profits of the intermediate-term 
momentum and long-term contrarian portfolios can be predicted by firm 
size. This evidence support Hypothesis 3 that the magnitude and 
persistence of momentum profitability can be predicted based on firm 
size. 
(2) The evidence provide additional support for Hypothesis 7, the price 
overreaction hypothesis (Lehmann (1990), Lo and Mackinlay (1988， 
1990), and etc.) and Hypothesis 9， the earning underreaction hypothesis 
(Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). 
(3) The finding that price the momentum portfolio of big firms 
significantly outperforms that of small firms over all holding periods 
strongly supports Hypothesis 8. 
(4) However, the earning momentum portfolio of small firms significantly 
tends to outperform that of big firms over all holding periods. 
The evidence that the price momentum portfolio of big firms significantly 
outperforms that of small firms is perhaps due to the big firms' aggressive 
expansion in prosperity and because of other good news. In the past 
decades, the lodging sector and airline sector have been dominated by a 
few major players, and top restaurant chains have accounted for a major 
share of restaurant sales during this time. Historical evidence show that 
big firms tend to oversupply in prosperity and to other good news, such as 
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tax deregulation, "cheap" dollar policy, and hotel construction cost 
declination (Powers and Barrows, 2002; Vogel, 2001; and Lundberg et al., 
1995). Apparently, the big tourism firms should be largely responsible for 
the irrational fluctuation. For instance, the "overbuilding" in the U.S. 
lodging sector in the middle 1980s caused by the combined impact of tax 
deregulation and general economic expansion. The dramatic expansion 
resulted in a serious oversupply and financial problems for the hotel 
sector from the middle of 1980s to the beginning of 1990s resulted 
(Vogel, 2001). From 1989 to 1993, the major airlines also encountered 
serious loss due to oversupply from the middle of the 1980s (Morrison 
and Winston, 1995). Therefore, the stock prices of big tourism firms tend 
to overreact more aggressively in magnitude than that of small tourism 
stocks. 
A possible explanation for the earning momentum profits of small stocks 
outperforming that of big stocks is that small stocks are hard to trade in 
the market thus need a higher liquidity risk premium. In addition, the 
transaction fee of trading smaller stocks is higher than that of big stocks. 
Thus, earning momentum strategies of small stocks need higher profits to 
cover the higher cost. 
126 
5.3.4 Returns of Risk-Adjusted Momentum Strategies for 
Tourism Portfolio 
This subsection compares the characteristics of the momentum portfolios 
and risk-adjusted momentum portfolios returns. Table 5.15 and Figure 
5.14 report the returns and risk-adjusted returns for the tourism price and 
earning momentum portfolios based on past trading volume and firm size. 
The formation period is K=3 months. There are four portfolios: CI, C2, 
VI’ and V2. 
From the risk-adjusted momentum returns reported in Table 5.15, 
although some abnormal profits are not significant at a 10% level, it is 
clear that momentum profits cannot be fully explained by the Fama and 
French factors, such as price momentum portfolios of V2 and earning 
momentum portfolios of V2. 
The risk-adjusted price momentum portfolio CI, C2, VI，and V2, tend to 
earn significant negative momentum profits in the 36-month. The 
abnormal returns are -9.6%, -8.4%, -8.3%, and -9.2% per year 
respectively. This evidence is also contradicts the Fama-French 
hypothesis. 
In addition, as for the earning momentum strategies, the tendency of 
momentum profits converting to zero in the long-term is not found in risk-
adjusted earning momentum returns. 
This evidence rejects Hypothesis 12 that the intermediate-term price 
momentum strategies' profits and the long-term price contrarian 




Comparison between Risk-adjusted and Non-Risk-Adjusted Mean 
Annual Returns For Tourism Price and Earning Momentum 
Strategy Portfolios (K=3 Months) 
This table reports the mean annual returns and Fama-French three-factor risk adjusted mean annual 
returns for tourism price and earning momentum strategy portfolios based on past trading volume, and 
firm size. The sample of equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all tourism stocks traded on 
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. At the beginning of each quarter starting from January 1990, all 
tourism stocks are sorted based on their previous formation period returns and is divided into three 
equal-weighted portfolios. R1 represents the loser portfolio with the lowest returns in the low 33.3% of 
the sample pool; R3 represents the winner portfolio with the highest returns in the upper 33.3% during 
the previous formation period. Price Contrarian Strategy (R1-R3) represents that the portfolio longs the 
R1 portfolio and shorts the R3 portfolio at the same time. Besides, using the lower and upper 33.3%s as 
breakpoints, the holding period trading volume and firm size are divided into two equal-weighted 
groups. C I (VI ) represents the smallest firm size (lowest trading volume) portfolio, and C2 (V2) 
represents the largest firm size (highest trading volume) portfolio. "All" portfolio is the basic 
momentum portfolio not classified by firm size and trading volume. Returns used in this study are 
geometric average annual return above the risk-free rate of return. T statistics are shown in parentheses 
below the returns values. The sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A; Price Momentum Strategy 
Not Risk-Adjusted Risk-Adjusted 
J = 3 J ^ J = 9 J=12 J=36 J=48 J = 6 0 J ^ J ^ J ^ J = 1 2 J=36 J=48 J=60 
Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon 
Portfol io R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 
-0.018 -0.031 -0.015 0.042 -0.071 -0.056 -0.048 0 . 0 4 5 - 0 . 0 2 4 - 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 4 6 - 0 . 0 9 6 0.004 -0.046 
(-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.33) (1.23) (-1.80)* (-1.48) (-1.48) (2.21)* (-0.51) (-0.22) (0.85) (-1.75)* (0.05) (-0.43) 
V2 0.183 0.124 0.098 0.070 -0.016 -0.032 -0.046 0.068 -0.111 -0.116 -0.070 -0.084 -0.036 -0.014 
(1.93)* (2.02广(2.37)* (1.81)* (-0.51) (-1.53) (-1.29) (1.37) (-2.08)* (-2.22)* (-1.43) (-1.43) (-0.60) (-0.21) CI 0.062 -0.022 -0.014 -0.022 -0.068 -0.057 -0.059 0.094 -0.105 -0.090 -0.037 -0.083 0.020 -0.027 (0.63) (-0.30) (-0.33) (-0.58) (-1.85)* (-1.67)* (-1.68)* (1.71)* (-1.85)* (-1.51) (-0.63) (-1.33) (0.25) (-0.33) C2 0.096 0.114 0.096 0.136 -0.020 -0.033 -0.044 0.020 -0.030 -0.037 0.013 -0.097 -0.055 -0.032 (1.83)* (1.74)* (2.26)* (3.55)* (-0.58) (-1.23) (-1.99)* (0.99) (-0.61) (-0.81) (0.24) (-1.88)* (-0.91) (-0.40) All 0.057 0.012 0.019 0.035 -0.027 -0,028 -0.053 0.062 0.037 0.034 0.063 -0.092 0.052 0.033 (1.05) (0.31) (0.65) (1.45) (-1.02) (-1.25) (-1.90)*1 d-OD (0.77) (0.82) (1.61) (-1.70)* (0.62) (0.25) Panel B: Earning Momentum Strategy 
Not Risk-Adjusted Risk-Adjusted J ^ J = 9 J=12 J=36 J=48 J = 6 0 J ^ J ^ J ^ J = 1 2 J=36 J=48 J=60 Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon Mon 
Portfol io E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 E3-E1 
Vi 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 4 3 0.025 0.026 -0.005 0 . 0 0 2 ~ - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 3 -0.054 -0.060 -0.069 -0.022 -0.048 (0.32) (0.90) (0.59) (0.85) (-0.25) (0.11) (-0.07) (0.07) (-1.00) (-1.26) (-1.74)* (-1.75)* (-0.31) (-0.53) V2 0.012 0.011 0.041 0.022 -0.005 -0.002 -0.032 -0.099 -0.167 -0.122 -0.048 0.000 0.164 0.095 (0.10) (0.15) (0.52) (0.37) (-0.13) (-0.05) (-0.87) (-1.16) (-2.33)* (-2.20)* (-0.79) (0.01) (1.83)* (1.07) CI 0.029 0.135 0.032 0.017 0.016 0.002 0.003 -0.054 -0.159 -0.089 -0.017 0.070 0.163 0.068 (0.22) (1.08) (-0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.06) (0.88) (1.71)* (-1.85)* (-1.51) (-0.63) (-1.33) (0.25) (-0.33) C2 0.031 0.048 0.037 0.036 0.010 0.002 0.001 -0.042 -0.061 -0.087 -0.090 -0.165 -0.021 -0.007 (0.41) (1.04) (0.88) (1.01) (0.38) (0.07) (0.05) (0.99) (-0.61) (-0.81) (0.24) (-1.88)* (-0.91) (-0.40) All 0.079 0.040 0.025 0.049 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.042 0.030 0.042 0.062 -0.045 0.055 0.100 
(1.51) (1.05) (0.84) (1.97)* (0.80) (0.84) (0.47) (0.67) (0.55) (0.92) (1.52) (-0.90) (0.77) (1.05) 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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Figure 5.13 
Comparison between Risk-adjusted and Non-Risk-Adjusted Mean 
Annual Returns For Tourism and Earning Price Momentum 
Strategy Portfolios (K=3 Months) 
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5.3.5 Section Summary 
Several important results are found in this section. 
(1) The magnitude and persistence of the mean return of tourism stocks in 
the intermediate-term and long-term can be individually predicted by two 
pieces of different information, past price (return) and earning. Strategies 
based either on past returns or on earnings surprises are profitable. This 
finding strongly supports Hypothesis 1, but rejects Hypothesis 11 
thelndustry effect hypothesis. 
(2) The finding that price momentum portfolios experience price revision 
and have significant negative momentum profits in three- to five-year 
holding periods after portfolio formation tends to support Hypothesis 7, 
the price overreaction hypothesis. It suggests that at least a portion of the 
momentum profits is better characterized as an overreaction. 
(3) In contrast, the profits of earning momentum strategies persist in the 
long-term holding period. This evidence confirms the earning 
underreaction hypothesis of Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) 
{Hypothesis 9). 
(4) On average, past earning information has longer persistence and larger 
effect on market momentum portfolios compared with the effect on 
tourism momentum portfolios. This evidence is compatible with 
Hypothesis 10. 
(5) Most of the evidences about the profits associated with price and 
earning momentum portfolios based on past trading volume or firm size 
also confirm the price overreaction hypothesis {Hypothesis 7), the earning 
underreaction hypothesis {Hypothesis 9)，and Hypothesis 10 in the 
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intermediate-term and long-term holding periods. However, a few pieces 
of evidence in the tourism portfolio are not consistent with these 
hypotheses. The following examples illustrate the point. Small stocks (CI) 
price momentum portfolios experience a quick price reversal as early as 9-
month after portfolio formation; price momentum portfolios with low past 
volume (VI) do not experience a significant price momentum in the 
intermediate-term. Although the big stocks (C2) earning momentum 
strategy is more profitable for the market portfolio than for the tourism 
portfolio in the intermediate-term, the study does not find this evidence in 
the long-term. This evidence suggests that firm size and trading volume 
stocks have important impacts on the predictability of price strategies. 
(6) Trading volume and firm size are valuable information sources about 
future price responses. The evidence in this section supports Hypothesis 2 
and Hypothesis 3 which propose that the magnitude and persistence of 
momentum profitability can be predicted based on past trading volume 
and firm size. 
(7) The price momentum portfolio of high volume stocks significantly 
outperforms that of low volume stocks for both tourism stocks and market 
stocks as a whole; the earning momentum portfolio of high volume stocks 
significantly outperform that of low volume stocks for tourism stocks. 
(8) The finding that the price momentum portfolio of big firms 
significantly outperforms that of small firms over all holding periods 
strongly supports Hypothesis 8\ the earning momentum portfolio of small 
firms significantly tends to outperform that of big firms over all holding 
periods. 
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(9) Fama-French three factors 一 market factor, size (SMB) factor, and 
BE/ME (HML) factor - cannot even partially explain the profitability of 
momentum strategies sorted by past price or earnings surprises in the 
intermediate-term and long-term. This evidence rejects Hypothesis 12, the 
Fama-French three-factor risk-based model. 
Generally speaking, there is no significant difference between the patterns 
of the tourism portfolio and the market portfolio in the intermediate-term 
and long-term. As one portion of the whole national economy, the 
performance of the tourism industry is positively correlated with the 
general economic climate. On the other hand, the ways that investors 
interpret information (such as past price, past trading volume, past earning 
surprises, and firm size) of tourism stocks are similar with those of the 
market stocks as a whole. 
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Chapter 6： Conclusions 
A. Main Results and Discussions 
This study examines the performance of tourism stocks from 1990 to 
2000. I have begun the process of understanding the behavior of tourism 
stocks' underlying assets, the tourism industry. Several important results 
are found in this study. 
(1) The momentum (or contrarian) strategies based on past price, past 
earning surprise, past trading volume, and firm size give rise to significant 
profits in the short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term for both 
tourism stocks and the overall stock market in the United States. This 
finding strongly supports Hypothesis 1 that average tourism and market 
stock returns in different horizons can be predicted by past returns and 
past earnings. 
(2) The evidence of profitability of tourism momentum or contrarian 
strategies in different horizon contradicts Hypothesis 11, the Industry 
effect hypothesis (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999), which proposes that 
momentum investment strategies are significantly less profitable once the 
stocks are controlled within the tourism industry. For example, the 
evidence that tourism portfolio stocks earn higher contrarian profit than 
the market portfolio in the short horizon implies that industry effects have 
virtually no effect to profitability in the short-term. 
(3) The study supports Hypothesis 6 which indicates that contrarian price 
strategies in the short-term can earn significant profit even if the returns 
of these portfolios are risk-adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor 
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model. But the study rejects Hypothesis 12 that momentum (or contrarian) 
price strategies profit of intermediate- and long-term can be significantly 
reduced if the portfolios risk-adjusted by Fama-French three-factor 
model.(4) Our empirical results in (1) and (3) have important implications 
for the debate of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The predictive 
ability of past return, past earning surprises, past trading volume, firm 
size, and formation period to predict future returns implies that prices do 
not tend to equal fundamental values. 
(5) Positive cross autocorrelations due to big firms lead small firms' 
returns can be one of the reasonable factors for short-term contrarian 
profits. This evidence supports Hypothesis4, the lead-lag hypothesis (Lo 
and Mackinlay, 1990). As an implication of Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 5 
proposes that the contrarian portfolio of small firms significantly 
outperforms that of large firms is also supported. 
(6) Two pieces of publicly available information, stocks' past return and 
the past earning surprises individually predict future returns in the 
intermediate-term and long-term. The study suggests that their ability to 
the predict stock returns are compatible; one effect is not subsumed by the 
other. 
The difference in market reaction to the two kinds of information has 
some intuitive reason. The earnings momentum strategies are based on the 
performance of the most recent two quarters' announced net incomes 
(earnings). Earning or net income is a financial value which is an 
indicator of operational performance in the past earning reported period. 
In comparison, past returns reflect a broad set of market expectations of 
the firm's future outlook. Thus, they influence stock future prices in 
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different ways. Using the strategies based on one-way analysis, helps to 
disentangle the relative predictive power of past returns and earnings 
surprises for future returns. 
(7) The finding that price momentum portfolios experience price 
revision in the long-term confirms Hypothesis 7, the price overreaction 
hypothesis (Lehmann (1990), Lo and Mackinlay (1988’ 1990), and etc.). It 
suggests that at least a portion of momentum profits is better characterized 
as an overreaction; the market initially tends to be overly optimistic and 
then adjusts downward over time. For earning surprises, the evidence that 
the earning momentum profits persist for more than three years supports 
the underreaction theory (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996) 
{Hypothesis 9) that the market does not incorporate the news of past 
earnings promptly, and indeed, the adjustment is gradual so that there are 
drifts in subsequent returns. The empirical results of this thesis are clearly 
inconsistent with the Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis and the price 
underreaction hypothesis (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). 
The intermediate-term stock price overreaction and long-term error 
correction in the tourism portfolio could possibly be caused by a 
combination of the business cycles and oversupply cycles of the tourism 
industry. The business cycles of the tourism industry is closely positively 
related to the general economic climate. For instance, Choi, Olsen, 
Kwansa, and Tse (1999) report the cyclical pattern in the lodging sector. 
Lundberg et al (1995) and Powers and Barrows (2001) find that tourism 
firms tend to overreact to good news that results in oversupply cycles 
which are characterized by over-expansion in prosperity and huge loss in 
recession. The restaurant and airline sector also tends to expand too 
quickly in prosperity, trapping it into issues of horrendous debt payments 
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(Zheng, 2002; and Vogel, 2002). These oversupply cycles overlapped the 
economic cyclical curve and exaggerated the performance of the tourism 
industry. Therefore, in prosperity or other good news, tourism stock prices 
tend to overreact with the irrational expansion or oversupply process of 
the tourism industry. In recession, tourism stock prices drop until the 
demand catches up with the supply in the tourism industry. This reason is 
also helpful in explaining why tourism stocks are undervalued and more 
volatile and risky than others. 
(8) The evidence of the study confirm Hypothesis 10 which indicates that 
in general the earning momentum effect of the market portfolio tends to 
be stronger and longer-lived than that of the tourism portfolio. 
The possible explanation is as follows. Products and services of the 
tourism industry are highly perishable and intangible (Harris and Brown, 
1998), such as hotel rooms, restaurant seats, and airplane seats; if their 
consumption does not take place, their loss will be occurred 
simultaneously. On the other hand, unlike the goods produced in factories 
and sold elsewhere, the operational information of tourism products and 
services can be acquired simply. Their current operational performance 
(such as sales) could be more easily observed and near-term financial 
performance (such as earnings) could be more precisely estimated by 
analysts and investors than what could be done for other industries, such 
as manufacturing industry, whose unsold products could be stored and 
sold after the next earning quarterly disclosure to recover a proportion of 
cost in a worst case scenario and whose earnings information could not be 
easily observed by the public. Since, the market has made very large 
revisions based on the earnings information revealed before the earnings 
disclosure for the current quarter or fiscal year for tourism stocks. 
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Therefore, the earning momentum effect for tourism stocks is expected to 
be more short-lived in persistence and smaller in magnitude than for the 
whole market on average. 
(9) Trading volume and firm size are valuable information sources about 
future price responses. The evidence in this section supports Hypothesis 2 
and Hypothesis 3 which propose that the magnitude and persistence of 
momentum (or contrarian) profitability can be predicted based on past 
trading volume and firm size. 
Particularly, the finding that price momentum portfolios of big firms 
significantly outperform that of small firms over the intermediate- and 
long-term strongly support Hypothesis 8. This finding is perhaps due to 
the big firms' aggressive expansion during prosperity and other good 
news. In the past decades, the lodging sector and the airline sector have 
been dominated by a few major players, and top restaurant chains have 
accounted for a major share of restaurant sales in the last decades. 
Historical evidence shows that big firms tend to oversupply in prosperity 
and to other good news, such as tax deregulation, cheap dollar policy, and 
hotel construction cost declination (Powers and Barrows (2002), Vogel 
(2001)，and Lundberg et al. (1995)). Apparently, the big tourism firms 
should be largely responsible for the irrational fluctuation. For instance, 
the "overbuilding" in the U.S. lodging sector in the middle of 1980s 
caused by the combined impact of tax deregulation and the general 
economic expansion. The dramatic expansion resulted in serious 
oversupply and financial problems for the hotel sector from the middle of 
1980s to the beginning of 1990s (Vogel, 2001). From 1989 to 1993, the 
major airlines also encountered serious loss due to oversupply in the 
middle 1980s (Morrison and Winston, 1995). Therefore, the stock prices 
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of big tourism firms tend to overreact more aggressively in magnitude 
than that of small tourism stocks. 
(10) The magnitude and persistence of future return can be predicted 
based on past return, past earning surprises, trading volume, firm size, and 
holding period. Table 6.1 summarizes the best-performance portfolios and 
momentum (or contrarian) portfolios based on past return, past earnings, 
past trading volume, firm size, formation period, and holding period. For 
instance, the annual return for the small losers ClRl and high volume 
losers V2R1 of short-term tourism portfolio are as high as 9.0% and 5.7% 
per month for the one-week holding period. Thus, the combined portfolio 
C1V2R1 tends to earn the highest short-term contrarian profits. The mean 
annual returns for the big winners C2R3 and low volume winners V1R3 
of intermediate-term tourism portfolio for the 12-month holding period 
are as high as 10.2% and 10.4% per year respectively. Thus the combined 
portfolio C2V1R3 tends to earn the highest momentum profits. Therefore, 
it seems that any method of technical analysis of time-varying returns 
investment strategies or processes can profitably include trading volume 
and firm size as determinants for future price responses. 
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Table 6.1 
Performance Summaries of Portfolios Based on Past Return, Past 
Earnings Surprises, Past Trading Volume, Firm Size, Formation 
Period, and Holding Period for Tourism Stock Portfolio and 
Market Portfolio (Not-risk-adjusted) 
This table reports the best-performance portfolio and momentum or contrarian portfolio 
based on past return, past earnings, past trading volume, firm size, formation period, and 
holding period. "NA" means none. "Not significant" means not significant at a 10% level. 
The sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A: Price Momentum (or Contrarian) 
Tourism Portfolio Market Portfolio 
„ . „ . , , 。， Intermediate- . . ‘， Intermediate- . ‘ Holding Period J Short-term term Long-term Short-term term Long-term 
Most Profitable Portfolio C1V2R1 C2V1R3 CIVIRI C1V2R1 C1V1R3 CIVIRI 
Formation Period K having nA Not significant Not significant NA Not significant Not significant 
the Most Profitable 
Most Profitable ~~ 
Momentum/Contrarian C1V1(R1-R3) C2V2(R3-R1) C1V1(R1-R3) C1V1(R1-R3) C2V2(R3-R1) C1V1(R1-R3) 
Portfolio 
Formation Period K with 
the Most Profitable nA Not significant Not significant NA Not significant Not significant 
Momentum/Contrarian 
Portfolio |_ 
Panel B: Earning Momentum (or Contrarian) 
Most Profitable Portfolio NA V1E3 V2E3 NA C1V1E3 C1V2E3 
Formation Period K having nA Not significant Not significant NA Not significant Not significant 
the Most Profitable Most Profitable 
Momentum/Contrarian NA C1V2(E3-E1) C1V2(E3-E1) NA C1V2(E3-E1) Not significant 
Portfolio 
Formation Period K with 




(11) Given the real constraints many investors face, the contrarian returns 
for the short-term can generally produce arbitrage profits when 
considering transactions costs and risk premium. However, it may not be 
profitable to establish intermediate-term momentum strategies and long-
term contrarian strategies. A momentum (or contrarian) strategy is 
trading-intensive. Thus trading costs tend to be relatively high. These 
implementation issues will substantially reduce the benefits from pursuing 
a momentum (or contrarian) portfolio. To illustrate the point, suppose 
investors always exploit price momentum by using the optimal volume-
size-based momentum strategy - C2(R3-R1) in Table 6.2. This would 
yield a mean annual return of about 13.6% per year when the holding 
period of the portfolio is 12 months. If risk-adjusted by the Fama-French 
three factors, the investors earn an extra 1.3% per year. Chan, Jegadeesh 
and Lakonishok (1996) report average trading costs for small firms of 
about 3% per year (combining a purchase and sale), so the excess return 




Mean Annual Returns after Fama-French Risk-adjustment and 
Transaction Costs Reduction for Tourism Price and Earning 
Momentum Strategy Portfolios (K=3 Months) 
This table reports the mean annual abnormal returns and Fama-French three-factor risk adjusted mean 
annual abnormal returns for tourism price and earning momentum strategy portfolios based on past 
trading volume, and firm size. The sample of equal-weighted tourism stock portfolio includes all 
tourism stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Returns used in this study are geometric 
average annual return after Fama-French three-factor risk-adjustment and transaction costs reduction. 
Average annual trading cost for small firms of about 0.03 (combining a purchase and sale) is used as 
the benchmark for transaction cost reduction. The sample period is January 1990 to December 2000. 
Panel A: Price Momentum (or Contrarian) 
Intermediate-term Long-term 
J=:3 Mon J=6 Mon J=9 Mon J=12 Mon J=36 Mon J=48 Mon J=60 Mon 
一 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R3-R1 R1-R3 R1-R3 R1-R3 
VI 0.015 -0.054 -0.041 0.016 -0.126 -0.026 -0.076 
V2 0.038 -0.141 -0.146 -0.1 -0.114 -0.066 -0.044 
CI 0.064 -0.135 -0.12 -0.067 -0.113 -0.01 -0.057 
C2 -0.01 -0.06 -0.067 -0.017 -0.127 -0.085 -0.062 
All 0.032 0.007 0.004 0.033 -0.122 0.022 0.003 Panel A; Earning Momentum (or Contrarian) 
^ .0.025 -0.083~~ -0.084 ^ ^ -0.099 -0.052 -0.078 
V2 -0.129 -0.197 -0.152 -0.078 -0.03 0.134 0.065 
CI -0.084 -0.189 -0.119 -0.047 0.04 0.133 0.038 
C2 -0.072 -0.091 -0.117 -0.12 -0.195 -0.051 -0.037 
All 0.012 0 0.012 0.032 -0.075 0.025 0.07 
* Positive Significant at the 10% level for a one-tailed T-test. 
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(12) A note of caution is necessary when we try to generalize the results 
from the whole stock market to a special industry. In the comparison 
between the stock performance between the overall market and the 
tourism portfolio, I find that the tourism portfolio has its own 
characteristics. In many cases, the performance of portfolios based on past 
returns and past earnings is very different between the tourism and market 
portfolios. For example, the effect of price information will not likely be 
impounded in tourism stock prices in five years; thus it has a longer 
contrarian effect than the market portfolio. 
However, in most cases, we cannot see that the tourism industry exhibits 
significantly different statistical behavior patterns than that of the market 
portfolio. The reasons could be the following. First, the tourism industry 
is one sector of the whole economy. The economics of the tourism 
industry, like most other businesses, closely reflects the general economy. 
Thus, the performance of tourism stocks tends to be highly correlated to 
the whole stock market. Second, as illustrated in the subsection 5.2.4 and 
5.2.5, the profitability of contrarian strategies for both the tourism stock 
portfolio and the market stock portfolio are similarly compensated for 
risks of Fama-French three factors. And finally, there is no significant 
difference between the ways that investors interpret information (such as 
past price, past trading volume, firm size) of tourism stocks and market 
stocks as a whole. 
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B. Contributions and Suggestions 
The study contributes to the financial study of the predictability of stock 
returns with new evidence and perspectives. That is, it employs an 
intergrated finance method and provides additional evidences and 
perspectives in examining return predictability patterns, justifying the 
relative predictive power of explanatory variables, and evaluating the 
competing hypotheses for the predictability of stock returns. The study 
adds to the existing finance literature in several ways. 
First, this study adopts an integrated viewpoint that includes the most 
critical explanatory variables. It provides a comprehensive analysis of 
different momentum strategies on a common set of data. I study the 
performance of price momentum with earnings momentum strategies 
using portfolios formed on the basis of one-way (basic momentum 
strategies), two-way (momentum strategies based on past trading volume 
or firm size), and Fama-French risk-adjustment for both tourism stocks 
and stocks of the whole market. These comparisons help to disentangle 
the relative predictive power of each explanatory variable for future 
returns. The study also provides additional evidence on the Fama-French 
three-factor risk-adjusted performance for the price and earning 
momentum strategies. 
Second, the study evaluates various explanations for the profitability of 
momentum strategies which still lack sufficient explanations in the 
empirical finance literature in different horizons as documented in 
previous literature. This thesis confirms that short-horizon excess profits 
are partially due to lead-lag effects (Lo and Mackinlay, 1990) in a special 
way. In addition, the thesis tends to support the overreaction and price 
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correction hypothesis (Lehmann, 1990; DeLong et al, 1990; Lo and 
Mackinlay, 1988, 1990; and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
1998) and also confirms the earning underreaction hypothesis (Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). The thesis also suggests that the Fama-
French three-factor risk compensation can also explain part of the 
contrarian profits in the short-term. These three hypotheses, two behavior 
models and Fama-French risk-based model, individually explain the 
predictability of future returns. This point of view differs with previous 
literature in this topic. 
Third, while the previous studies examine the price behaviors for stocks in 
all stocks, I take a different approach. I investigate the price behavior 
patterns in the tourism industry only. On one hand, the returns 
microstructure-bias in stocks within one industry is smaller than those 
among different industries, and therefore, the results of the empirical 
study are more reliable. On the other hand, studying the characteristics of 
the tourism industry and tourism stocks adds different perspectives. Such 
as the premise that big firms tend to aggressively oversupply in good news 
consequently implies there is an overreaction of tourism stocks. The 
finding that products and services of the tourism industry are highly 
perishable and intangible supports the earning underreaction hypothesis. 
The study contributes to the tourism industry by providing more 
understanding of its impacts on stock performance. The thesis interprets 
the profitability of future returns of tourism stocks with the tourism 
industry cycle, oversupply cycle, and suggest the oversupply cycle can be 
helpful in explaining why tourism stocks are undervalued and are more 
volatile and risky than others stocks. 
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Oversupply in the tourism industry resulting from prosperity has hurt 
tourism stocks' return and increased their volatility. Two suggestions 
regarding the tourism industry can be made based on the results of this 
present study. First, fast expansion due to market overreaction will create 
serious financial problems in recession. Consolidation via mergers and 
acquisitions within the tourism industry, rather than aggressive expansion 
by building new properties, may be the wise growth strategy to pursue for 
the tourism industry. Mergers and acquisitions with other related 
companies may bring additional returns to existing shareholders due to a 
reduction in operating and capital costs gained from consequent 
economies of scale. Such a strategy should help reduce oversupply and 
create favorable market conditions for the tourism industry, and therefore 
help improve stock performance. Second, the tourism industry should be 
very careful about their new financing activities in the open market. Such 
activities, particularly when used in funding new properties, not only 
magnify the financial and market risks but also create downward pressure 
on tourism stocks due to earnings dilution and increased uncertainty 
(Brueggeman and Fisher, 1997). A conservative growth policy would be 
helpful. In brief, executives of tourism companies and policy decision 
marker in tourism industry should carefully review their growth strategies 
and financing policies. A conservative growth strategy accompanied by an 
internal-oriented financing policy can lower risk and improve their return, 
and thus improve their risk-adjusted performance. 
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C. Limitations and Future Research 
Admittedly, this empirical research is in nonexperimental settings and 
thus it is limited by data availability. The sample pool for the tourism 
industry is small, so the explanatory power of some evidence could be 
subject to the criticism "out-of-sample performance". On the other hand, 
it is difficult to justify the reliability of the explanations of investment 
patterns, such as price or earning momentum strategy, from individual 
studies which have different methodologies and samples. In this vein, the 
explanations of this study are only suggestive and an open area of 
research. However, I believe this study could contribute new evidence and 
perspectives to the justification of research on the predictability of stock 
returns and to the better understanding of the tourism industry. 
My results also raise at least three interesting questions for future 
research. 
First, although most of my evidences support the price overreaction 
hypothesis and earning underreaction hypothesis, some of the evidence in 
the tourism portfolio is not consistent with these hypotheses, such as the 
CI price momentum portfolio experiencing a quick price reversal as early 
as 9-month after formation; the VI price momentum portfolio does not 
experience a significant price momentum in the intermediate-term. I know 
of no explanation for these puzzles. 
Second, in this study, I research the earning momentum and price 
momentum individually. However, the correlation between the past 
earning news and past return cannot be well controlled in the sample 
selection. The correlationship between past earnings and returns reduce 
theirs predictive power on future stock price. As mentioned earlier, I also 
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find that past price tends to contribute more to price momentum than does 
past earning news. Thus, I believe a more robust model of future price 
predictability would combines both past earnings and returns, to explain 
this finding. 
Third, using long range data sample can improve the explanatory power 
of stock return predictability. 
Finally, though the study finds significant autocovariance in the Fama-
French three factors (Market, SMB and HML factor), and my evidence 
and many other studies also report that the Fama-French three-factor 
model does not subsume momentum effects, the magnitude of contrarian 
or momentum profits in the short-term, intermediate- and long-term, and 
the autocorrelation of the return time series in intermediate-term are likely 
to be lower under the risk-adjustment of the model. This means the Fama-
French model is useful in explaining the price predictability. On the other 
hand, the evidence that autocovariances of Market factor, SMB factor and 
HML factor are significant implies that the Fama-French model is not a 
real multivariable regression model. Hence, can the Fama-French model 
be revised is another challenge I leave for future research. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Tourism Industry SIC Code Description 
Major Group 45: Transportation By Air 
This major group includes establishments engaged in furnishing domestic 
and foreign transportation by air and also those operating airports and 
flying fields and furnishing terminal services. Establishments primarily 
engaged in performing services which may incidentally use airplanes 
(e.g., crop dusting and aerial photography) are classified according to the 
service performed. Only 4512 are related to tourism industry. 
• Industry Group 451: Air Transportation, Scheduled, And Air 
Courier 
o 4512 Air Transportation, Scheduled 
Major Group 47: Transportation Services 
Only 4724 and 4725 are related to tourism industry. 
O 4724 Travel Asencies 
O 4725 Tour Operators 
Major Group 70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other 
Lodging Places 
This major group includes commercial and noncommercial establishments 
engaged in furnishing lodging, or lodging and meals, and camping space 
and camping facilities. 
• Industry Group 701: Hotels And Motels 
o 7011 Hotels And Motels 
• Industry Group 702: Rooming And Boarding Houses 
O 7021 Rooming And Boardins Houses 
• Industry Group 703: Camps And Recreational Vehicle Parks 
o 7032 SportiuQ And Recreational Camps 
o 7033 Recreational Vehicle Parks And Campsites 
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• Industry Group 704: Organization Hotels And Lodging Houses, On 
o 7041 Organization Hotels And Lodging Houses, On Membership Basis 
Major Group 79: Amusement And Recreation Services 
This major group includes establishments engaged in providing 
amusement or entertainment services, not elsewhere classified. 
Establishments primarily engaged in operating motion picture theaters are 
classified in Industry Group 783，and those operating museums, art galleries, arboreta, and botanical and zoological gardens are classified in Major Group 84. 
• Industry Group 791: Dance Studios, Schools, And Halls 
o 7911 Dance Studios, Schools, And Halls 
• Industry Group 792: Theatrical Producers (except Motion Picture)， 
o 7922 Theatrical Producers (except Motion Picture) And Miscellaneous 
o 7929 Bands, Orchestras, Actors, And Other Entertainers And Entertainment 
• Industry Group 793: Bowling Centers 
O 7933 Bowlins Centers 
• Industry Group 794: Commercial Sports 
o 7941 Professional Svorts Clubs And Promoters 
o 7948 Racim. Including Track Operation 
• Industry Group 799: Miscellaneous Amusement And Recreation 
o 7991 Physical Fitness Facilities 
o 7992 Public Golf Courses 
o 7993 Coin-operated Amusement Devices 
o 7996 Amusement Parks 
o 7997 Membershiv Svorts And Recreation Clubs 
o 7 9 9 9 Amusement And Recreation Services, Not Elsewhere 
Classified 
Major Group 58: Eating And Drinking Places 
This major group includes retail establishments selling prepared foods and 
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drinks for consumption on the premises; and also lunch counters and 
refreshment stands selling prepared foods and drinks for immediate 
consumption. Restaurants, lunch counters, and drinking places operated as 
a subordinate service facility by other establishments are not included in 
this industry, unless they are operated as leased departments by outside 
operators. Thus, restaurants and lunch counters operated by hotels are 
classified in Services, Major Group 70; those operated by department 
stores in Major Group 53. Bars and restaurants owned by and operated for 
members of civic, social, and fraternal associations only are classified in 
Industry 8641. Mobile food and dairy wagons are classified in Industry 
5963. 
• Industry Group 581: Eating And Drinking Places 
o 5812 Eating Places 
o 5813 Drinking Places (alcoholic Beverases) 
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Appendix 2: Tourism Stock Sample List 
This table reports all tourism stocks traded in NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ reported in the 
CRSP tapes. "Exch." represents the exchanges the stock traded. 1 is New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), 2 is American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and 3 is NASDAQ. Tourism industry firm 
selection is based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 1987 Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) 
code system. The tourism industry sample is selected from firms with SIC codes of major 
industry group 58 (Eating And Drinking Places), 45 (Transportation By Air), 70 (Hotels, 
Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places), 79 (Amusement And Recreation 
Services), and industry 4724 (Travel Agencies) and 4725 (Tour Operators) from major group 47 
(Transportation Services). Please be noted that the "SIC Number" used in this table are 1980 
SIC code. "Cusip Number" represents the eight-character number that uniquely identifies a 
particular security. CUSIP is an acronym for the Committee on Uniform Security Identification 
Procedures (CUSIP). 
Cusip . SIC Date of reported in „ . , ^ Name Exch. „ . „ Symbol Number Number Crsp file � 
Beginning Ending 
85765740 STATESWEST AIRLINES INC 3 4510 19860606 19920421 SWAL 83087910 SKYWEST INC 3 4510 19860626 20001229 SKYW 
69483610 PACIFIC SOUTHWEST AIRLINES NEW 3 4510 19860724 19870529 PSWA 
59047910 MESA AIR GROUP INC NEV 3 4510 19870311 20001229 MESA 
920710 AIR T INC 3 4510 19840423 20001229 AIRT 
04338Q10 ASA HOLDINGS LTD 3 4510 19820722 19990511 ASM 
19978910 COMAIR HOLDINGS INC 3 4510 19810716 20000111 COMR 
33941610 FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC 3 4510 19840110 19920722 FLTI 
59066B10 MESABA HOLDINGS INC 3 4510 19830630 20001229 MAIR 
59190510 METRO AIRLINES INC 3 4510 19811030 19910328 MAIR 
5954ID10 MID PACIFIC AIRLINES CORP 3 4510 19800916 19880205 MPAl 
80637410 SCHEDULED SKYWAYS INC 3 4510 19840412 19850116 SKYS 
12486810 C C A I R INC 3 4510 19890713 19990609 CCAR 
75900710 REGIONAL AIR GROUP CORP 3 4510 19890307 19890927 RAIR 
20828650 CONQUEST INDUSTRIES INC 3 4510 19890518 19960401 CAIR 
77471410 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS INC 3 4510 19900911 19940128 RMHI 
75974110 RENO AIR INC 3 4510 19930308 19990222 RENO 
4839610 ATLANTIC COAST AIRLINES HLDG INC 3 4510 19930721 20001229 ACAI 
89169710 TOWER AIR INC 3 4510 19931116 20000228 TOWR 
39054K10 GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD 3 4510 19940120 20001229 GLUX 
66728010 NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORP 3 4510 19940318 20001229 NWAC 
912520 AIR L A INC 3 4510 19940513 19950208 AILA 
35906510 FRONTIER AIRLINES INC NEW 3 4510 19940520 20001229 FRNT 
5882510 BALTIC INTERNATIONAL USA INC 3 4510 19940627 19980908 BISA 
952510 AIRWAYS CORP 3 4510 19950908 19971117 AAIR 
92201B20 VANGUARD AIRLINES INC 3 4510 19951031 20001229 VNGD 
95908010 WESTERN PACIFIC AIRLINES INC 3 4510 19951205 19971201 WPAC 
91149810 UNITED SHIPPING & TECHNOLOGY INC 3 4510 19960529 20001229 USHP 
78351310 RYANAIR HOLDINGS PLC 3 4510 19970602 20001229 RYAAY 
92765K10 VIRGIN EXPRESS HOLDINGS 3 4510 19971113 20001229 VIRGY 
59812610 MIDWAY AIRLINES CORP 3 4510 19971205 20001229 MDWY 
74150310 PRICELINECOM INC 3 4510 19990330 20001229 PCLN 
64107810 NETAIR INTERNATIONAL CORP 3 4510 19841218 19890807 NTAR 
132010 AlAINDUSTRIESINC 3 4511 19830721 19840926 AlAI 
908610 AIR CALIFORNIA INC 3 4511 19721214 19771012 ACAL 
913510 AIR MIDWEST INC 3 4511 19821105 19910712 AMWI 
913810 AIR ONE INC 3 4511 19831110 19850426 AONE 
923610 AIR WISCONSIN SERVICES INC ’ 3 4511 19780721 19920127 ARWS 
2365010 AMERICA WESTAIRLS INC 3 4511 19830225 19940825 AWAL 
4774410 ATLANTA EXPRESS AIRL CORP 3 4511 19820722 19830824 ATLX 
5366410 AVIATION GROUP INC 3 4511 19811210 19860131 LIFT 
10542340 BRANIFF INC 3 4511 19840315 19891114 BAIR 
89407610 TRANSWORLD CORP LIQUIDATING TR 1 4511 19620702 19870331 TW 
27619110 EASTERN AIR LINES INC 1 4511 19620702 19861125 EAL 
69775710 PAN AM CORP 1 4511 19620702 19910925 PN 
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176510 A M R CORP DEL 1 4511 19620702 20001229 AMR 
62945J10 N W A INC 1 4511 19620702 19890726 NWA 
10542510 BRANDT INTERNATIONAL CORP 1 4511 19620702 19820526 BNF 
63243110 NATIONAL AIRLINES INC 1 4511 19620702 19800107 NAL 
95758610 WESTERN AIR LINES CMC 1 4511 19620702 19861218 WAL 
24736110 DELTA AIR LINES INC 1 4511 19620702 20001229 DAL 
21079510 CONTINENTAL AIR LINES INC 1 4511 19620702 19821028 CAL 
1165910 ALASKA AIRGROUP INC 1 4511 19620702 20001229 ALK 
91190510 U S AIRWAYS GROUP INC 1 4511 19620702 20001229 U 
29159310 EMPIRE AIRLINES INC 3 4511 19800508 19860204 EAIR 
55499190 MACKEY AIRLS INC 2 4511 19620702 19670106 MCY 
60814910 MOHAWK AIRLS INC 2 4511 19620702 19720412 MAL 
66402310 NORTHEAST AIRLINES INC 2 4511 19620702 19720801 NEA 
69499690 PACIFIC NORTHN AIRLS 2 4511 19620702 19670630 PNA 
81164110 SEABOARD WORLD AIRLS INC 1 4511 19620702 19800930 SWA 
34408220 FLYING TIGER LINE INC 3 4511 19840313 19850705 FLYX 
88673510 TIGER INTERNATIONAL INC 1 4511 19620702 19890215 TGR 
35907610 FRONTIER HOLDINGS INC 2 4511 19640415 19851121 FA 
9777910 BONANZA AIR LINES INC 2 4511 19650802 19680417 BON 
44040310 HORIZON AIR INDS INC 3 4511 19840125 19870409 HZIR 
923010 AIR WEST INC 2 4511 19660906 19700324 AWT 
98190410 WORLDCORP INC 1 4511 19670424 19981211 WOA 
69263210 OZARK HOLDINGS INC 2 4511 19670508 19860915 OZA 
89399190 TRANS INTL AIRLS CORP 1 4511 19670628 19680308 TIA 
937410 AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL INC 3 4511 19680514 19801103 ALFT 
47103430 JAPAN AIR LINES LTD 3 4511 19721214 20001229 JAPNY 
80407310 SATURN AIRWAYS INC 2 4511 19690128 19761130 SUR 
55453710 MACKEY INTERNATIONAL INC 3 4511 19760408 19780621 MCKY 
92934310 W T C INTERNATIONAL NV 2 4511 19700709 19870903 WAF 
60571010 MISSISSIPPI VALLEY AIRLINES INC 3 4511 19831206 19850517 MVAI 
76027410 REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC 1 4511 19721214 19860812 RAI 
64934310 NEW YORK AIRLINES INC 3 4511 19810220 19850828 NYAL 
40407310 HALING 2 4511 19740523 19940315 HA 
65729010 NORTH ATLANTIC AIRLS INC 3 4511 19831011 19840621 ARVT 
84474110 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO 1 4511 19721214 20001229 LUV 
67462810 OCEAN AIRWAYS INC 3 4511 19790910 19811125 OAIR 
69034310 OVERSEAS NATIONAL AIRWAYS 3 4511 19721214 19790115 OVER 
72010110 P I E D M O N T AVIATION INC 1 4511 19721214 19871104 PIE 
2048610 ALOHA INC 2 4511 19791214 19861226 ALO 
70976410 PEOPLE EXPRESS INC 3 4511 19801106 19861229 PEXP 
74407210 PROVINCETOWN BOSTON AIRL INC 3 4511 19830915 19860502 PBAL 
89334960 TRANS WORLD AIRLINES INC 1 4511 19830303 19881024 TWA 
21079810 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CORP 2 4511 19830419 19870206 CAI 
75891510 REGENT AIR CORP 3 4511 19831003 19840719 RAIR 
47709310 JET AMERICAN AIRLS INC 2 4511 19811113 198(51226 JA 
86510 A C I HOLDINGS INC 2 4511 19830825 19870429 ACF 
78074810 ROYALE AIRLINES INC 3 4511 19830126 19880122 RYAL 
82868810 SIMMONS AIRLINES INC 3 4511 19840124 19880808 SIMM 
84217910 SOUTHERN AIRWAYS INC 3 4511 19721214 19790629 
11041930 BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC 1 4511 19870211 20001229 BAB 
96763010 WIEN AIR ALASKA INC 3 4511 19721214 19801229 WCON 
34064610 FLORIDA EXPRESS INC 3 4511 19851016 19880419 FEXA 
74086110 PRESIDENTIAL AIRWAYS 3 4511 19850906 19891031 PAIR 
97415210 WINGS WEST AIRLINES 3 4511 19850911 19880809 WING 
90254950 U A L CORP 1 4512 19620702 20001229 UAL 
48251630 K L M ROYALDUTCH AIRLINES 1 4512 19620702 20001229 KLM 
59813010 MIDWAY AIRLINES INC 1 4512 19801204 19911001 MDW 
21080210 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES HLDGS INC 2 4512 19721214 19920320 CTA 
95707110 WESTAIR HOLDING INC 2 4512 19881025 19920529 WAH 
21079520 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC 1 4512 19930902 20001229 CAL 
21079530 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC 1 4512 19930902 20001229 CAL 
89334984 TRANS WORLD AIRLINES INC 2 4512 19940103 19941101 TWA 
00949P10 AIRTRAN HOLDINGS INC 2 4512 19940628 20001229 AAI 
2365720 AMERICA WEST HOLDINGS CORP 1 4512 19940921 20001229 AWA 
41984910 HAWAIIAN AIRLINES INC NEW 2 4512 19950621 20001229 HA 
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941710 AIRNET SYSTEMS INC 1 4512 19960531 20001229 ANS 
69775810 PAN AM CORP FLA 2 4512 19960925 19980226 PAA 
16940910 CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES CO LTD 1 4512 19970730 20001229 ZNH 
50172310 LAN CHILE S A 1 4512 19971107 20001229 LFL 
78127810 RUDYS RESTAURANT GROUP INC 3 5800 19860618 19971201 RUDY 
69906210 PARADISE HOLDINGS INC 3 5800 19940510 19980922 PRDS 
53516010 LINDAS DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS INC 3 5800 19940525 19970825 LINCA 
4045810 ARIZONA APPETITOS STORES INC 3 5810 19860122 19870616 A API 
30705920 FAMILY STEAK HOUSES FL INC 3 5810 19860414 20001229 RYFL 
87113610 SYBRA INC 3 5810 19860613 19890327 SIBR 
9792010 BOMBAY PALACE RESTS INC 3 5810 19860723 19890413 CURY 
55960310 MAGNOLIA FOODS INC 3 5810 19860724 19880801 CAFE 
27785110 EATERIES INC 3 5810 19860813 20001229 EATS 
52129810 LE PEEP RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19860828 19890606 LPEP 
28084710 EDINER INC 3 5810 19860904 19890410 EDIN 
14910910 CATCH A RISING STAR INC 3 5810 19870205 19900426 RISE 
4882010 ATLANTIC RESTAURANT VENT INC 3 5810 19870210 19880524 ARVI 
28939310 ELMERS RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19870416 20001229 ELMS 
17162010 CIATTIS INC 3 5810 19870511 19971008 CIAT 
86268420 STRATAMERICA CORP 3 5810 19870610 19920615 STCO 
8204720 BENIHANA INC 3 5810 19870715 20001229 BNHNA 
85232830 STACEYS BUFFET INC 3 5810 19880512 19980316 SBUF 
26861320 E L X S I C O R P 3 5810 19870812 20001229 ELXS 
15870430 CHAMPIONS SPORTS INC 3 5810 19881125 19940623 CSBR 
8204710 BENIHANA INC 3 5810 19830511 20001229 BNHN 
9676110 BOB EVANS FARMS INC 3 5810 19721214 20001229 BOBE 
13133410 CALNY INC 3 5810 19721214 19880302 CLNY 
16308260 CHEFS INTERNATIONAL INC 3 5810 19810608 19981216 CHEF 
16706010 CHI CHIS INC 3 5810 19770921 19880413 CHIC 
12489V10 CBRLGROUPINC 3 5810 19811105 20001229 CBRL 
23210810 CUTCO INDUSTRIES INC 3 5810 19721214 19980331 CUTC 
26550710 DUNKIN DONUTS INC 3 5810 19721214 19900102 DUNK 
23406820 DAKA INTERNATIONAL INC 3 5810 19831103 19970717 DKAI 
45937320 INTERNATIONAL DAIRY QUEEN INC 3 5810 19721214 19980107 INDQA 
50182320 L D B C O R P 3 5810 19721214 19950130 LDBC 
39942710 GROUND ROUND RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19691215 19971202 GRXR 
57790510 MAVERICK RESTAURANT CO 3 5810 19831004 19920817 MAVR 
47023610 JAMCOLTD 3 5810 19721214 19870928 MSST 
69830420 PANCHOS MEXICAN BUFFET INC 3 5810 19721214 20001229 PAMX 
70538210 PEEK N PEAK REC INC 3 5810 19721214 19881214 PEEK 
71222110 PEOPLES RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19810720 19851114 PEPL 
76125610 RESTAURANT ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 5810 19821230 19850513 CHEZ 
76126710 RESTEC SYS INC 3 5810 19830921 19871210 RTEC 
76801520 RITZYS G D INC 3 5810 19821214 19900713 RITZ 
93190410 WALL STREET DELI INC 3 5810 19820928 20001229 WSDI 
82967210 SIS CORP 3 5810 19830526 19890816 SISB 
83014010 SIZZLER RESTAURANTS INTL INC 3 5810 19821026 19910426 SIZZ 
89855120 TUBBYS INC 3 5810 19831216 19990505 TUBY 
87069010 SWENSENS INC 3 5810 19840123 19880825 SWEN 
59373630 MIAMI SUBS CORP 3 5810 19821116 19990302 SUBS 
87262310 T P I ENTERPRISES INC 3 5810 19790116 19970114 TPIE 
45937330 INTERNATIONAL DAIRY QUEEN INC 3 5810 19860212 19980106 INDQB 
14947210 CA1TLEGUARD INC 3 5810 19890215 19910131 CGXX 
75120310 RALLYS HAMBURGERS INC 3 5810 19891013 19990809 RLLY 
33847110 FLAGSTAR COMPANIES INC 3 5810 19891206 19970516 FLST 
57467230 MASCOTTCORP 3 5810 19890726 19950522 DINE 
67082310 O CHARLEYS INC 3 5810 19900719 20001229 CHUX 
12990310 CALIFORNIA BEACH RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19900821 19921109 CALB 
10112210 BOSTON RESTAURANT ASSOCIATES INC 3 5810 19900228 19991123 BRAI 
SANTA BARBARA RESTAURANT GRP 
80137810 INC 3 5810 19900821 20001229 SBRG 
38214088 GOOD TIMES RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19900622 20001229 GTIM 
83545110 SONIC CORP 3 5810 19910228 20001229 SONC 
69840W10 PANERA BREAD CO 3 5810 19910607 20001229 PNRA 
8606310 BERTUCCIS HOLDING CORP 3 5810 19910628 19980720 BERT 
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62936020 N P C INTERNATIONAL INC 3 5810 19910812 19950808 NPCIB 
55916430 MAGIC RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19910809 19950426 MGIK 
05336P10 AVADO BRANDS INC 3 5810 19911121 20001229 AVDO 
16280930 CHECKERS DRIVE IN RSTRNTS INC 3 5810 19911115 20001229 CHKR 
HAMBURGER HAMLET RESTAURANTS 
40676410 INC 3 5810 19911122 19960625 HAMB 
50048110 KOO KOO ROO ENTERPRISES INC 3 5810 19911015 19990201 KKRE 
54230710 LONE STAR STEAKHOUSE & SALOON IN 3 5810 19920312 20001229 STAR 
05635V10 BACK BAY RESTAURANT GROUP INC 3 5810 19920313 19990405 PAPA 
75382010 RARE HOSPITALITY INTL INC 3 5810 19920331 20001229 RARE 
68219810 ON THE BORDER CAFES INC 3 5810 19920430 19940518 OTBC 
50114810 KRYSTAL COMPANY 3 5810 19920514 19970926 KRYS 
45950Q10 INTERNATIONAL FAST FOOD CORP 3 5810 19920522 19960528 FOOD 
90184010 TWISTEE TREAT CORP 3 5810 19830725 19910214 TWST 
94183210 WATERMARC FOOD MANAGEMENT CO 3 5810 19920601 19971212 WAMA 
85524410 STARBUCKS CORP 3 5810 19920626 20001229 SBUX 
5248110 AUSTINS INTERNATIONAL INC 3 5810 19920729 19970211 AUST 
16307210 CHEESECAKE FACTORY INC 3 5810 19920918 20001229 CAKE 
20468010 COMPSCRIPTINC 3 5810 19921006 19980626 CPRX 
87342510 TACO CABANA INC 3 5810 19921016 20001219 TACO 
34484J10 FOODQUEST INC 3 5810 19921111 19960708 FOOQ 
92039J10 VALUE HOLDINGS INC 3 5810 19921120 19960808 VALHE 
35803210 FRESH CHOICE INC 3 5810 19921209 20001229 SALD 
3789910 APPLEBEES INTERNATIONAL INC 3 5810 19890920 20001229 APPB 
23320P10 D F & R RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19930128 19951117 DFNR 
63234710 NATHANS FAMOUS INC NEW 3 5810 19930226 20001229 NATH 
15774510 WILT CHAMBERLAINS RESTAURNTS INC 3 5810 19930211 19930212 WILT 
05635W10 BACKYARD BURGER 3 5810 19930625 20001229 BYBI 
69881310 PAPA JOHNS INTL INC 3 5810 19930608 20001229 PZZA 
47012110 JAKES PIZZA INTERNATL INC 3 5810 19930701 19960725 JAKE 
43786210 HOMETOWN BUFFET INC 3 5810 19930923 19960920 HTBB 
74726J30 Q P Q C O R P 3 5810 19930922 19971027 QPQQ 
72584810 PIZZA INN INC NEW 3 5810 19930901 20001229 PZZI 
73151310 POLLO TROPICAL INC 3 5810 19931019 19980720 POYO 
10057810 BOSTON CHICKEN INC 3 5810 19931109 19981209 BOST 
22236130 COUNTRY STAR RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19931215 19980310 CAFE 
39850220 GRILL CONCEPTS INC 3 5810 19931208 20001229 GRIL 
88708P10 T I M B E R LODGE STEAKHOUSE 丨NC 3 5810 19931209 19980902 TBRL 74905810 QUIZNOS CORP 3 5810 19940201 20001229 QUIZ 15878410 CHAMPPS ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 5810 19940329 19960221 CHPP 74756P10 QUALFTY DINING INC 3 5810 19940302 20001229 QDIN 
12003510 BUGABOO CREEK STEAK HOUSE INC 3 5810 19940406 19960916 RARE 
38552110 GRAND HAVANA ENTERPRISES INC 3 5810 19940413 19981027 PUFF 
04961R10 ATOMIC BURRITO INC 3 5810 19940518 20001229 ATOM 
77183310 ROCK BOTTOM RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19940722 19990810 BREW 
MACHEEZMO MOUSE RESTAURANTS 
55445710 INC 3 5810 19940916 19971001 MMRI 
5248210 AUSTINS STEAKS & SALOON INC 3 5810 19950125 19971118 STAK 
75086K10 RAINFOREST CAFE INC 3 5810 19950407 20001201 RAIN 
36523510 GARDEN FRESH RESTAURANT CORP 3 5810 19950517 20001229 LTUS 
75390410 RATTLESNAKE HOLDING INC 3 5810 19950629 19970917 RTTL 
54119810 LOGANS ROADHOUSE INC 3 5810 19950726 19990216 RDHS 
47652340 JERRYS FAMOUS DELI INC 3 5810 19951024 20001229 DELI 
76564130 RICKS CABARET INTERNATIONAL INC 3 5810 19951013 20001229 RICK 
46530610 ITALIAN OVEN INC 3 5810 19951121 19961230 OVEN 
80683210 SCHLOTZSKYS INC 3 5810 19951215 20001229 BUNZ 
88101610 TERRACE HOLDINGS INC 3 5810 19951206 19980929 THIS 
78668010 SAGEBRUSH INC 3 5810 19960111 19980130 SAGE 
64890420 NEW WORLD COFFEE AND BAGELS INC 3 5810 19960201 20001229 NWCI 
82765510 SILVER DINER INC 3 5810 19960327 20001229 SLVR 
59283R10 MEXICAN RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19960425 20001229 CASA 
82280910 SHELLS SEAFOOD RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19960424 20001124 SHLL 
10575520 BRAZIL FAST FOOD CORP 3 5810 19960506 20001229 BOBS 
8907210 BIG BUCK BREWERY AND STK HS INC 3 5810 19960613 20001229 BBUC 
31783210 FINE HOST CORP 3 5810 19960620 19980708 FINE 
159 
75660130 RED HOT CONCEPTS INC 3 5810 19960723 19990511 RHCS 
41790510 HARVEST RESTAURANT GROUP INC 3 5810 19960710 19980916 ROTI 
28257710 EINSTEIN NOAH BAGEL CORP 3 5810 19960802 20000306 ENBX 
64938P10 NEW YORK BAGEL ENTRPRS INC 3 5810 19960827 19981130 NYBS 
25367510 DIEDRICH COFFEE INC 3 5810 19960912 20001229 DDRX 
19218910 COFFEE PEOPLE INC 3 5810 19960925 19990707 MOKA 
16788910 CHICAGO PIZZA & BREWERY INC 3 5810 19961009 20001229 CHGO 
72585Q10 P J AMERICA INC 3 5810 19961025 20001229 PJAM 
12542110 CIAO CUCINA CORP 3 5810 19961122 19980630 CIAO 
30706810 FAMOUS DAVES OF AMERICA 3 5810 19961104 20001229 DAVE 
76972510 ROADHOUSE GRILL INC 3 5810 19961126 20001229 GRLL 
22527P10 CREATIVE HOST SERVICES INC 3 5810 19970722 20001229 CHST 
8.915E+14 TOTAL ENTERTAINMENT REST CORP 3 5810 19970718 20001229 TENT 
15878710 CHAMPPS ENTERTAINMENT INC DEL 3 5810 19970717 20001229 CMPP 
45192610 IL FORNAIO AMERICA CORP 3 5810 19970919 20001229 ILFO 
85508610 STAR BUFFET INC 3 5810 19970925 20001229 STRZ 
4290130 ARTHUR TREACHERS INC 3 5810 19971105 19990210 ATCH 
4071210 ARK RESTAURANTS CORP 3 5810 19851212 20001229 ARKR 
5068710 AUDEC CORP 3 5810 19841128 19880509 ADUC 
00758B10 ADVANTICA RESTAURANT GROUP INC 3 5810 19980112 20001229 DINE 
85787510 STEAKHOUSE PARTNERS INC 3 5810 19980227 20001229 SIZL 
87483510 TAM RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19980210 20000906 TAMR 
44106W10 HOST AMERICA CORP 3 5810 19980723 20001229 CAFE 
90917610 UNISERVICE CORP FLA 3 5810 19980805 20001229 UNSRA 
69333Y10 P F CHANGS CHINA BISTRO INC 3 5810 19981204 20001229 PFCB 
11776910 BUCA INC 3 5810 19990421 20001229 BUCA 
89968810 TUMBLEWEED INC 3 5810 19990428 20001229 TWED 
78116B10 RUBIOS RESTAURANTS INC 3 5810 19990521 20001229 RUBO 
25468010 DISCUS CORP 3 5810 19850801 19920615 DISC 
43903010 HOOKER ENTERPRISES INC 3 5810 19850729 19880427 NEXT 
96175410 WESTWOOD GROUP INC 3 5810 19841123 19880719 TWGI 
82099090 SHA1TUCK FRANK G CO 1 5811 19620702 19671229 FHK 
76199090 RESTAURANT ASSOC INC 2 5811 19620702 19660114 RST 
49129410 KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN CORP 1 5811 19690116 19710708 KTY 
16510 A & M FOOD SERVICES INC 3 5812 19830920 19860708 AMFD 
429510 ACAPULCO RESTAURANTS 3 5812 19780921 19860205 ALAR 
83082110 SKYLINE CHILI INC 2 5812 19861203 19980428 SKC 
1647610 ALL AMERICAN BURGER INC 3 5812 19790618 19811120 TAAB 
2588210 AMERICAN FAMILY PIZZA INC 3 5812 19840306 19860528 AFPZ 
2931210 AMERICAN RESTAURANT CORP 3 5812 19840203 19880808 AMRS 
76125210 RESTAURANT ASSOCIATES INDS INC 2 5812 19620702 19871120 RA 
4565410 ASSOCIATED HOSTS INC 3 5812 19721214 19881216 AHST 
88475610 THOMPSON JOHN R CO 1 5812 19620702 19650402 THM 
9180910 BLACK ANGUS SYS INC 3 5812 19721214 19870721 BLCK 
3333010 ANCORP NATIONAL SVCS INC 3 5812 19620702 19790221 ANCP 
7309820 BAYPORT RESTAURANT GROUP INC 3 5812 19821005 19960809 PORT 
16115310 CHART HOUSE ENTERPRISES 3 5812 19721214 19740430 CHTH 
16172810 CHATEAU DEVILLEINC 3 5812 19730522 19841109 CDVE 
16190110 CHART HOUSE INC 3 5812 19721214 19831229 CHHO 
10964110 BRINKER INTERNATIONAL INC 1 5812 19840106 20001229 EAT 
19623910 COLONY FOODS INC 3 5812 19721214 19780620 CKIT 
99090 A B C C O N S C O R P 1 5812 19620702 19671204 ABC 
69865310 PANTERASCORP 3 5812 19831214 19900123 PANT 
20979810 CONSOLIDATED PRODUCTS INC 1 5812 19721214 20001229 COP 
21044510 CONSUL RESTAURANT CORP 3 5812 19800204 19921012 CNSL 
17026810 CHOCK FULL O NUTS CORP 1 5812 19620702 19991015 CHF 
21639010 COOKYS STEAK PUBS INC 3 5812 19721214 19830329 COPB 
22235310 COUNTRY KITCHEN INTL INC 3 5812 19730104 19771121 CKTH 
22409710 CRAB HOUSE INC 3 5812 19830106 19840608 CRHO 
22972510 CUCOS INC 3 5812 19831215 19990202 CUCO 
86299090 STOUFFER FOODS CORP 1 5812 19620702 19671004 SFD 
8874310 BICKFORDS INC 2 5812 19620702 19701130 BIK 
25536510 DIVERSIFOODS INC 3 5812 19820406 19850911 DFDI 
25859010 DOUBLE R FAST FOODS INC 3 5812 19830224 19830923 RRFF 
28287510 ELCHICO CORP 3 5812 19721214 19770930 
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28287910 EL CHICO RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19830630 19980120 ELCH 
28586510 ELECTRONIC THEATRE RESTAURANTS 3 5812 19820909 19831213 ETRC 
28656010 ELIAS BROTHERS RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19721214 19811214 ELBS 
29109210 EMERSONS LTD 3 5812 19721214 19760407 EMRS 
44048810 HORN & HARDART BAKING CO 2 5812 19620702 19660505 HNB 
41078310 HANOVER DIRECT INC 2 5812 19620702 20001229 HNV 
30251310 F M S MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INC 3 5812 19721214 19750129 FMSM 
30700410 FAMILY ENTERTAINMENT CTRS INC 3 5812 19820901 19841003 FMLY 
30705610 FAMILY SHOWTIME THEATRES INC 3 5812 19830307 19850508 EATS 
31187010 FAST FOOD OPERATORS INC 3 5812 19810409 19911206 POPI 
63999290 NEDICKS STORES INC 2 5812 19620702 19650527 NSI 
74344710 PROPHET COMPANY 2 5812 19620702 19640526 PRP 
33890310 FLAKEY JAKES INC 3 5812 19831011 19860917 FJAK 
34430810 FOLKS RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19831122 19870108 FOLK 
34475710 FOOD HOST U S A INC 3 5812 19721214 19731121 
34984710 FORUM RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19721214 19830524 FORM 
35803810 THE FRESHER COOKER INC 3 5812 19840511 19850823 FRSH 
35849610 FRIENDLY ICE CREAM CORP 3 5812 19721214 19790409 FICE 
36110910 FURR S CAFETERIAS INC 3 5812 19721214 19800514 FURR 
30709110 FAMOUS RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19811019 19910711 GMEX 
44267210 HOWARD JOHNSON CO 1 5812 19620827 19800617 HJ 
37542410 GILBERT ROBINSON INC 3 5812 19721214 19781108 GROB 
34056710 FLORIDA CAPITAL CORP 2 5812 19630409 19840221 FCC 
25699090 DOBBS HOUSES INC 1 5812 19630916 19660630 DOB 
40676510 HAMBURGER HAMLETS INC 3 5812 19721214 19880512 HAMB 
41240510 HARDWICKE COMPANIES INC 3 5812 19721214 19830921 
43357310 HISTORIC SMITHVILLE INNS INC 3 5812 19730518 19741115 HSTS 
43611910 HOLLYS INC 3 5812 19800620 19850625 HLLY 
24870310 DENNYS INC 1 5812 19651005 19850125 DEN 
44555210 HUNGRY TIGER INC 3 5812 19721222 19851127 HTIG 
58013510 MCDONALDS CORP 1 5812 19660705 20001229 MCD 
45973010 INTERNATIONAL KINGS TABLE INC 3 5812 19760405 19880503 IKNG 
91890510 VALHIINCNEW 1 5812 19671023 20001229 VHI 
39151410 GREAT WESTERN UNITED CORP 1 5812 19680116 19780221 GWU 
86605610 SUMMIT FAMILY RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19721214 19960715 SMFR 
46639910 JACKS FOOD SYS INC 3 5812 19721214 19740805 
44107410 HOST INTERNATIONAL INC 1 5812 19680627 19820303 HII 
47650210 JERRICOINC 3 5812 19721214 19900518 JERR 
1.256E+14 C K E RESTAURANTS INC 1 5812 19811015 20001229 CKR 
48811910 KELLY JOHNSTON ENTERPRISES INC 3 5812 19810701 19850910 KEJO 
91926910 VALLES STEAK HOUSE 2 5812 19690122 19821012 VLE 
49705410 KINNARD COMPANIES INC 3 5812 19800116 19811228 KCNI 
84750710 SPECIALTY RESTAURANT CORP 2 5812 19700109 19810129 SRC 
37610910 GINOSINC 1 5812 19700130 19820204 GNO 
54302610 LONGCHAMPSINC 3 5812 19721214 19731206 
39154610 GREATER BAY CASINO CORP DEL 2 5812 19700528 19980102 GBY 
79587210 SAMBO S RESTAURANTS INC 1 5812 19700701 19811210 SRI 
8874010 BICKFORDCORP 2 5812 19701201 19820602 BIK 
57790310 MAX &ERMAS RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19831005 20001229 MAXE 
14574410 CARROLS CORP 1 5812 19710223 19861222 CRL 
73243610 PONDEROSA INC 1 5812 19710830 19870122 PON 
23905510 DAVIS FOOD SVC INC 2 5812 19720224 19730828 DAV 
60453510 MINUTE MAN AMER INC 3 5812 19721214 19850206 MMAN 
78118210 RUBY TUESDAY INC 1 5812 19721214 20001229 RI 
41170210 HARDEES FOOD SYS INC 1 5812 19721009 19810129 H 
72584110 PIZZA CORP AMER 2 5812 19721110 19740926 PZA 
63003010 NANKIN EXPRESS INC 3 5812 19831012 19860319 NKIN 
72584510 PIZZA HUT INC DE 1 5812 19721130 19771107 PIZ 
63234610 NATHANS FAMOUS INC 3 5812 19721214 19870723 NATO 
83013910 SIZZLER INTERNATIONAL INC 1 5812 19721214 20001229 SZ 
62936030 N P C INTERNATIONAL INC 3 5812 19840814 20001229 NPCI 
63906810 NAUGLES INC 3 5812 19811029 19860728 NAUG 
35874810 FRISCHS RESTAURANTS INC 2 5812 19721214 20001229 FRS 
65510710 NOBLE ROMANS INC 3 5812 19830531 19970620 NROM 
78659910 SAGA CORP 1 5812 19721214 19860620 SGA 
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40918410 HAMPTON HEALTHCARE INC 2 5812 19721214 19880718 HHI 
84679010 SPARTAN FOOD SYS INC 1 5812 19721214 19790710 SF 
17158310 CHURCHS FRIED CHICKEN INC 1 5812 19721214 19890921 CHU 
68241010 1 POTATO 2 INC 3 5812 19830629 19860203 SPUD 
44562810 HUNT INTERNATIONAL RES CORP 1 5812 19780419 19791002 HI 
69372710 PACEMASTER INC 3 5812 19721214 19760109 PCMS 
72584710 PIZZA INN INC 2 5812 19721214 19870728 PZA 
70285410 PASTA KING INC 3 5812 19771013 19780922 PSTA 
71406710 PERKINS FOODS INC 3 5812 19760819 19780515 
71956710 PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS INC 1 5812 19790130 20001229 PIC 
72028410 PIER 39 INC 3 5812 19721214 19800521 PIER 
95059010 WENDYS INTERNATIONAL INC 1 5812 19760609 20001229 WEN 
72584310 PIZZA ENTERTAINMENT CENTERS INC 3 5812 19811216 19841106 FUNN 
72590010 PIZZA TIME THEATRE INC 3 5812 19810416 19840518 CHKY 
72590110 PIZZA VENTURES INC 3 5812 19811016 19830902 PVEN 
73020510 PO FOLKS INC 3 5812 19831013 19880208 POFO 
54928210 LUBYS INC 1 5812 19730131 20001229 LUB 
74157910 PRIMEFAX INC 3 5812 19830801 19840626 PFAX 
74162410 PRIMO INC 3 5812 19840206 19870428 PRMO 
53219710 LIFESTYLE RESTAURANTS INC 2 5812 19721214 19870911 LIF 
74924510 R A X RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19830714 19920521 RAXRA 
75188310 RANCH HOUSE AMER INC 3 5812 19721214 19740221 
87242210 T G 丨 FRIDAYS INC 1 5812 19831208 19900220 TGI 
28406110 ELTORITO RESTAURANTS INC 1 5812 19840119 19861222 ET 
76122310 RESOURCES WEST INC 3 5812 19781218 19850724 RWES 
76126210 RESTAURANT SYSTEMS INC 3 5812 19830929 19851227 RSYS 
46609610 J ALEXANDERS CORP 1 5812 19721214 20001229 JAX 
80584410 SBARRO INC 1 5812 19850508 19990928 SBA 
78015510 ROYAL CASTLE SYS INC 3 5812 19721214 19770815 RYCS 
78318010 RUSTY PELICAN RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19831014 19871119 RSTY 
78351910 RYANS FAMILY STEAK HOUSES INC 3 5812 19820713 20001229 RYAN 
76125220 RESTAURANT ASSOCIATES INDS INC 2 5812 19850903 19871120 RA 
78390610 S C B RESTAURANT SYSTEMS 3 5812 19831216 19850605 SSCB 
58040010 MCFADDIN VENTURES INC 2 5812 19831215 19890629 MV 
81137710 SEA GALLEY STORES INC 3 5812 19801202 19910128 SEAG 
81143710 SEA WORLD INC 3 5812 19721214 19770726 SEAW 
82503910 SHONEYSINC 1 5812 19721214 20000711 SHN 
82504110 SHONEYS SOUTH INC 3 5812 19830616 19880914 SHNS 
83071510 SKIPPERS INC 3 5812 19810519 19891130 SKIP 
71406310 PERKINS FAMILY RESTAURANTS LP 1 5812 19861009 19971222 PFR 
84305720 SOUTHERN HOSPITALITY CORP 3 5812 19721214 19920421 SHOS 
34483910 FOODMAKERINCNEW 1 5812 19870224 19881202 JIB 
84890110 SPORTS RESTAURANT INC 3 5812 19831202 19860319 SPTS 
85787010 STEAK & ALE RESTAURANTS AMER 3 5812 19721214 19760603 STKL 
12769810 CAFES ONE L P 1 5812 19870122 19891215 USF 
87242010 T G I F T E X A S I N C 3 5812 19831208 19870616 TEXF 
87342410 TACOBELL 3 5812 19721214 19780621 
87342710 TACO CHARLEY INC 3 5812 19811102 19830204 TACC 
24549310 DEL TACO RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19831128 19910911 DETA 
41163240 HARD ROCK INTERNATIONAL PLC 2 5812 19870423 19880915 HRK 
90206810 TWO PESOS INC 2 5812 19870206 19930714 TWP 
83079840 SKOLNIKS INC 3 5812 19880429 19941221 SKNS 
12513710 C E C ENTERTAINMENT INC 1 5812 19890103 20001229 CEC 
21628420 COOKER RESTAURANT CORP 2 5812 19890613 20001213 CGR 
16090210 CHART HOUSE ENTERPRISES INC 1 5812 19890829 20001229 CHT 
87224510 T C B Y ENTERPRISES INC 1 5812 19840328 20000531 TBY 
88852810 TITUS FOODS INC 3 5812 19830517 19840419 TIFI 
56034530 MAIN STREET & MA丨N INC 3 5812 19900822 20001229 MAIN 
88910310 TOKYO BOWL RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19840409 19840926 TKYO 
36111510 FURRS BISHOPS INC 1 5812 19910502 19960102 CHI 
68989910 OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE INC 1 5812 19910618 20001229 OSI 
44962310 I H O P C O R P N E W 1 5812 19910712 20001229 IHP 
46636710 JACK IN THE BOX INC 1 5812 19920305 20001229 JBX 
61942910 MORTONS RESTAURANT GROUP INC 1 5812 19920603 20001229 MRG 
23833010 DAVCO RESTAURANTS INC 2 5812 19930810 19980331 DVC 
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51508L10 LANDRYS SEAFOOD RESTAURANTS INC 1 5812 19930819 20001229 LNY 
91729010 USACAFES 2 5812 19831116 19861231 USF 
87217310 T B A ENTERTAINMENT CORP 2 5812 19940216 20001229 TBA 
92581710 VICORP RESTAURANTS INC 3 5812 19820826 20001229 VRES 
97989930 WOODROAST SYSTEMS INC 3 5812 19940607 19980921 WRSI 
92628610 VICTORIA STATION INC 3 5812 19721214 19860421 VSTA 
71913210 PHOENIX RESTAURANT GROUP INC 2 5812 19941018 20001229 PRG 
90331R10 U S FOODSERVICE 1 5812 19941116 20000412 UFS 
23719410 DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC 1 5812 19950530 20001229 DRI 
23833N10 DAVE & BUSTERS INC 1 5812 19950630 20001229 DAB 
96188810 WETSONS CORP 3 5812 19721214 19731018 
36111560 FURRS RESTAURANT GROUP INC 2 5812 19960130 20001229 FRG 
61847810 MORRISON RESTAURANTS INC NEW 1 5812 19960311 19980731 MRN 
61845910 MORRISON MANAGEMENT SPEC INC 1 5812 19960311 20001229 MHI 
72702510 PLANET HOLLYWOOD INTL INC 1 5812 19960419 19990817 PHL 
98909810 ZAPATA FOODS INC 3 5812 19721214 19740719 ZAPA 
89595310 TRICON GLOBAL RESTAURANTS INC 1 5812 19971007 20001229 YUM 
35849710 FRIENDLY ICE CREAM CORP NEW 2 5812 19971114 20001229 FRN 
73316740 POPMAILCOMINC 3 5812 19971117 20001229 POPM 
11988210 BUFFETS INC 3 5812 19851025 20001002 BOCB 
12432010 BYERS INC 3 5812 19851126 19890823 BYRS 
23322D10 DLITESOFAMER INC 3 5812 19840919 19860806 DLIT 
68386P10 OPTICARE HEALTH SYSTEMS INC 2 5812 19990920 20001229 OPT 
28382910 ELPOLLOASADOINC 3 5812 19841018 19890912 EPAI 
50101410 KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS INC 3 5812 20000405 20001229 KREM 
13054D10 CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN INC 3 5812 20000802 20001229 CPKI 
84632910 SPAGHETTI WAREHOUSE INC 1 5812 19850926 19990122 SWH 
72585310 PIZZA TRANSPORT AUTH INC 3 5812 19850307 19861212 PTAI 
76126110 RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT SVCS INC 3 5812 19841101 19881031 RESM 
98881010 ZABS BACKYARD HOTS INC 3 5812 19850918 19870331 ZABS 
74467810 PUDGIES CHICKEN INC 3 5820 19950810 19970709 PUDG 
92224210 VARIFLEX INC 3 5890 19940617 20001229 VFLX 
05534G10 B C E MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS INC 1 7000 19960910 19991022 BCX 
00929H10 AIRCOA HOSPITALITY SVCS INC 3 7010 19860307 19900503 AIRC 
50101110 KRISCH AMERICAN INNS INC 3 7010 19861017 19920423 INNS 
03070D20 AMERIHOST PROPERTIES INC 3 7010 19870526 20001229 HOST 
18986910 COACHMAN INC 3 7010 19870817 19900713 CINC 
11145010 BROADWAY HOLDINGS INC 3 7010 19871210 19900525 BWAY 
48284510 KAHLER REALTY CORP 3 7010 19721214 19960813 KHLR 
48113930 JOURNEYS END RESORTS INC 3 7010 19910619 19930604 JERI 
82503410 SHOLODGEINC 3 7010 19920212 20001229 LODG 
35967810 FULL HOUSE RESORTS INC 3 7010 19930817 20001229 FHRI 
9661210 BOARDWALK CASINO INC 3 7010 19940214 19980630 BWLK 
11835A10 BUCKHEAD AMERICA CORP 3 7010 19940428 20001229 BUCK 
86852410 SUPERTEL HOSPITALITY INC 3 7010 19940426 19991026 SPPR 
47045710 JAMESON INNS INC 3 7010 19940127 20001229 JAMS 
25862410 DOUBLETREE CORP 3 7010 19940701 19971218 TREE 
05873J10 BALLYS GRAND INC 3 7010 19940801 19980326 BGLV 
16139F10 CHARTWELL LEISURE INC 3 7010 19941128 19980325 CHRT 
89337510 TRANS WORLD GAMING CORP 3 7010 19941215 19970624 IBET 
86400310 STUDIO PLUS HOTELS INC 3 7010 19950621 19970411 SPHI 
86444410 SUBURBAN LODGES AMERICA INC 3 7010 19960523 20001229 SLAM 
43740G10 HOMEGATE HOSPITALITY INC 3 7010 19961024 19971202 HMGT 
90295630 U S FRANCHISE SYSTEMS INC 3 7010 19961025 20001116 USPS 
13741M10 CANDLEWOOD HOTEL COMPANY INC 3 7010 19961105 20001229 CNDL 
82668020 SIGNATURE INNS INC 3 7010 19970121 19990507 SONS 
64156G10 NEVSTAR GAMING &ENTMT CORP 3 7010 19970919 19991202 NVST 
47102C10 JANUS HOTELS AND RESORTS INC 3 7010 19980122 20001229 JAGI 
46088R10 INTERSTATE HOTEL CORP 3 7010 19990618 20001229 IHCO 
78440610 S K I L T D 3 7010 19851119 19960628 SKII 
144410 A 丨TSINC 3 7011 19721214 19741016 AITS 59000K10 MERITAGE HOSPITALITY GROUP INC 2 7011 19870318 20001229 MHG 
44966150 I L X RESORTS INC 2 7011 19880216 20001229 ILX 
55295310 M G M MIRAGE 1 7011 19880502 20001229 MGG 
76714710 RIO HOTEL & CAS丨NO INC 1 7011 19840604 19981231 RHC 
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55301210 M G M GRAND HOTELS INC 1 7011 19620702 19860425 GRH 
2714810 AMERICAN LEISURE CORP DE 3 7011 19800325 19840706 AMCO 
2715030 AMERICAN LEISURE CORP NJ 3 7011 19811001 19840706 AMCO 
3034610 AMERICAN UNITED INNS INC 3 7011 19721220 19731204 
82344990 SHERATON CORP AMER 1 7011 19620702 19680228 SHR 
83543840 SONESTA INTERNATIONAL HOTELS CP 3 7011 19620702 20001229 SNSTA 
4933910 ATLAS HOTELS INC 3 7011 19721214 19820223 AHTL 
43284810 HILTON HOTELS CORP 1 7011 19620702 20001229 HLT 
17239910 CINDYS INC 3 7011 19721214 19840306 CNDY 
26120110 DOWNTOWNER CORP 3 7011 19721214 19730814 
49922410 KNOTT HOTELS CORP 2 7011 19620702 19760923 KNT 
30223410 EXTECH CORP 3 7011 19781204 19920819 EXTH 
30303010 FABULOUS INNS AMER 3 7011 19830829 19880808 FABS 
75628110 RECRION CORP 2 7011 19620702 19740814 RCN 
89345110 TRANSAIRCO INC 2 7011 19620702 19740905 TRS 
89454610 TREADWAY COMPANIES INC 2 7011 19620702 19810730 TCO 
76118510 RESORTS INTERNATIONAL INC 2 7011 19630522 19881114 RT 
76118520 RESORTS INTERNATIONAL INC 2 7011 19630522 19880111 RT 
94742310 WEBB DELAWARE CORP 1 7011 19630819 20001229 WBB 
43507110 HOLIDAY CORP 1 7011 19630930 19900207 HIA 
39154110 GREATER BAY CASINO CORP 3 7011 19790531 19850417 GBAYA 
89358710 TRANSCONTINENTAL INVESTING CORP 1 7011 19640902 19720307 TIK 
43285690 HILTON INTLCO 1 7011 19641202 19670509 HIN 
44856410 HYATT CORP 3 7011 19721214 19790205 HYAT 
44858210 HYATT INTERNATIONAL CORP 3 7011 19721214 19820212 HINTA 
45825410 INTER ISLAND RESORTS LTD 3 7011 19721214 19820907 ISLD 
75132810 RAMADA INNS INC 1 7011 19670920 19891220 RAM 
95845110 WESTERN INTERNATIONAL HOTELS CO 2 7011 19681205 19700731 WIH 
2759110 AMERICAN MOTOR INNS INC 2 7011 19690623 19850102 INN 
12769510 CAESARS WORLD INC 1 7011 19691015 19950302 CAW 
44107010 HOST ENTERPRISES INC 2 7011 19691203 19720804 HOS 
98213510 WRATHER CORP 2 7011 19691212 19880120 WCO 
56633010 MARCUS CORP 1 7011 19721214 20001229 MCS 
78030810 ROYAL INNS AMER INC 2 7011 19701109 19730223 ROA 
89420610 TRAVELODGEINTNATIONAL INC 3 7011 19710222 19781010 TRVL 
91068810 UNITED INNS INC 1 7011 19720327 19950120 U1 
74156210 P R I M E MOTOR INNS INC 1 7011 19720330 19920731 PDQ 
STARWOOD HOTELS & REST WLDWD 
85590A20 INC 1 7011 19720503 20001229 HOT 
44190010 HOSPITALITY MOTOR INNS INC 2 7011 19720928 19790209 HMN 
82539010 SHOWBOAT INC 1 7011 19730216 19980601 SBO 
66718810 NORTHVIEWCORP 3 7011 19721214 19871229 NOVC 
05873C10 BALLY ENTERTAINMENT CORP 1 7011 19721214 19961218 BLY 
50419510 LAQUINTAINNSINC 1 7011 19730403 19980717 LQI 
29030820 ELSINORECORP 2 7011 19790301 19951031 ELS 
74757110 QUALITY INNS INTL INC 2 7011 19721214 19801128 INQ 
12769010 CAESARS NEW JERSEY INC 2 7011 19781121 19901130 CJN 
72133110 PIKES PEAK SKI CORP 3 7011 19830830 19840430 PSKI 
45794810 INTEGRA A HOTEL & RESTAURANT CO 1 7011 19800618 19911205 FTG 
3056210 AMER丨CANA HOTELS & REALTY CORP 1 7011 19821104 19970218 AHR 
5873510 BALLYSPARKPLINC 1 7011 19790723 19860612 BPP 
56256710 MANDALAY RESORT GROUP 1 7011 19831025 20001229 MBG 
44144510 HOTEL PROPERTIES INC 2 7011 19760430 19860915 HPS 
68590510 ORIENT EXPRESS HOTELS INC 1 7011 19840330 19940630 OEH 
18947010 CLUB MED INC 1 7011 19840925 19950801 CMI 
80190410 SANTA FE GAMING CORP 2 7011 19830616 19990401 SGM 
25537410 DIVI HOTELS N V 2 7011 19860905 19911127 DVH 
81764710 SERVICOINC 3 7011 19721214 19890426 SRVI 
50419610 LA QUINTA MTR INNS LTD PRTNR 1 7011 19861015 19940125 LQP 
61974410 MOTEL 6 LP 1 7011 19861031 19900814 SIX 
74156320 PRIME MOTOR INNS LTD PARTNERSHIP 1 7011 19861217 19970620 PMP 
84174810 SOUTHEASTERN INNS CORP 3 7011 19721214 19731127 
84379710 SOUTHERN SCOTTISH INNS INC 3 7011 19721214 19731204 
84522210 SOUTHWEST SCOTTISH INNS INC 3 7011 19721214 19750319 SWSC 
85038810 SPRINGER CORP 3 7011 19721214 19730802 
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1989110 ALLSTAR INNS L P 2 7011 19870330 19920501 SAI 
75670210 RED LION INNS LTD PNTR 2 7011 19870408 19980522 RED 
929310 AIRCOA HOTEL PARTNERS L P 2 7011 19870723 19970929 AHT 
44379420 HUDSON HOTELS CORP 3 7011 19890406 20001229 HDDS 
5480210 AZTAR CORP 1 7011 19891221 20001229 AZR 
6990420 BASS PLC 1 7011 19900213 20001229 BAS 
39818910 GRIFFIN GAMING & ENTMT INC 2 7011 19901009 19961216 GGE 
38526910 GRAND CASINOS INC 1 7011 19911009 19981231 GND 
13119310 CALLAWAY GOLF CO 1 7011 19920228 20001229 ELY 
54021P10 LODGIANINC 1 7011 19920818 20001229 LOD 
74191710 PRIME HOSPITALITY CORP 1 7011 19920827 20001229 PDQ 
40418110 H F S I N C 1 7011 19921210 19971217 HFS 
57190310 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC NEW 1 7011 19931012 19980520 MAR 
91854710 VACATION SPA RESORTS INC 3 7011 19721214 19930107 VSPA 
41782610 HARVEYS CASINO RESORTS 1 7011 19940215 19990202 HVY 
P8797T13 SUN INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD 1 7011 19960227 20001229 SIH 
40049010 GRUPO SIDEK S A DE C V 1 7011 19940712 19970307 SDK 
40862310 HAMMONS JOHN Q HOTELS INC 2 7011 19941117 20001229 JQH 
74342P10 PROMUS HOTEL CORP NEW 1 7011 19950703 19991130 PRH 
89816810 TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESRTS INC 1 7011 19950607 20001229 DJT 
75670110 RED LION HOTELS INC 1 7011 19950727 19961108 RL 
N7368910 RENAISSANCE HOTEL GROUP NV 1 7011 19950927 19970327 RHG 
95958820 WESTERN STANDARD CORP 3 7011 19721214 19730213 
30224P10 EXTENDED STAY AMERICA INC 1 7011 19951214 20001229 ESA 
11004110 BRISTOL HOTELS & RESORTS INC 1 7011 19951213 20000331 BH 
44091410 HOST MARRIOTT SERVICES CORP 1 7011 19960102 19990901 HMS 
75700510 RED ROOF INNS INC 1 7011 19960201 19990812 RRI 
76962710 RIVIERA HOLDINGS CORP 2 7011 19960513 20001229 RIV 
98310010 WYNDHAM HOTEL CORP 1 7011 19960521 19980105 WYN 
46088610 INTERSTATE HOTELS CO 1 7011 19960620 19980601 IHC 
14091810 CAPSTAR HOTEL CO 1 7011 19960820 19980731 CHO 
86787D10 SUNTERRACORP 1 7011 19960815 20000530 OWN 
86694810 SUNBURST HOSPITALITY CORP 1 7011 19961104 20001229 SNB 
91879Q10 VAIL RESORTS INC 1 7011 19970204 20001229 MTN 
92924B10 W H G RESORTS & CASINOS INC 1 7011 19970422 19980116 WHO 
16990510 CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL INC 1 7011 19971016 20001229 CHH 
57190320 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC NEW 1 7011 19980330 20001229 MAR 
83379310 SODEXHO MARRIOTT SVCS 1 7011 19980330 20001229 SDH 
95750P10 WESTCOAST HOSPITALITY CORP 1 7011 19980403 20001229 WEH 
76118310 RESORTQUEST INTERNATIONAL INC 1 7011 19980520 20001229 RZT 
58998810 MERISTAR HOTELS & RESORTS 丨NC 1 7011 19980803 20001229 MMH 22615310 CRESTLINE CAPITAL CORP 1 7011 19981230 20001229 CU 70069010 PARK PLACE ENTERTAINMENT CORP 1 7011 19990104 20001229 PPE 23962420 DAYS INNS CORP 3 7011 19851231 19880607 DAYS 
G6774310 ORIENT EXPRESS HOTELS INC 1 7011 20000810 20001229 OEH 
30150K10 EXECUSTAY CORP 3 7020 19970827 19990301 EXEC 
10845210 BRIDGESTREET ACCOMMODATIONS INC 2 7021 19970925 20000531 BDS 
2368520 AMERICAN ADVENTURE INC 3 7030 19870326 19871106 AAIX 
1663410 ALL SEASONS RESORTS INC 3 7030 19840313 19900409 ALSE 
CHANNEL AMERICA BROADCASTING 
15891310 INC 3 7030 19770429 19961106 CATV 
15100510 CELEBRITY RESORTS INC 3 7030 19900814 19921201 CELE 
37890450 GLOBAL OUTDOORS INC 3 7030 19900307 19970730 GLRS 
92229410 VARSITY SPIRIT CORP 3 7030 19920128 19970725 VARS 
15092460 CELEBRITY ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 7030 19940218 19970505 CLEB 
14376110 CAROLANDOCORP 3 7032 19730302 19731001 CROL 
2368510 AMERICAN ADVENTURE INC 3 7033 19810818 19870325 GOAA 
60737910 MOBILE HOME CMNTYS INC 3 7033 19721214 19740103 
88550010 THOUSAND TRAILS INC 3 7033 19791212 19940329 TRLS 
91288510 UNFTED STATES VACATN RESORTS INC 3 7033 19831213 19860922 USVR 
88550210 THOUSAND TRAILS INC DEL 2 7033 19981204 20001229 TRV 
53840510 LIVING WELL INC 3 7040 19840918 19880526 WELL 
51766930 LAS VEGAS ENTERTAINMENT NTWK INC 3 7110 19920220 19991015 LVEN 
MILLENNIUM SPORTS MANAGEMENT 
59990720 INC 3 7900 19930924 19990310 MSPT 
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89272110 TRAFFIX INC 3 7900 19951206 20001229 TRFX 
55972X10 MAGNUM SPORTS & ENTMNT INC 3 7900 19961024 20001229 MAGZ 
68219Q10 ON STAGE ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 7900 19970814 19991026 ONST 
56118410 MALIBU GRAND PRIX CORP 3 7910 19840413 19890426 MGPC 
64881910 NEW STAR ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 7920 19860606 19891228 MOVY 
46090710 INTRAVISION INC 3 7920 19840709 19860609 VISN 
48102110 JOSEPHSON INTERNATIONAL INC 3 7920 19721214 19880721 JSON 
26791210 DYNA GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC 3 7920 19890227 19980728 DGK 
82508110 SHOP TELEVISION NETWORK INC 3 7920 19900803 19920511 STNP 
42193410 HEALTH CLUB TELEVISION NETWK INC 3 7920 19910111 19921204 HCTV 
74090620 PREMIERE RADIO NETWORKS INC DEL 3 7920 19920429 19970612 PRNI 
74090610 PREMIERE RADIO NETWORKS INC DEL 3 7920 19960126 19970612 PRNIA 
3018810 AMERICAN TELNET CORP 3 7922 19800501 19840127 TNET 
62752510 MUSIC FAIR ENTERPRISES INC 3 7922 19721214 19731108 
62754210 MUSIC MAKERS GROUP INC 3 7922 19721214 19730326 
74955910 R HI ENTERTAINMENT INC 2 7922 19920729 19940706 RHE 
96181510 WESTWOOD ONE INC 1 7922 19840424 20001229 WON 
39944Q10 GROUPE A B SA 1 7922 19961212 20001229 ABG 
55890910 MAGICWORKS ENTERTAINMENT INC 2 7922 19970610 19980911 MJK 
9946910 BOOTS & COOTS INTL WELL CTRL INC 2 7922 19980130 20001229 WEL 
78417810 S F X ENTERTAINMENT INC 1 7922 19980428 20000801 SFX 
49566710 KING WORLD PRODUCTIONS INC 1 7922 19841205 19991115 KWP 
24120910 DE LAURENTIIS ENTMT GROUP INC 2 7929 19860530 19890822 DEG 
56118210 MALIBU ENTNMT WORLDWIDE INC 2 7929 19931103 20000623 MBE 
97655110 WIRTZ PRODUCTIONS LTD 3 7929 19721214 19730907 
26008610 DOVER DOWNS ENTERTAINMENT INC 1 7929 19961004 20001229 DVD 
14165810 CARE MED CENTERS INC 3 7930 19900531 19901128 CMCI 
15956710 CHARAN INDUSTRIES INC 2 7932 19620702 19740805 CHV 
2919510 AMERICAN RECREATION CTRS INC 3 7933 19721214 19970424 AMRC 
20589120 CONBOW CORP 3 7933 19721214 19760517 CBOW 
39074810 GREAT LAKES RECCO 2 7933 19620702 19810121 GBW 
30326120 FAIR LANES INC 3 7933 19721214 19870326 FAIR 
10256510 BOWL AMERICA INC 2 7933 19721214 20001229 BWL 
10488210 BRAINERD INTERNATIONAL INC 3 7940 19860127 19951229 BIRI 
84917910 SPORTS ENTERTAINMENT GROUP INC 3 7940 19880419 19890823 SEGI 
10537010 BRANDYWINE SPORTS INC 3 7940 19771014 19871015 BRDY 
62574410 MULTNOMAH KENNEL CLUB 3 7940 19801224 19910703 MKNL 
85318110 STANDARD BRED PACERS & TROTTER 3 7940 19800912 19871112 STBD 
30315310 FAIR GROUNDS CORP 3 7940 19901116 19940228 FGNO 
17148410 CHURCHILL DOWNS INC 3 7940 19930329 20001229 CHDN 
70756910 PENN NATIONAL GAMING INC 3 7940 19940526 20001229 PENN 
1.381E+14 CANTERBURY PARK HOLDING CORP 3 7940 19941205 20001229 TRAK 
70959810 PENSKE MOTORSPORTS INC 3 7940 19960327 19990726 SPWY 
38617610 GRAND PRIX ASSOC LONG BEACH INC 3 7940 19960625 19980630 GPLB 
46033520 INTERNATIONAL SPEEDWAY CORP 3 7940 19961105 20001229 ISCA 
68654510 ORLANDO PREDATORS ENTRTNMT INC 3 7940 19971211 20001229 PRED 
18620210 CLEVELAND INDIANS BASEBALL CO 3 7940 19980604 20000215 CLEV 
55826020 MADISON SQUARE GARDEN CORP 1 7941 19620702 19770819 MSG 
30253310 FN I INC 3 7941 19721214 19850311 FNOR 
84916910 SPORTS ARENAS INC 2 7941 19620702 19661206 SAR 
60231910 MILWAUKEE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 3 7941 19721214 19760421 MPSS 
10057710 BOSTON CELTICS LTD PARTNERSHIP 1 7941 19861204 20001229 BOS 
98148810 WORLD JAIALAI INC 3 7941 19731022 19781122 WJAL 
57090610 MARQUEE GROUP INC 2 7941 19961213 19990316 MRT 
98156Q10 WORLD WRESTLING FED ENTMT INC 1 7941 19991019 20001229 WWF 
13036110 CALIFORNIA JOCKEY CLUB 3 7948 19721214 19861113 CJOC 
10536710 BRANDYWINE RACEWAY ASSN INC 2 7948 19620702 19700602 BRA 
14857310 CASTLETON INDUSTRIES INC 2 7948 19620702 19780531 CII 
29443310 EQUINETICS INC 3 7948 19811028 19840719 EQNT 
77657610 ROOSEVELT RACEWAY INC 2 7948 19620702 19710310 RR 
98613210 YONKERS RACEWAY INC 2 7948 19620702 19720615 YR 
72345610 PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT GROUP INC 1 7948 19721214 20001229 PNK 
79840710 SAN JUAN RACING ASSN INC 1 7948 19680318 19891207 SJR 
54421410 LOS ALAMITOS RACE COURSE 3 7948 19721214 19840810 LARC 
59920710 MILE HIGH KENNEL CLUB 3 7948 19721214 19760818 MKENA 
166 
60971110 MONMOUTH PARK JOCKEY CLUB 3 7948 19721214 19770831 MJOC 
62574420 MULTNOMAH KENNEL CLUB 3 7948 19801224 19870921 MKNLB 
97314320 WINCORP REALTY INVTS 2 7948 19721227 19841207 WRP 
80120610 SANTA ANITA CONS INC 3 7948 19721214 19791231 
90008410 TURF PARADISE INC 3 7948 19730131 19940811 TURF 
55376910 M T R GAMING GROUP 3 7948 19921207 20001229 MNTG 
29492910 EQUUS GAMING CO L P 3 7948 19950207 20001229 EQUUS 
84778810 SPEEDWAY MOTORSPORTS INC 1 7948 19950224 20001229 TRK 
96925820 WILLIAM PENN RACING ASSN 3 7948 19721214 19780103 
19574610 COLONIAL HOLDINGS INC 3 7948 19970318 20001018 CHLD 
03113V10 A M F BOWLING INC 1 7948 19971104 20001114 PIN 
15871110 CHAMPIONSHIP AUTO RACING TM INC 1 7948 19980310 20001229 MPH 
2538910 AMERICAN DISPOSAL SERVICES INC 3 7950 19960725 19981015 ADSI 
39000520 GREAT AMERICAN RECREATION INC 3 7990 19860214 19950823 GRAR 
91325210 UNITELCORP 3 7990 19860501 19870506 UNTL 
72790310 PLAYERS INTERNATIONAL INC 3 7990 19861117 20000322 PLAY 
37931N20 GLOBAL CASINOS INC 3 7990 19870731 19990707 GBCS 
60627610 MISSOURI RIVER SERVICES INC 3 7990 19881216 19900119 MRSI 
15962010 CHARGIT INC 3 7990 19831130 19870506 CHGT 
01859P60 ALLIANCE GAMING CORP 3 7990 19781102 20001229 ALLY 
82524L10 SHORTTAKES INC 3 7990 19891116 19910711 STAK 
04530J30 ASPEN MARINE GROUP INC 3 7990 19900126 19940426 AMGI 
2632510 AMERICAN GAMING & ENTMT LTD 3 7990 19900621 19950508 AGEL 
72812910 PLAYORENA INC 3 7990 19900330 19921204 PLEX 
36865110 GEMINEX INDUSTRIES INC 3 7990 19900417 19910513 GEMX 
24790820 DELTA RENTAL SYSTEMS INC 3 7990 19901001 19910104 CRUZ 
14018010 CAPITAL GAMING INTL INC 3 7990 19901123 19950705 GDFI 
73932310 POWERHOUSE TECHNOLOGIES INC 3 7990 19910724 19990629 PWRH 
51827W10 LATIN AMERICAN CASINOS INC 3 7990 19911212 20001229 LACI 
2492810 AMERICAN CLASSIC VOYAGES CO 3 7990 19920305 20001229 AMCV 
92038310 VALUE ADDED COMMUNICATIONS INC 3 7990 19920812 19950221 VACI 
2083910 ALPINE MEADOWS OF TAHOE INC 3 7990 19921001 19940513 PDRR 
9858810 BOOMTOWN INC 3 7990 19921023 19970630 BMTN 
14759010 CASINO MAGIC CORP 3 7990 19921023 19981015 CMAG 
74082230 PRESIDENT CASINOS INC 3 7990 19921211 19981119 PREZ 
97607210 WINTER SPORTS INC 3 7990 19930121 19971217 WSKI 
14761710 CASINOS U S A INC 3 7990 19930219 19930219 CSUS 
36465L10 GAMING CORP OF AMERICA 3 7990 19930222 19951128 GCAM 
9206710 BLACK HAWK GAMING & DEV CO INC 3 7990 19930513 20001229 BHWK 
54225210 LONE STAR CASINO CORP 3 7990 19930617 19950816 LONE 
74154810 PRIMADONNA RESORTS INC 3 7990 19930622 19990226 PRMA 
25468B10 DISCOVERY ZONE INC 3 7990 19930604 19960521 ZONE 
50582030 LADY LUCK GAMING CORP 3 7990 19930929 20000302 LUCK 
46591620 IWERKS ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 7990 19931019 20001101 IWRK 
57634530 MASTER GLAZIERS KARATE INTL INC 3 7990 19931018 19980528 KICK 
2073210 ALPHA HOSPITALITY CORP 3 7990 19931105 20001229 ALHY 
15649210 CENTURY CASINOS INC 3 7990 19931110 20001229 CNTY 
03070Q10 AMERISTAR CASINOS INC 3 7990 19931109 20001229 ASCA 
84467610 SOUTHSHORE CORP THE 3 7990 19931207 19951205 SHSO 
3303710 ANCHOR GAMING 3 7990 19940128 20001229 SLOT 
83083P10 SKYLINE MULTIMEDIA ENTMT INC 3 7990 19940214 19981202 SKYL 
86310610 STRATOSPHERE CORP 3 7990 19940224 19970428 TOWV 
51769310 LAS VEGAS MAJ LEAGUE SPORTS INC 3 7990 19940407 19950426 LVTD 
36465610 GAMING WORLD INTERNATIONAL LTD 3 7990 19940511 19961224 GWLD 
38551910 GRAND GAMING CORP 3 7990 19940525 19951128 GGCC 
38163310 GOLF ENTERPRISES INC 3 7990 19940713 19960730 GLFE 
46265410 丨RATA INC 3 7990 19940815 19981106 IRATA 
1.724E+14 CINEMA RIDE INC 3 7990 19940927 19980311 MOVE 
30701 AlO FAMILY GOLF CENTERS 3 7990 19941117 20000503 FGCI 
25540810 DIVOT GOLF CORP 3 7990 19941122 19990322 PUTT 
81721A10 SENIOR TOUR PLAYERS DEV INC 3 7990 19941116 19980821 SRTR 
75966Q40 RENAISSANCE ENTERTAINMENT CORP 3 7990 19950127 19981230 FAIR 
19633410 COLORADO CASINO RESORTS INC 3 7990 19950331 19990504 CCRI 
3040510 AMERICAN WAGERING INC 3 7990 19960510 20000803 BETM 
92843010 VISUAL EDGE SYSTEMS 3 7990 19960724 19990715 EDGE 
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38097510 GOLDEN BEAR GOLF INC 3 7990 19960801 19980727 JACK 
88633U10 TICKETMASTER GROUP INC 3 7990 19961119 19980624 TKTM 
51206P10 LAKES GAMING INC 3 7990 19990104 20001229 LACO 
19259710 COINTELCORP 3 7990 19850415 19861120 COTL 
98741310 YOUBET COM 3 7990 19990615 20001229 UBET 
74907710 QUOKKA SPORTS INC 3 7990 19990728 20001229 QKKA 
52541P10 LEISURE TIME CASINOS & RESRTS IN 3 7990 19990917 20001115 LTCR 
88633M10 TICKETS COM INC 3 7990 19991104 20001229 TIXX 
56808810 MARINA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 3 7990 19850123 19971219 MRNCZ 
47742010 JILLIANS ENTERTAINMENT CORP 3 7990 19850723 19970724 QBAL 
56085010 MAJOR VIDEO CORP 3 7990 19831031 19890117 MAJV 
23129710 CURRENCY TECHNOLOGY CORP 3 7993 19810921 19851101 BUCK 
36490410 GAMES NETWORK INC 3 7993 19830823 19840626 GNET 
46639210 JACKPOT ENTERPRISES INC 1 7993 19811001 20001229 J 
41361910 HARRAHS ENTERTAINMENT INC 1 7993 19900226 20001229 HET 
46459210 ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS INC 3 7993 19920914 20001229 ISLE 
4022810 ARGOSY GAMING CO 丨 7993 19930218 20001229 AGY 
43613220 HOLLYWOOD CASINO CORP 2 7993 19930528 20001229 HWD 
85768910 STATION CASINOS INC 1 7993 19930525 20001229 STN 
60902710 MONARCH CASINO & RESORT INC 3 7993 19930806 20001229 MCRI 
10330410 BOYD GAMING CORP 1 7993 19931015 20001229 BYD 
02516B10 AMERICAN COIN MERCHANDISING INC 3 7993 19951016 20001229 AMCN 
59814810 MIDWAY GAMES INC 1 7993 19961030 20001229 MWY 
20034610 COMET ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 7993 19840912 19900531 COMT 
80009110 SANDS REGENT 3 7993 19850131 20001229 SNDS 
790510 ADVENTURE LANDS OF AMERICA INC 3 7996 19781006 19851029 ADLA 
15050110 CEDAR POINT INC 3 7996 19721214 19830729 CEDR 
36101510 FUNTIME INC 3 7996 19721214 19880104 FNTM 
15018510 CEDAR FAIR L P 1 7996 19870423 20001229 FUN 
83001 PI0 SIX FLAGS INC 1 7996 19771028 20001229 PKS 
01643P10 ALL AMERICAN SPORTPARK INC 3 7996 19941221 20001229 AASP 
5266110 AUTHENTIC FITNESS CORP 1 7997 19920(526 1 9991216 ASM 
84917P10 SPORTS CLUB INC 2 7997 19941013 20001229 SCY 
05873K10 BALLY TOTAL FITNESS HOLDING CORP 1 7997 19960110 20001229 BFT 
09688T10 BOCA RESORTS INC 1 7997 19961113 20001229 RST 
60359310 MINI INTERNATIONAL CORP 3 7999 19821110 19861117 MINI 
13465610 CAMPTOWN INDUSTRIES INC 3 7999 19721214 19730516 CPTO 
14790010 CASTLE ENTERTAINMENT INC 3 7999 19820405 19840412 CPRT 
16114610 CHARNITA INC 3 7999 19721214 19730206 CHRN 
26544010 DUNES HOTEL & CASINOS INC 2 7999 19620702 19841002 DHC 
47645710 JEROME MACKEYS JUDO INC 3 7999 19721214 19731120 
49548110 KING INTERNATIONAL CORP 3 7999 19721214 19881010 KITL 
41361510 HARRAHS 1 7999 19720428 19800228 HRR 
6.046E+14 MIRAGE RESORTS INC 1 7999 19780815 20000531 MIR 
78708610 SAHARA CASINO PARTNERS L P 1 7999 19870723 19930930 SAH 
63623G10 NATIONAL GOLF PROPERTIES INC 1 7999 19930812 20001229 TEE 
45876410 INTERLOTT TECHNOLOGIES INC 2 7999 19940414 20001229 ILI 
53759010 LITTLEFIELDCORP 3 7999 19941215 20001229 LTFD 
62545310 MULTIMEDIA GAMES INC 3 7999 19960522 20001229 MGAM 
2965430 AMERICAN SKIING CO 1 7999 19971106 20001229 SKI 
46611Q20 J C C HOLDING CO 2 7999 19981209 20001129 JAZ 
19207810 COELCO LTD 3 7999 19841018 19850422 CLCL 
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